# B R I T I S H  A T T I T U D E S

# T O

# I N D I A N  N A T I O N A L I S M

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by

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A B S T R A C T

This thesis is essentially an analysis of British attitudes towards Indian nationalism between 1922 and 1935. It rests upon the argument that attitudes created paradigms of perception which conditioned responses to events and situations and thus helped to shape the contours of British policy in India. Although resistant to change, attitudes could be and were altered and the consequent paradigm shift facilitated political change.

Books, pamphlets, periodicals, newspapers, private papers of individuals, official records, and the records of some interest groups have been examined to re-create, as far as possible, the structure of beliefs and opinions that existed in Britain with regard to Indian nationalism and its more concrete manifestations, and to discover the social, political, economic and intellectual roots of the beliefs and opinions.

The first chapter is an introductory discussion of attitudes considered as ideological correlates of imperialism. The second chapter deals with British views on the working of Dyarchy in India and Indian demands for further reforms. British reactions to the rise of militant nationalism and the controversy over the Simon Commission are analysed in the third chapter. The fourth chapter is primarily an examination of the responses to the first civil disobedience campaign and the Gandhi-Irwin Pact. The fifth and sixth chapters analyse the debate on the White Paper, the activities of some pressure groups, the role played by the State in moulding public opinion, and the discussions leading up to the 1935 Act. The seventh and final chapter draws together the threads and sets out the conclusions derived from this study.

C O N T E N T S

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## 1: Introduction

This study of British attitudes to Indian nationalism between 1922 and 1935 essentially attempts to answer three basic questions: what were these attitudes; what was their economic, social, political and intellectual context; and, finally, what was the relationship between these attitudes and imperial policy?

Such an investigation seems justifiable on two grounds. First, it will enable the reconstruction, albeit in part, of the structure of beliefs and ideas about the Indian Empire that existed in British society during the period under study. This reconstruction, even if incomplete, can be a means of extending social history (1). Secondly, metropolitan attitudes towards a subject people and their nationalism constitute an important part of the ideological correlates of imperialism. An examination of such attitudes will therefore provide an additional interpretative dimension to the study of the complex geometry of imperialism.

Recent historians of the retreat of the Raj have advanced several reasons. Some have argued that the end of the British Empire in India was virtually predetermined, the decline of the Empire having been programmed, as it were, into the logic of imperialism and its institutions (2). Others have seen the collapse of Empire as stemming from a failure to maintain structures of collaboration, or an

inability to solve problems created by international economic crises (3). Another view is that, far from seeking ways of ending British rule in India (and elsewhere), Britain was attempting to shore up the Raj through increasingly complex political moves, some of which were designed to undermine the strength of nationalism by the development of provincial loci of power (4).

Concentrating as they do on economic and political factors, most of these explanations do not take note of what may be called the psychological or ideological component of imperialism. This is partly because attempts to establish a causal connection between ideas and imperialism necessarily founder on the imprecision inherent in the relationship. That there is a link between the structure of beliefs and imperialism is perhaps self-evident. Imperialism in general, and British imperialism in particular, was accompanied in its various phases by the expression of several ideas and opinions, some supportive of, and some hostile to, imperialism. What, however, is not so clear is the nature of this relationship.

Michael Howard has suggested that the structures of beliefs and ideas in a society 'determined action and perhaps made some actions more likely than others' (5). Corelli Barnett was more emphatic. He has argued that the collapse of British power and the decline of the Empire in the Nineteen Forties was caused by a moral revolution which transformed British character (6). D.K. Fieldhouse, discussing the concept of 'popular imperialism', has advanced the contrary but more plausible view that 'it would be far more accurate to say that imperialism as a state of mind was a shadow cast by the events of imperial expansion than that empire was the product of the imperial idea' (7).

The truth cannot perhaps be discerned by asking whether ideas

determined action or whether imperialism was the progenitor of the imperial idea. It may be that the relationship was more a 'confused mixture of cause and effect' (8). It will be more helpful, therefore, to assume that the relationship between ideas and imperialism was one of interdependence and interaction rather than one of unidirectional causation. If imperialism in practice generated a set of ideas, these ideas in turn set the boundaries of the intellectual matrix within which the various decision-makers were constrained to move. The process was constant, dynamic and reciprocal. Imperial ideology may therefore be seen neither as a cause, nor as a consequence of imperialism, but as one of its significant correlates.

The dominant ideology in any society tends to legitimize, justify, and reproduce or perpetuate the structure of that society. In the case of imperialism too, the dominant ideology performed similar functions in two interrelated but different areas, for, of necessity, imperial ideology had two separate foci: the metropolitan society on the one hand, and the subject society on the other.

In the latter, it was imperial ideology which diminished the need for repression and coercive action to maintain or extend the Empire. The psychological incorporation of a subject people into the imperial system was accomplished in several ways.

The apparently passive acceptance of imperial dominance by the indigenes of a colony was secured by, for example, making them feel inferior to the alien ruling élite (9). Or it was obtained through the dissemination of myths about the permanence of Empire (10). On occasion, imperial hegemony was buttressed by the resurrection or even invention of indigenous traditions (11). Imperial ideology served also to secure local collaborators who helped imperial penetration and later its perpetuation. Such collaborators often had material reasons for

tending to support the Empire, but this tendency was reinforced by ideology. The introduction of the English language and a Western system of education into India, for example, acted to psychologically integrate the new 'Westernized' Indian élite into the imperial system.

While imperial ideology performed this important function of securing the acquiescence of the colonial people, it also helped to reinforce the metropolitan roots of Empire. It was not enough to blunt the hostility of subject people; it was essential also to create an imperial ethos at home to enlist the active support of the necessary minions of Empire, the soldiers and officials who shored up the imperial edifice. The dissemination of imperial ideas and the creation of an imperial spirit enabled the builders of Empire to deflect criticism. This diffusion of the imperial ideology within the metropolitan society was carried out at several levels.

Patrick Dunae has shown, for instance, how between 1870 and 1914 popular literature for boys mirrored British imperial thought and played an important part in promoting an imperial spirit (12). School textbooks also reflected imperial ideas, and rarely contained views critical of Empire, especially in the 'imperial' period (13). Young people were influenced in other ways also. Youth movements conditioned them to accept and cherish the idea of Empire (14).

It may also be relevant to consider in this context Edward Said's concept of 'Orientalism'. According to him, Orientalism was a 'western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient', which prepared the way for imperial armies and administrators (15). In other words, in Said's view, ideas about the Orient enabled the West to exercise cultural hegemony over the East, which in turn permitted political conquest.

Interestingly, as the British Empire was increasingly chal-

lenged by destructive forces, imperialists adopted more vigorous methods to inculcate an imperial ethos among the people of Britain to ensure the survival of the Empire. Organizations such as the Royal Colonial Institute, the League of the Empire, and the Victoria League attempted to promote an imperial ethos through lectures, and activities like the Empire Day Movement (16). Significantly, at a still later stage, the Empire Marketing Board along with the Imperial Institute sought to create an enthusiasm for the Empire by collecting films about it and showing them to the public (17).

Imperial ideology, then, formed one of the important props of Empire. It nurtured the imperial spirit at home and at the same time conditioned the colonial people to perceive the imperial yoke as a boon rather than as a burden.

Nevertheless, not all the ideas that emerged from and during an imperial relationship were ideas that supported the Empire. Antithetical notions, critical of the Empire, could and did emerge.

Society is not homogeneous. It is divided in various ways, and, although the dominant ideas reflect the views and interests of the ruling social strata, other alternative and oppositional ideas can arise from any given social formation. These may spring from other social strata or from the very range of variations available in any given society (18). The dominant ideology may select from the range of ideas and thus exclude alternatives, and the dominant social groups may attempt to inhibit alternative ideas (19). Nevertheless, alternative and oppositional ideas can, subject to social and political forces, exist simultaneously (20). This was true of British imperialism also (21). It gave rise to an imperial ideology, but generated also antithetical ideas. These ideas influenced the way in which British imperialism operated in practice.

An examination of the interrelationship between ideas and British imperialism will therefore provide a more complete picture of the British Empire. The basic assumption in this context is not that ideas or ideology were the fundamental determinants of British imperialism, but rather that they were intellectual or mental elements in the imperial matrix which exerted pressure and influenced the course of British imperialism.

One way in which the ideological component of British imperialism can be investigated is to examine the attitudes of the British public towards colonial societies. This study attempts to do this, focusing upon British attitudes towards Indian nationalism.

An attitude has been defined as a 'relatively enduring organization of interrelated beliefs that describe, evaluate and advocate action with respect to an object or situation'(22). Attitudes constitute the internal framework of perception of an observer which determines the manner in which the observer reacts to a specific situation. Often, the reaction can be the expression of an opinion. There is thus a basic difference between attitudes and opinions (23). However, attitudes can be ascertained through an analysis of expressed opinions. Indeed, there is an extremely complex relationship between attitudes and opinions, for the expressed opinions, though they are products of attitudes, also add to the intellectual milieu in which attitudes are formed, shaped and altered. That is to say, although attitudes are resistant to change, they are not altogether impervious to influences and pressures.

That attitudes can and do change is illustrated by the shifting perceptions of Britain's imperial role. P.J. Marshall has pointed out how the fears and inhibitions about Britain's role in Asia entertained in Britain during the eighteenth century were dispelled by the end of

the century by an intellectual transformation (24). This change can be explained as being due to the fact that the early contacts between Britain and Asia were between an emergent capitalist society on the one hand and a feudal society on the other. British society had not yet fully emerged from the chrysalis of feudalism and was still burdened, it may be suggested, by the modes of thought and culture inherited from the past. These acted to inhibit the development of an imperial ethos. The later conjuncture of advanced capitalism, a more aggressive imperialism and the rapid efflorescence of an imperial spirit is significant and suggestive. It is not being argued here that the change in attitudes was the decisive factor in explaining the rise of an imperialist spirit, nor that material factors such as transformations in the social structure are sufficient to alter attitudes.

What may be inferred, however, from this particular example, is that attitudes, despite an inherent inertia, undergo changes over time. These changes can be caused by modifications in the structures of society or in the dynamics of power relationships and also by intellectual reorientations resulting from the emergence of alternative ideas and new images.

At the same time, since images of a situation are governed by the internal framework of perception, the study of attitudes becomes crucial to any analysis of British imperialism. Though the key determinants of imperial policy lay in other spheres, the way in which problems and events were perceived was conditioned by the structure of ideas and beliefs. Since solutions and responses to events depended on the way in which problems were perceived, it may logically be concluded that attitudes and actions had a close correlation. Given its nature, this correlation is not amenable to precise and rigorous analy-

sis. Nevertheless, it can and ought to be examined, for the existence of the correlation demands such an investigation.

There have been several studies of British attitudes to India during the Victorian era (25). Similar studies for the more recent period, a period of imperial decline, are very rare, and those that exist have primarily dealt with sectional attitudes or the opinions of specific groups (26). Such studies provide useful insights into the modes of thought in the metropolitan society. But they do not encompass a wide enough perspective to allow comparisons. This study of British attitudes towards Indian nationalism between 1922 and 1935 has been undertaken as an attempt to provide such a comparative perspective on imperial attitudes during a period when the Raj was being increasingly menaced by the rising tide of Indian nationalism. This was a period of storm and stress in India as well as in Britain, with intervals of relative tranquility. An examination of the wide range of British attitudes towards Indian nationalism during this period will therefore enable a fuller exploration of the relationship between these attitudes and imperialism.

British attitudes towards India and Indian nationalism can be discerned from several kinds of sources. Benita Parry, Allen J. Greenberger, and Shamsul Islam have explored the connections between imperialist attitudes and imaginative literature, in the specific context of Anglo-Indian relations (27). Essentially their studies also confirm the findings of those who investigated the links between imperialism and literature (28). These show that, although the dominant ideas reflected in literary works were those that exalted imperialism, there were also works that questioned the assumptions and attitudes of imperialism. If Rudyard Kipling was the archetypal imperialist writer who lyrically extolled the Empire, there were several others

who, like Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, struck a contrapuntal note (29). Later, E.M. Forster captured, in his novel A Passage to India, the ambivalence towards the Empire that was beginning to be displayed in the Twenties.

Writers encapsulate the attitudes and ideas of the society in which they live. It may be logical to conclude, therefore, that the plurality of views about the Empire which could be perceived in literary works with Indian themes was not merely a product of the creative imagination of the writers, but reflected an underlying social reality. At the same time, such works helped to influence and shape attitudes, perhaps at a subliminal level, for they presented a particular image of Indian society which either reinforced existing ideas and beliefs or raised questions about them.

While the literature of the Empire had a degree of ambivalence, the medium of film displayed a remarkable singularity of purpose. Films with Indian themes usually depicted a romantic image of a feudal India peopled by Princes and Princesses, with gallant Europeans rescuing damsels in distress (30). The Indian Empire was shown as unchanged and unchanging, and constitutional developments found no place in them, while the European's typical dislike of the educated native and respect for the warrior native was reflected in these films (31).

The strongly imperialist tone of films was probably due to the rigid control that was exercised over them, as cinema was seen as a potent mass medium (32). Even American producers, apprehensive of possible banning by British censors and the consequent loss of the huge Empire market, perforce turned out 'imperial' films (33). Thus British censorship rules forced the creation of a counterpoise to the usually anti-imperialist stance of American publicists.

One of these rules was that films should not be allowed to show

Europeans in a bad light (34). It was necessary to maintain the mystique of a superior European culture, and Indians or any other colonial people could not be permitted to penetrate the mask of superiority. This had in fact been recognized very early. Thus the East India Company, protesting in 1801 about proposals to end its commercial monopoly in India, argued that one consequence of terminating the monopoly would be that native Indian shipping would multiply, Indian lascars would flock to London, and, it added (35):

> ...the contemptuous report which they disseminate on their return cannot fail to have a very unfavourable influence upon the minds of our Asiatic subjects, whose reverence for our character, which has hitherto contributed to our ascendancy in the East...will be gradually exchanged for the most degrading conceptions; and if an indignant apprehension of having hitherto rated us too highly, or respected us too much, should once possess them, the effects of it may prove extremely detrimental.

Even into the Nineteen Thirties, the authorities in Britain were concerned about Indians receiving a 'wrong' image about British society.

For instance, as late as 1934, R.A. Butler, the Under-Secretary of State for India, was expressing surprise that a film like The Private Lives of Henry VIII had got past the Indian censors (36). This film had won an Oscar, starred Charles Laughton in the title role, and was obviously set in the distant past. Yet it was feared that it would conjure up a false image for Indian audiences. Indeed, even earlier, the King himself had told the Secretary of State for India, Samuel Hoare, that there was a need for a more stringent film censorship in India, and several MPs had also expressed their dismay that films which disparaged Western morals and civilization were being shown in India (37).

The British authorities were not concerned only with presenting Indians with a sanitized version of British society. They were equally keen that British viewers should see only an approved image of In-

dia. The India Office, for example, asked for special censorship of films showing rioting in India (38). There was thus a constant monitoring of films to ensure that images that would alter existing structures of beliefs would not be allowed to reach either Indians or the British public.

Similar control was also exercised over the 'new' medium of radio. Talks and other programmes on India helped to nurture the British stereotypes about India, for they were confined to subjects such as life in Indian villages, the caste system, and Indian languages, and presented no radical departures.

The control exercised over the 'popular' media of radio and cinema demonstrates the importance attached by the authorities to the need for preventing the dissemination of oppositional ideas about the British Empire in India.

Such official intervention and control is not easily visible however in the case of factual, as opposed to imaginative, publications. As the challenge of Indian nationalism forced itself upon British consciousness, the public in Britain responded with a plethora of opinions expressed through books, pamphlets, articles and letters in newspapers and periodicals. Significant inferences about British attitudes can be drawn by examining even some of these. Since their message was direct, they had, it may safely be presumed, a greater influence on the public than works of creative imagination. It is not being argued here that these publications directly impinged on the official mind and thus determined imperial policy. On the other hand, they were predominantly reflections of a climate of opinion which policy-makers had to consider. British public opinion was, among several factors, one of the constraints acting on the imperial decision-makers (39). If it had not been, officials might

not have sought so assiduously to prevent any radical shifts of opinion.

This study will therefore take a (necessarily selective and impressionistic) look at some of the publications on India and Indian politics that appeared between 1922 and 1935. These publications contributed either to the reinforcement of existing beliefs about India or to the projection of alternative images. Who were the people who produced them? At which social strata were they aimed? The answers to such questions can lead also to conclusions about the sections of the British public which demonstrated an interest in Indian affairs, and the possible reasons for such interest, for the term 'public' suggests a homogeneity which is absent in reality. Firstly, the fact of publication itself indicates an exclusive group of articulate individuals. More importantly, these individuals and their readers come from a variety of social strata, and it will be useful to know if any relationship exists between the writer, the idea, and the social stratum to which he belonged. On the other hand, there was an implicit attempt in all such writing to create a homogeneous 'public opinion'. The tendency of the dominant groups to exercise ideological hegemony was reflected also in the tendency to manipulate and mould public opinion, or at a deeper level to shape and form attitudes.

British attitudes towards Indian nationalism can be inferred also from a perusal of the private correspondence of individuals who were interested in India for one reason or another. The correspondence of officials will offer clues about the extent of the influence that public opinion had on policy-making. That of non-officials, untrammelled as it was by the requirements of officialdom, may be revealing. Again, the examination of such correspondence has been selective. Given the volume of correspondence available for study, selection is necessary and inevitable. But selection, even if arbitrary, need not detract

from or vitiate any conclusions that may be arrived at, since the primary purpose is to discover, so far as it is possible, the range of attitudes, and their contexts.

Any study of British attitudes and public opinion must remain incomplete if no attention is given to the activities of various groups that emerged in the Twenties and Thirties. Some of these were pressure groups which hoped to influence or alter official policy. Others merely sought to inform the public, and thus to reinforce or change the prevalent notions. The activities of such groups can be an index to trends of thought and also indicate the mechanisms used to influence or shape opinion.

One of the interesting questions raised by any study of attitudes is whether any correlation exists between the social status of a group and its attitudes. Although a decisive answer cannot perhaps be given, this study will attempt to discover the social roots of groups which were actively concerned with Indian affairs in order to find if there was any such correlation. Some of these groups were sympathetic to Indian nationalism, while others were committed to the maintenance of the British Empire in India. Even a cursory analysis of the membership of the various groups should yield useful insights into the relationship between attitudes and social or economic factors.

Another significant factor which has to be considered is the role played by the State in attempting to shape attitudes. Although there exists a natural resonance between the dominant ideology and the ideas that the State seeks to propagate, there is also an element of active propaganda by the State to sustain ideas which would support its policies.

Keith Wilson has recently argued that the Foreign Office took no positive steps to mould public opinion before the First World War, and that, on the contrary, it fostered the 'prevailing ignorance' of

the British people about foreign affairs (40). It would be instructive to examine the attitude of the India Office towards propaganda, and the methods that it may have used to influence public opinion on India. It seems logical to assume that, as criticism of Government policy on India increased, the India Office might have attempted to counter it through direct and indirect measures.

To summarize, this study will examine the published writing of the period, and the correspondence of officials and non-officials, and will also analyse the activities of various groups connected with Indian affairs, as well as the way in which the India Office reacted to public opinion. This will allow a range of attitudes to be delineated and related to the political, social and economic context.

It may be useful, at this juncture, to briefly examine the context, both in its British and its Indian setting. In Britain, the period under study was a period that saw the paradoxical juxtaposition of rising affluence and of bleak poverty (41). Although sectors of the economy were able to ride over the economic crises that marked this period, important areas of economic activity were devastated, and this was to be crucial for shaping the contours of British attitudes towards India. Ian Drummond did not apparently take this significant aspect into account when he argued that, throughout the inter-war period, the Indian market was small and diminishing in importance (42). It may be that Britain exported more to countries outside the Empire, and India might have been a small market in terms of the total volume of British trade, but perceptions, and particularly contemporary perceptions, are not made by statistics alone. The decline in British industries, especially the 'old' industries such as textiles, iron and steel, and shipbuilding, was depressingly evident (43). As it was in these areas that Indian industry was offer-

ing increasing competition, the Indian market must have seemed as important as ever. Intensifying competition from other countries such as Japan, Germany and the USA meant in fact that India became economically ever more important (44). For businessmen, then, India was a vital element in the Empire, and concessions made to Indian entrepreneurs, such as the fiscal autonomy convention, and the resulting tariff barriers, could only have seemed threatening. And, as A.P. Thornton suggested, in history it is not what is true, but what is thought to be true that is often more significant (45).

The economic crisis that faced Britain was accompanied also by a moral and intellectual crisis. There was a new climate of dissent, an unwillingness to accept received notions about social order and justice. Intellectuals began to question the traditional assumptions about society (46). The questioning extended also to the Empire, and in particular to the exercise of control over India. In a poem published in 1932, Julian Bell captured the essence of the prevailing trends of thought (47):

> Instructed by their Press, such men are sure
> Of all our ills the empire is the cure.
> As for the empire, it is plain, of course,
> Since it was won it must be kept by force.
> And so the case is simple and complete
> For spending eighty millions on the fleet.
> True, now and then, some villain may observe,
> Despite their Empire, men can all but starve;
> And subject races oddly don't perceive
> What, except jail, the Empire has to give;
> But plain blunt businessmen will not attend
> To mere ideas - who knows how that might end.

Such dissenting writing changed little, for attitudes and beliefs resisted change. Nevertheless, the emergence of radical and critical ideas indicated that a solvent was at work, slowly dissolving old ideas and images about the Empire.

One of the factors responsible for the reappraisal of Indian affairs from new perspectives was the rapid pace of political change

in India after the First World War. There had been criticism of imperialism in the past (48). But the emergence in India of a new style of politics, under the leadership of Gandhi, forced the British public to reconsider existing notions. The massacre at Amritsar, the Rowlatt Satyagraha and the boycott of the visit of the Prince of Wales all led to a remarkable shift in British opinion (49).

Such a shift could be seen, for example, in the gradual evolution of ideas on Indian constitutional reform within the 'Round Table' group. Although the members of the Round Table movement were initially convinced that Indians were unfit for self-government, by the end of the First World War they had come to see the necessity of reforms, and one of its members, Lionel Curtis, became closely involved in the making of the Government of India Act of 1919 (50). This is not to suggest that it was the shift in ideas that contributed to the idea of new political reforms in India. The reforms had become politically necessary, as a means of retaining the collaboration of Indian élites (51). But, it can be argued, the shift in attitudes facilitated and even perhaps shaped political change. Ideas may not be the progenitors of political action. Nevertheless they can inhibit or, alternatively, facilitate change. The flux of intellectual attitudes in Britain, and in particular the emergence of oppositional and alternative ideas following the social and psychological upheaval caused by the war, created a climate of opinion in Britain which must be analysed to obtain a more complete picture of Britain's imperial relations with India.

In India, also, the period after the war was a time of rapid change in economics as in politics. The war gave an additional stimulus to Indian industry, and it grew quickly. At the same time, however, the war had also caused a serious dislocation of the economy,

and thus created conditions in which militant agitation might thrive. Such agitation did take place, in localities at first, and then on a larger national scale.(52). It was in response to this growing militancy that the British fashioned the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, designed at once to defuse the political tensions in India by strengthening the networks of collaboration, and, by shifting the focus of political power to the provincial level, to weaken the nascent overarching nationalism that would be a greater threat to imperialism.

In the event, the Government of India Act of 1919 could neither stem the tide of nationalism, nor effectively alter the political geometry of India. If there had been a real transfer of power in the provinces, the fruits of office might have tempted more collaborators, and provincialism might have been strengthened at the expense of nationalism. At that time, however, any meaningful transfer of power was anathema to the British, partly because of the notion that Indians were unfit for self-government. The Act of 1919 was a compromise, more a temporizing expedient than a long-term solution for the Indian political problem.

The years following upon the reforms did appear to bring a semblance of peace to India for a time, but it was not long before the peace was fractured by a renewal of agitation, first over the Statutory Commission, and then as a more extensive civil disobedience movement. The Government of India Act of 1935 was a renewed attempt to win friends in India and to blunt the sharp edge of militant nationalism. Between 1922 and 1935, the pendulum of Indian politics oscillated between tranquility and trouble, evoking in consequence a variety of reactions in Britain.

It is upon these reactions that this study will concentrate, in order to elucidate British attitudes towards Indian nationalism, and

to discern the connections, if any, between these attitudes and the policies adopted. The efflorescence of British interest in India was partly due to the increasing pressure of Indian nationalism, and partly a result of the long and tortuous process of political change set in motion by the appointment of the Statutory Commission in 1927. These interrelated factors combined with the special attention given to India by newspapers and periodicals of the time to sharpen and renew British interest in Indian affairs.

It must be admitted perhaps that during the inter-war period domestic questions like unemployment, and international issues like disarmament, peace and security, appear to have been the major preoccupations of the British intelligentsia. Interest in India was displayed by a relatively tiny segment of British society. One of the secondary aims of this study will be to discover what prompted certain people to take a special interest in Indian affairs. One obvious motivation would be personal connections with India. Were there any other reasons? Such an inquiry will also permit conclusions to be drawn regarding the social roots of the opinions and ideas expressed by the British public.

To briefly recapitulate, this study will examine British attitudes towards Indian nationalism between 1922 and 1935, and will attempt to discern the connections between attitudes, policies, and the social, political and economic contexts.

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

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## 2. Reform and Reaction: The Illusory Peace 1922-6

In the summer of 1921, a Britain which had emerged victorious from the Great War contemplated a vast Empire which had by then grown to its maximum territorial extent (1). Ironically, however, the very dimensions of the British Empire seemed to precipitate crises, as though empires had a critical size beyond which they would begin to decay. In Egypt, Ireland and India, the once awesome and apparently invincible imperial power faced a series of challenges from new nationalist leaders with new political strategies, and it appeared as if there was a general crisis of the Empire (2). At such a time, when the structure of Empire seemed threatened, as the sharp edge of nationalist agitation chipped away at the imperial edifice, Britain sought to cling more tenaciously to the notion of Empire, and to the component parts of the Empire. This was particularly true of India, which had for a long time been regarded as the most vital element of the British Empire.

Till 1919, the Indian Empire had seemed everlasting and the permanence of the British Raj appeared to be beyond doubt. But the Raj had rested upon the active collaboration of some sections of the Indian people, and the passive acquiescence of the rest (3). The rise and growth of an increasingly militant nationalist movement had, however, begun to cast doubts on the continuance of this necessary collaboration and acquiescence. The Government of India Act of 1919

was an attempt to stem the rising tide of militancy and to retain the collaboration of Indians. But this attempt seemed predestined to failure as the Rowlatt Act agitation, the Khilafat movement and then the non-co-operation movement struck, between 1919 and 1922, a series of sharp blows on the Imperial Government. Significant elements of Indian society, it appeared, were no longer willing to extend unconditionally the co-operation that had hitherto been given to support the imperial structure in India.

If the Rowlatt satyagraha and the Khilafat movement were straws in the wind, as it were, indicating the new direction of the Indian nationalist movement, the non-co-operation movement marked a new phase in the struggle, and it completely altered the nature and structure of Indian politics. The non-co-operation movement was unprecedented,not only in the passionate political intensity it generated, but, more significantly, in terms of the new sections of Indian society which had been drawn into the political arena as a result of the movement (4). The success of the movement in attracting widespread popular support, and the tactics used, perplexed the authorities in India and in London, and quite unnerved Government officials (5). Not surprisingly, the movements of 1919-22 significantly affected British perceptions of Indian nationalism, and thus influenced British attitudes to Indian politics in the succeeding years (6).

In Britain, there was a reluctance to see the non-co-operation movement as a manifestation of a stronger and more vigorous nationalism. The Times, for example, saw it as a 'symptom of a crude, but awakening national consciousness' (7). This perception of events in India as being symptoms of an emergent nationalism, rather than those of a mature, well developed political movement, reflected a curious refusal to recognize the changes in Indian politics. It was

as if The Times was commenting upon the Swadeshi movement in Bengal in the first decade of the twentieth century, and not upon a situation that had been changed, and changed utterly, by a new spirit of militancy. Indeed, this change had been noted by the owner of The Times, Lord Northcliffe, who felt, after a visit to India, that the situation there recalled that which had prevailed before the mutiny of 1857, and who observed a new hostility towards Europeans (8). Why then did The Times refuse to recognize the strength and nature of the nationalist movement in India?

One reason was that The Times, like several other observers and commentators, saw the unrest in India as being the result of other factors, most notably the Khilafat issue (9). Even the Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, thought that the prime factor in the Indian situation was the Khilafat question (10). Apparently, the fact that Hindus and Muslims, politically divided by the introduction of separate electorates in 1909, could now come together, united by a common cause, mystified British observers, and led them to invest the Khilafat question with an undue significance for explaining Indian unrest. The British had always perceived India as a land riven by communal and sectarian conflict and held together only by the unifying force of pax Britannica (11). The Hindu-Muslim unity forged in the white heat of post-war international and domestic politics appeared so contrary to the existing image of warring irreconcilables that it necessarily acquired a disproportionate significance. Other causes, nationalism among them, were relegated to the background.

The strength of Indian nationalism was further obscured by the argument that Indian unrest could be attributed to the weakness of the Government in India as well as in Britain. The Daily Mail

suggested, for example, that the real source of trouble in India was weakness at home (12). The Observer, on the other hand, blamed the Viceroy, Lord Reading, and the Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu. It accused them of having struck a blow at the basis of the Empire by 'an incredible crudity of judgment and an inexplicable violation of their constitutional duty' (13). Even The Times, which had initially praised the Government for its handling of the situation, quickly shifted to an extremely critical stance. It called for strong action in India, and for the replacement of Montagu with a 'statesman of stronger fibre', since he was letting 'the sceptre of India fall from nerveless fingers' (14). The spirit of this increasing hostility to Montagu was perhaps best encapsulated in the Punch cartoon, which depicted Gandhi telling Montagu, 'One of us has to go', and John Bull remarking acidly, 'Why not both?' (15).

Montagu was a member of a coalition Cabinet. Such Cabinets are usually fragile structures, subject to inherent stresses and tensions, and are held together only by the nuts and bolts of political exigencies. The Cabinet headed by Lloyd George in the spring of 1922 was in this sense no exception. It was, in fact, already moving towards a collapse as the Conservatives began manoeuvres to recapture the bastions of power for themselves (16). The attacks on Montagu, therefore, might have been merely the opening salvoes in an assault upon the coalition itself. Montagu became the prime target, however, because the Indian question provided the critics of the Government with useful ammunition. In the end, Montagu was compelled to resign on a technicality. He had sanctioned, without prior approval from the Cabinet, the publication of the Government of India's views on the Treaty of Sèvres, and this was deemed to be an unpardonable transgression of Cabinet ethics. Winston Churchill too had committed a

similar solecism at this time, by making an unauthorized declaration on the status of Indians in Kenya. He however escaped criticism. Montagu, on the other hand, had already alienated the Cabinet too much to find many supporters among its members. Indeed, Montagu had, it would appear, little influence in the Cabinet by this time. Even on India, it was the advice of Curzon and Churchill that came to be followed in Cabinet, not that of Montagu (17). Apparently, Montagu fell victim to a newly ascendant reactionary policy on India, evident not only inside the Cabinet but visible outside as well.

There were several reasons for this shift in British attitudes towards India at this time. A.H. Grant, a former Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province, pointed out in a letter to The Times that the daily reports of the activities of the agitators, the ungracious reception of what was considered to be a very liberal scheme of reforms, and most of all the organized attempts to boycott the visit of the Prince of Wales tended to irritate and estrange British public opinion (18). Montagu also had sensed this feeling of exasperation in Britain. The British people were fed up with India, he wrote to Reading, and were in particular incensed by India's boycott of the Prince of Wales (19). Chelmsford too detected what he termed a 'hysterical wave of feeling' in Britain with reference to affairs in India (20).

The swing to a reactionary policy on India may also have been a part of the general movement in Britain from a 'rhetoric of progress' to a 'rhetoric of resistance' (21). Beset by problems emanating from the war and its aftermath, Britain was perhaps retreating wearily to a more conservative position, and was probably in no mood to put up with the apparent intransigence of Indian nationalists.

This swing was reflected even in the usually radical columns

of the New Statesman. Obviously reacting to the apparent inaction of the Government of India, it pointed out in a leading article that, if the 'Gandhi Movement' was allowed to spread as widely and rapidly as it had in the previous two years, Britain would be left with only two choices: either to quit altogether, or to use force on a massive scale (22). The adoption of the latter course would arouse the protests of 'civilised democracy all over the world', the New Statesman declared, while, on the other hand, abdication of British rule would lead to anarchy and ultimately to autocratic monarchies, and thus would constitute treason to democracy. Pursuing a middle course between these extreme positions, the New Statesman recommended the continuation of the reforms policy coupled with the use of sufficient force to maintain peace. Clifford Sharp, the editor of the New Statesman at this time, was prejudiced against Indian nationalists (23). His personal predilections might have coloured the editorial stance of the New Statesman, and led it to advocate a judicious mixture of reform and repression as a cure for Indian ills. At the same time, this solution closely echoed existing British notions about the nature of the Indian nationalist movement, and about the consequences of a British withdrawal. That even a radical journal like the New Statesman should have accepted and reiterated stereotypes about India indicates the hold such ideas had upon the British intelligentsia.

In India also, the Viceroy was at this time receiving similar advice. Willingdon, Governor of Madras, urged Reading to combine suppression of the non-co-operation movement with positive steps to secure further constitutional advances (24). This resonance of ideas between a Governor in India and a radical English journal was not inexplicable. It could be argued that the hostility of the

radicals to the new Gandhian nationalism might have stemmed in part from their dislike of Gandhi's ideas on religion and caste. But, it can be suggested, the more basic determinant of the attitude of the New Statesman and its editor was the persistence of the notion that there could only be anarchy in India if the British left.

Moreover, the solutions advanced by Willingdon and the New Statesman were basically derived from a fundamental tenet of British political strategy in India: that the maintenance of Empire required the conciliation of the moderate elements and the repression of extremist agitation. The assumptions underlying this strategy were that the moderates could prop up the Empire in India, and that the extremist agitators were weak enough to be easily suppressed. These assumptions, it may be suggested, were themselves conditioned and shaped by the preconceptions about the strength and character of the Indian nationalist movement, particularly those which regarded the movement as the activity of a minority. It was the strategy based on these assumptions which contributed in part to the forging of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, which would, it was hoped, recover the support of the moderates in India for ensuring the permanence of the raj.

The assumptions were so strong indeed that, despite the failure of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms to effectively rally the Indian moderates, and in spite of the visible success of the extremists in launching and sustaining the non-co-operation movement, the desire to conciliate the moderates did not disappear. On the contrary, the attempts to extinguish the fires of nationalist agitation with the help of the moderates continued to dominate British strategy. One retired ICS official, H.V. Cobb, who had been the Resident at Mysore, and the Chief Commissioner of Coorg, went so far

as to suggest that the moderates should be actively organized, as that was the only way of saving India (25). The fact that Cobb had served in areas which were outside the ambit of nationalist agitation might have led him to take a more optimistic view of the strength of the moderates, for he believed that for every 'seditionist' there were a thousand moderates (26). But his views were not entirely exceptional, and in fact, shorn of the rhetorical exaggeration, were typical. It was the desire not to alienate the moderates which probably restrained the Government of India from taking harsh measures against the non-co-operation movement, although it must be recognized that the Government of India might have been merely awaiting an opportune moment to arrest Gandhi and strike a decisive blow against it.

Gandhi was arrested on 10 March 1922, just as Montagu's resignation was announced, and thus gave rise to speculation that Montagu's exit had inaugurated a new more assertive policy in India. In fact, the Daily Herald, commenting on Montagu's resignation, had expressed the fear that Montagu and Reading would be replaced by 'worse men', to be followed by the adoption of a policy of extreme coercion, which in its opinion would mean disaster for the Empire (27). The Daily Herald naturally saw in the arrest of Gandhi a confirmation of its worst fears (28). Such speculation was fuelled also by the exultation of the conservative newspapers, which saw the arrest of Gandhi as the necessary beginning of a more stringent policy in India (29). Ironically, the arrest of Gandhi had nothing to do with Montagu's exit from the Cabinet, for the arrest had been contemplated for a long time, and carried out at what was deemed to be an opportune moment. In fact, the relative calm with which India reacted to the arrest was interpreted as signifying that the Government had indeed chosen the right psychological moment (30). In Britain those

clamouring for more forceful action in India welcomed Gandhi's arrest and his imprisonment. As Lord Montagu of Beaulieu pointed out to the Viceroy, the strong measures taken by the Government of India following Gandhi's arrest comforted English opinion (31). Only the Daily Herald raised its lone voice of protest, describing the sentence of six years' imprisonment imposed on Gandhi as a step taken to satisfy the 'primitive desire of our imperialists for revenge...' but one which would do nothing to solve the Indian problem (32). British opinion in 1922, with a few exceptions, welcomed the inauguration of a more assertive policy in India. It must also have been comforted by the fact that Montagu was replaced, not by another Liberal, but by Peel, a Conservative. It is not being suggested that the personal predilections of the Secretary of State for India made a significant difference in the India policy. To contemporary observers, however, it seemed that there was a shift, a change in the way Government dealt with Indian affairs (33).

There was perhaps a compelling economic reason for quickly restoring order in India. Although British trade with India was not seriously affected by political agitation in this period, it could not proceed smoothly. Insurance underwriters in London, for example, began to charge high rates for covering risk of damage through riots or civil commotion to goods warehoused in Indian cities (34). There was a noticeable decline in the imports of textiles, partly due to the boycott campaign. W.H. Pease, the Secretary of the Indian Tea Association, London, asked the Secretary of State for India for assurances that the strong action taken against political agitators in Assam tea districts would be continued (35). As Lloyd George pointed out to Reading, if British businessmen and financiers were to be encouraged to invest in India, it would be necessary to reassure them

regarding political conditions there (36).

Perhaps it was this thought that led Lloyd George to declare in the House of Commons on 2 August 1922 (37):

> One thing we must make clear - that Britain will in no circumstances relinquish her responsibility for India. That is a cardinal principle not merely of the present Government, but I feel confident that it will be a cardinal principle with any Government that could command the confidence of the people of this country.

Increasing participation of Indians in the Government was an inevitable evolution, agreed Lloyd George, but, he added, that was not in order that it may lead up to a final relinquishment of British trust. Lloyd George then placed the coping stone on this emphatic restatement of imperialist policy by declaring that, whatever might be the success of the Indians, as administrators or Parliamentarians, he could see 'no period when they can dispense with the guidance and assistance of this small nucleus of the British Civil Service', as it was the 'steel frame' of the whole structure, which would collapse if it was taken out.

As for the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, the Prime Minister was at pains to point out, in almost lyrically repetitive phrases, that the changes were 'in the nature of an experiment, and they must be treated as an experiment, a great and important experiment, but still an experiment'.

Although this speech was delivered in the course of a debate on the appropriation of funds for the Indian Civil Service, Lloyd George used the opportunity to quell the many critics of the Government's policy in India by emphasizing the permanence, not only of the Indian Civil Service as then constituted, but also of the British Raj in India, and strengthened his arguments by reference to the experimental nature of the reforms of 1919.

Not surprisingly, this speech caused a great deal of resentment

in India, especially since, in his references to the experimental nature of the reforms, Lloyd George had also suggested that future policy would depend upon the way in which Indian politicians operated the machinery provided to them. This seemed to the Indians to be suggesting that they were on probation, so to speak, and all sections were united in denouncing the implications of the speech. Interestingly, Colonel Josiah Wedgwood had reacted immediately in the Commons itself, pointing out that the Prime Minister's speech not only constituted a new declaration regarding India, but was also an implied threat that, if non-co-operators got into the councils and there conducted a campaign of opposition to the Government, the reforms scheme could be withdrawn (38). Indian reactions must have been fuelled by this interpretation, and the efforts made by the Under-Secretary of State for India, Earl Winterton, to deny that any such threat was implied did not serve to attenuate Indian anger.

Whatever Indians might have thought, the reforms of 1919 were indeed seen in Britain as an experiment (39). The Observer, for example, declared that it was Indian goodwill and capacity that were being tested by the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, and, if co-operation in full measure was not given, Indians would have defeated the 'attempt to admit them to the progressive control of their own fortunes...' (40). Writing in the Fortnightly Review, Michael O'Dwyer expounded a similar view. He asserted that Parliament should reiterate that no further constitutional advance was possible till the full ten years of experience had shown that the necessary conditions had been fulfilled (41). Given the prevalence of such ideas, it was not surprising that Lloyd George should have so categorically asserted the experimental nature of the reforms. It was not surprising either that Indians saw the speech primarily as an assertion that Britain

would continue to rule India with a heavy hand.

In Britain, the stresses were heard differently, and the speech was seen essentially as a defence of the Indian Civil Service. J.R. Chancellor, the Principal Assistant Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, in fact thought that it was regrettable that the Prime Minister's speech had such a bad effect in India, as he was merely trying to 'cheer up' the ICS (42).

It was true, of course, that at this juncture the ICS needed reassurance. Due to various factors, there had been a serious decline in the numbers of young Englishmen applying to join the Indian Civil Service, and this caused concern in Britain (43). So few British candidates came forward after the war that special recruitment from among discharged Army officers had to be resorted to so that the proportion of 'Europeans' in the ICS would remain high (44). David Potter has argued that this decline was essentially due to economic crises in Britain, rather than Indian nationalism (45). It would be more logical to expect that domestic economic crises would make imperial service more, not less attractive. Indeed, T.H. Beaglehole has shown how British interest in the ICS actually increased in the last years of the Raj (46) - years in fact, when the British economy was under great stress. But in the immediate aftermath of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, the heaven-born service seemed to have been shorn of its erstwhile glamour, pomp and power. Moreover, the possibility of having to serve under Indian ministers was a prospect not entirely to the liking of those brought up on images of Indian inefficiency and venality. It seems plausible, therefore, to argue that the main reason for the reluctance of British candidates to try for the ICS was the inherited set of images about Indian society. Quite a few of those who had been serving in the ICS took advantage of an

opportunity to retire early, thus indicating their apprehensions about serving under the reformed constitution.

Even five years later, Reginald Coupland, in India with the Lee Commission investigating the Civil Services, noted a sense of demoralization and defeatism in the Indian Civil Service (47). The origins of such demoralization lay in the British image of India. It was difficult to reconcile the notion of the ICS as the guardians with the idea of sharing power and responsibility, especially with the very Indians who were supposedly unfit to share them.

Philip Mason has recorded how, despite the recognition that significant changes were taking place in India in the Twenties, the illusion of permanence had not been shattered (48). It would appear, therefore, that the reason for the demoralization of the ICS was not the imagined immediate end of the Indian Empire, but the feeling that the once glittering 'steel frame' would be quickly corroded by the advancing tides of nationalism, both in the form of increasing devolution of power and also the rapid Indianization of the Service.

So concerned was the Government about the unintended Indianization of the ICS, brought about by the lack of British candidates, that it resorted to complicated manoeuvres to maintain what it deemed a safe proportion of 'Europeans' (49).

What is of relevance here is the implication that India could not do without a virtually permanent corps d'élite of British officers. The permanence of the Indian Empire could be ensured only by, it was apparently believed, preserving such a European core, and, though the illusion of permanence was still intact, there were real fears in Britain that the Empire in India was slowly but surely vanishing. The speech of Lloyd George, ostensibly in defence of the ICS, was intended, it would seem, to explicitly reassert the continu-

ation of British hegemony over India.

Ironically, one of the devices used to ensure the maintenance of the Raj was itself the cause of fears that India was acquiring too much freedom too rapidly. The fiscal autonomy convention was designed to retain the support of the moderates and thereby to ensure the permanence of the Empire (50). Under the convention, India was left relatively free to erect tariff barriers and thus seemed to have acquired an excessive degree of economic freedom, especially with regard to imports from Lancashire's textile mills (51). The Lancashire cotton magnates made strenuous attempts to get the India Office to persuade the Government of India to rescind or reduce the import duties on cotton goods, which had been increased by 4% in the beginning of 1921. But these attempts were unsuccessful, although they were met to some extent in the spring of 1922, when the Government of India increased the excise duty on cotton goods to 7½%, the tariff on imports having been at the same time put up to 15%. The Executive Committee of the India section of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution expressing its regret that the Indian tariff was increased, but appreciating the accompanying increase in the excise duty on Indian manufactures (52).

It was not merely in the case of fixing of tariffs that India appeared to be exercising an undue amount of fiscal freedom which was damaging to British interests. What caused consternation among British businessmen was the question of Indian orders for the supply of material and equipment. In India, the demand was being made that nothing should be done that subordinated the interests of the Indian tax-payer to those of the British manufacturer. Even as early as September 1921, the Legislative Assembly at Delhi had passed a resolution recommending that the High Commissioner for India should be instructed to buy stores in the cheapest market, and that any devi-

ations should be reported, with actual reasons being given (53).

The Indian stance prompted a group of MPs representing British commercial interests to seek a meeting with the Secretary of State for India, and he did meet them on 26 July 1922, along with the High Commissioner for India, officials of the India Office and others involved in the purchase of stores for India (54). The Secretary of State agreed that it was certainly important to get the largest proportion of Indian orders for Britain, especially in view of the rising unemployment. Earl Winterton, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for India, then went on to point out to the delegation that the High Commissioner for India had come in for criticism in the past when he had given preference to the manufactures of Britain, and that, in practice, Britain in any case got the largest share of the contracts. (In the financial year April 1921 to March 1922, out of a total of £11,052,755 placed on contract, £10,895,907 went to Britain.)

It would be useful to examine, at this juncture, some contemporary British opinions on Indian protective tariffs, and on the Indian economy. Although such opinions did not directly determine the commercial and fiscal policies of the Government or the decisions of businessmen, they constituted the intellectual matrix in which Government and businessmen functioned. Besides, these opinions emanated from persons who were likely to have exercised a great deal of intellectual influence, either because of their official positions or their expertise in Indian economics. While reflecting certain fundamental assumptions about the Indian economy, these expressed opinions also reinforced, through reiteration, such assumptions.

One such assumption was that India must remain predominantly an agricultural country. Charles Ernest Low, Secretary to the Government of India in the Commerce and Industry Department, and a member of the Indian Industrial Commission, declared in a paper read to the

East India Association in December 1923 (55):

> ...it is hardly necessary to insist on the fact that India must always be primarily an agricultural country, and that industries must always take a secondary place in her economic life...
> (emphasis added)

The members of the Round Table group also felt that 'The economic condition of India is, and must always be, the economic condition of the peasant and the countryside' (56) (emphasis added).

This descriptive and normative insistence on India remaining a primary producer of agricultural commodities, and consequently a consumer of manufactured goods, meshes so well with the imperial economic relationship that it may be conjectured that supportive and reinforcing statements necessarily emanate from that relationship.

An unsigned article in the Asiatic Review, discussing Indian trade statistics up to 1924, made this idea more explicit. In it, the anonymous author pointed out the importance of the Indian market, and went on to say (57):

> But India is not only our biggest market. She is also our best market in the sense that she supplies us with foodstuffs and raw materials, and takes in exchange the products of our factories. In the latest year for which statistics are available, 90 per cent of our imports from India consisted of foodstuffs and raw materials and 10 per cent of manufactured goods, while our exports to India consisted of manufactured goods to the extent of 95 per cent. The percentages are practically the same as they were before the war.

In a similar vein, Gilbert Slater argued that there was no need to artificially stimulate industrialization in India through protectionist policies as there was fairly rapid development already, and such rapid industrialization was not desirable in any case (58). Gilbert Slater had been in India for seven years, first as the Professor of Indian Economics at the University of Madras from 1915 to 1921, and then as a member of the Madras Legislative Council. His opinions would therefore have carried great weight as coming from one

who had close, informed and first-hand knowledge of Indian conditions. Since the audiences at meetings of the East India Association and the readers of the Asiatic Review usually included important and eminent public men connected with Indian affairs, the influence of such ideas and opinions as those expressed by Slater would have been very great.

The dominant economic ideas of this period, then, were that India should remain a captive market for British manufactured goods and a producer of raw materials, and, as a corollary, that protective tariffs should not be established.

These ideas undoubtedly contributed to developing resistance in Britain to further constitutional advances in India, for greater political freedom necessarily meant greater 'fiscal autonomy' for India. Not surprisingly, therefore, Indian demands for an early revision of the reforms of 1919 were viewed with apprehension. Such demands were considered to be premature and presumptuous.

There was evident exasperation in Britain about the way in which Indian leaders appeared to reject what most people in Britain considered to be extremely generous constitutional measures. Referring to the manner in which the Legislative Assembly had refused to vote supply, The Times, for example, hinted darkly that the grant of reforms was not unconditional, and that there might even be reverse steps if Indians did not co-operate in the fulfilment of their new duties and responsibilities (59).

Some observers and analysts felt that the Indian refusal to properly work the new system stemmed from an inability to take advantage of the opportunity provided. For example, the missionary and educationist, J.H. Oldham, who had visited India in the winter of 1921, wrote to Lord Lothian that Indians did not realize what could be achieved through the existing constitution, because of their political

inexperience, and also because the constitution was quite alien to Indian nature (60).

Even the Liberal intellectual, H.A.L. Fisher, had come to the conclusion that the Indian tactics of using the machinery provided by the reforms to hold up the work of the Government and to make the position of the British officials in India intolerable would provoke a violent reaction in the British Parliament, thus making it impossible to go further on the constitutional path (61). Fisher's fears were realized a few months later, in the form of the 'steel frame' speech of Lloyd George.

But it was not only Indians who felt that the system of Dyarchy was unworkable and that it needed to be reviewed and amended long before the expiry of the ten years stipulated for its trial. Willingdon, the Governor of Madras, was convinced that the system was contrary to all constitutional principles, and that, unless it was altered quickly, all shades of Indian political opinion would unite to wrest another concession out of Britain (62). The irony was that Willingdon's own province, Madras, was the most successful in implementing the reforms. It might be that he was taking an objective, all-India view.

It would seem that the Indian reactions to the reforms so puzzled and perplexed the British that they too began to have doubts about their efficacy and usefulness. Thus even Montagu came to believe that success in solving the Indian problem would rest upon getting away from Dyarchy and introducing 'responsible' ministries which would work with British assistance, the ICS functioning merely as an executive service (63).

Winston Churchill also interpreted the Indian reaction as indicating an incapacity for self-government. Although he had

supported the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme for reforms, Churchill came to believe that public opinion would question the expediency of granting democratic institutions to backward races which had no capacity for self-government, and thought that the solution would be to extend the system of native states (64).

These two complementary ideas, that democracy was unsuitable for India, and that the solution lay in extending the system of princely states, were to be expressed again and again by various publicists in Britain. Such ideas were at such a great distance from the predominant ideas, however, that there was very little likelihood of official policy being changed by them. Nevertheless, by creating doubts in the public mind about the utility of introducing democracy into India, and by positing an alternative, ostensibly Indian, system, these ideas increased public resistance to further constitutional advance.

There were others who, like Churchill, criticized the reforms of 1919 on the grounds that they were totally unsuited for India. Sir Henry Craik, MP, a die-hard Conservative, declared that the reforms of 1919 were the work of 'pedantic theorists', and went on to say that 'the scheme could not work; and if the truth were fairly allowed to be known, it is already proved to be bankrupt of all practical statesmanship' (65).

Craik's interest in India might have stemmed from his visit to India in the winter of 1907-8, which he described in Impressions of India. It would appear that Craik could not let the impressions he had formed in the high noon of Empire be dislodged by new notions of introducing democratic institutions into India. Significantly, another individual for whom also India must have seemed immutably fixed in an era of Curzonian pomp and imperial splendour was Sir Bampfylde

Fuller, who had been the first Lieutenant-Governor of the newly created province of Eastern Bengal and Assam. Fuller, who had left India in 1906, wrote, in a letter to The Times (66):

> The changes that were inaugurated in India by Lord Morley, and brought to completion by Mr. Montagu, have had the effect of wrecking what was perhaps, the most capable, just and economical system of government that the world has ever known...No lover of India has desired to see her kept for ever in alien leading strings. It was just and proper that her people should be given an increasing share in the government of their country. But why upset the system of government to introduce democracy - a method of state management for which no people are suitable until they have learnt to think commercially.

An older generation of public men in Britain, who regretted even the minimal devolution of power under the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, were thus laying the foundations for a die-hard campaign against Indian reforms. Such opposition was not entirely new, of course. There had been a great deal of resistance to the reforms of 1919, even while they were being debated in London (67). But the non-co-operation movement and the subsequent tactics of the Indian nationalists further fuelled the opposition to constitutional change.

But if the die-hard conservatives were opposed to any change, those adopting a more liberal approach were willing to consider the possibilities of change, but only when Indians had shown by their responsive co-operation that such change was useful and desirable.

Thus The Times, while rejecting the notion that the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms were premature or undesirable, declared that the Government could not be rushed into making further concessions, since a measure drafted with such care could not be subjected to review and revision within a few years of its inauguration (68). The Times was inclined to reflect the widely held British opinion that Indians lacked the necessary administrative skills, and therefore needed to learn these skills under the 1919 Act before they could legitimately

seek an extension of the reforms (69). The implicit assumption of Indian inferiority and the consequent necessity of tutelage was not missed by Indians, and Indian demands for equality might have been intensified by such assumptions. It was true that on occasion such assumptions were given an explicit reinforcement by some Indians themselves. Bhupendranath Basu, who had been on the Council of the Secretary of State for India, declared in March 1924 that his experience of recent events in India had proved to him the truth of Lord Morley's dictum that India was no more suited for Parliamentary government than Indian men were to wear fur coats (70). Basu was a moderate, and was perhaps expressing an opinion born in extreme despair. But even Lala Lajpat Rai, an ardent nationalist, told Beatrice Webb that he too had little confidence in Indians and was too fearful of other imperial powers to want Britain to leave India completely (71). These were isolated examples. Yet they were significant because they reinforced notions already entertained by important members of the British intelligentsia.

Another such notion, inherited from the past, and firmly embedded in the imperial mind by frequent reiteration, in various places, was the idea that constitutional changes were sought by a tiny minority, and that the majority were content to be under British rule. A few individuals detected a growing hostility to British rule among the Indian masses (72). But such opinions, contrary to the popular preconceptions, could not dislodge the idea that Indian nationalism was the political activity of a minority, and even the nationalist movements of 1919-22 failed to alter that idea.

The inclination of the British to see Indian nationalism and its manifestations as being confined to a very small segment of Indian society meant that they never formed a proper intellectual perception about

the nature and strength of Indian nationalism. At a pragmatic level, no doubt, the responses of the Government were dictated to some extent by its perception of the strengths and weaknesses of the nationalist movement in India. And this explains too why the authorities, in India and in Britain, were keen to stifle expressions of nationalism, which appeared to them to be seditious, if not actually treasonable. Two examples from this period illustrate this attitude.

An Indian student at the Dundee University College of St. Andrew's University, speaking to the Hibbert Literary Club, said that India had been systematically robbed, oppressed and demoralized by an insidious military conquest under the guise of commercial invasion, and that ever since the British came to rule in India they had subordinated Indian interests to those of Britain. The Senate of the University felt that such outbursts should be met with some rebuke severe enough to deter other students, and sought the advice of the India Office. The India Office, in its reply to the University, indicated that the Secretary of State concurred with the opinion of the Senate, and that he would welcome any disciplinary action that the University might propose to take (73).

The other example concerns the flying of the nationalist or swaraj flag on municipal buildings in India. The victory of the extremists in the municipal elections in the United Provinces had made it probable that swaraj flags would be flown, and Sir William Marris, the Governor of the United Provinces, felt that the Government could not acquiesce in such an act, and that a quick blow ought to be struck, either by prosecutions under Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code (which dealt with sedition) or by an ad hoc law prohibiting the flying of flags upon buildings controlled by legally constituted or Government-aided local authorities (74). In the India Office, there was virtually

total agreement with the opinion of Marris (75).

It was perhaps natural that the British authorities should take exception to official bodies flying the banner of nationalism or to students expounding anti-British sentiments in Britain. Sir William Duke had in fact regarded the Dundee speech of the Indian student as ill-mannered, apart from its political considerations (76). What is of significance in these instances is the fact that such manifestations of Indian nationalism were seen as necessitating stern action to preclude their recurrence in the future. It would appear, therefore, that the British, while denying the spread of nationalist sentiments to deeper levels of Indian society, were, at the same time, unwilling to let any overt display of nationalism pass unnoticed.

It was, however, in the Legislative Assembly and the provincial councils that Indian nationalism found its expression during this period of relative peace. The rejection of finance bills and the refusal to accept office were clear demonstrations of nationalist sentiment. To the Viceroy, Reading, these steps seemed to be wresting self-government in the very face of Government opposition (77).

To others, the response of the Indians seemed to suggest that the policy of conciliation had totally failed (78). The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms had been designed to conciliate the Indian moderates and thus secure willing collaborators. That the reform scheme could not do this was an index of the new, more assertive nationalism in India. The British failed to recognize this because they were unable to escape from the influence of inherited images about Indian nationalism.

The result was that Britain tended to adopt a more reactionary attitude towards India. The apparent failure of the policy of conciliation, the growing hostility of the Indian nationalists, and the waning of imperial prestige, coupled with an imperfect understanding of Indian

nationalism, caused a reaction to set in.

Thus, when the Labour Party came to power in London in January 1924, they were faced, not merely with the very real Parliamentary constraints of being a Government without a majority, but also with an atmosphere of strong and articulated hostility to Indian nationalism. The Labour Party had always expressed sympathy for the aspirations of the Indian nationalists, but now, when they actually had the reins of Government in their hands, they could not move as they wished, either in the case of India or in domestic politics. This fact was recognized by the outgoing Secretary of State, Lord Peel. He doubted if the Labour Party could undertake any major constitutional change in India, given its preoccupations with domestic issues and international problems such as the Ruhr question, and the fact that they could not do much anyhow without the agreement of the other Parties (79).

It was during the Labour Party's brief dalliance with the semblance of power that B.C.H. Calcraft Kennedy published, under the pseudonym of 'Al. Carthill', The Lost Dominion, a book in which he suggested that it was impossible to maintain or re-establish British control over India, as the Indian Empire 'must now continue with ever increasing momentum to follow the course on which it has been launched' (80). Its appearance at this juncture perhaps increased the fears of those who believed that a Labour Government would lean rather too much towards the Indian nationalists. But could the Labour Party in power have put into practice what it had preached when in opposition? The constraints were far too many for the Labour Government to have taken any effective steps towards meeting Indian political demands.

Gandhi recognized this. He felt that, since it was dependent on the support of other Parties, the Labour Party was bound to sacrifice India for the sake of domestic policies and thus might even turn

out to be worse than the Liberals or the Conservatives (81).

The Prime Minister hastened, in fact, to assure everybody that the Labour Party was not going to alter the policy towards India. In a statement to The Hindu of Madras, Ramsay MacDonald declared that no Party in Britain would be cowed by threats of force or of policies designed to bring government to a standstill, and warned that, if the Swarajists persisted in unconstitutional methods, the Labour Government would deal with them as firmly as any other Government (82).

The Swarajists, who had won majorities in the Legislative Assembly, in the province of Bengal, and in the Central Provinces in December 1923, had already passed a resolution in the Assembly demanding that immediate steps should be taken to grant full responsible government. But, in the circumstances, the Labour Government could hardly consider, let alone act upon, such a demand. Sir Leslie Wilson, Governor of Bombay, correctly analysed the situation in Britain, and came to the conclusion that no Party was likely to raise a major question on India with so many international and domestic difficulties facing the country, and he was of the opinion that the new Secretary of State for India, Lord Olivier, would give the required support to the Government of India to meet the difficulties in India (83).

The Prime Minister had in fact given assurances to Baldwin and other Conservatives which satisfied them (84). Presumably MacDonald had indicated that he was not likely to initiate any radical change in India. At the same time, he expressed the idea that it was unfair that Indians should be taking action to force his hand so soon after he had taken office, and before he had had time to explore the whole situation, as no Government could rush headlong into great policies (85).

After all, it was inconceivable that the Conservatives would have accepted any suggestion of a change in India, especially under a

Labour Government which had, when in opposition, proclaimed its sympathy for Indian self-government. The British Empire was an essential element of Conservative political philosophy. Hence even a hint of weakening the imperial structure was intolerable to the Conservatives (86). What were seen to be the 'antics' of the Swarajists,in the Assembly (their rejection of the Finance Bill, for example) and elsewhere, tended to harden attitudes against Indian nationalists (87).

Sir Michael O'Dwyer argued that abandoning the trust of the Indian masses at the bidding of a 'small Indian oligarchy' would constitute the greatest betrayal in history (88). The imperial historian, Reginald Coupland, in India with the Lee Commission on All India Services, was convinced that Parliament must refuse to grant self-government when the 1919 constitution came up for revision in 1929, and that on the contrary it should retain the safeguards of an active governor and a corps d'élite of English ICS and police officers under the control of the Secretary of State (89). Reginald Craddock was even more emphatic. He too had gone to India with the Lee Commission, and gave the impression that he thought on Morning Post lines, believing that, when the reforms failed,the 'good old days' of paternal government would return (90).

Lord Meston gave a new explanation of Indian nationalism. He asserted that it was only the Brahmin who desired self-government, so that he could preserve his dominant position in the face of increasing challenges from the lower castes (91).

Indian nationalism was essentially a secular phenomenon, although it might have, in the localities, derived some energy from latent forces embedded in religion and caste. Gandhi's tactics of political action and his ideas on religion and caste appeared to British observers to be investing Indian nationalism with a religious tint. To them,

nationalist politics seemed to be a mask for hiding the struggle between castes and religions. Meston's argument reflected therefore a fairly common notion in Britain that Indian nationalism was high-caste Hindu nationalism, and thus to be despised by democrats.

But what all the various ideas meant at this time was that India was not ready for any change in her constitution.

The Government could not, at the same time, appear to be totally indifferent to the Indian demands, for, it was recognized, unless something substantial was done quickly in India, the Swarajists would gather even more strength (92). An initial idea that was seriously considered was the one promoted by Josiah Wedgwood, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and the confidant of several Indian leaders, who suggested that a group of Indian leaders should be invited to London to hold discussions with the Government (93). But the idea ran aground in the conservative shoals of the India Council. Sir Charles Bayley, the Senior Member of the Council, was incensed by the thought that there could be any such contact between the King-Emperor's Government and extremists and seditionists who were trying to make government impossible while also cursing it in the vilest terms (94).

But it was not only India Office die-hards who thought the idea unsuitable. Even Lionel Curtis, one of the architects of the 1919 Act, thought that it would be better to send someone like Hilton Young to India to report on the working of the Act, rather than have a 'lot of extremists brought over here for a conference' (95).

The strenuous opposition of Reading finally killed the idea, and the Government had to consider other means of satisfying Indian political demands which would also be acceptable to the British Parliament. This necessarily hinged upon the continual demand made in India for an inquiry into the working of the Act of 1919 earlier than 1929.

The Government, however, was unable to accede to this, partly due to the personal predilections of the Secretary of State, and partly due to the opposition of the Council of India (96). In a Cabinet Memorandum, Olivier argued that it was not practical politics to institute an earlier inquiry, and to accede to the demand for self-government would be an act of insane levity (97). He was unwilling to advance the date of the inquiry because he thought that it would imply that the 1919 reforms were a failure, or that they had served their transitional function as a training school (98).

It would appear that there were at this time a set of forces which were interacting and in turn influencing the policy towards India. One was the need to do something in India that would stop the slide of the nationalists in India towards ever more extreme positions. Then there were the critics of the Government's policy whose voices were more influential at this juncture because the Government was in a weak position. Finally, there was pressure within the Labour Party to take progressive measures in India. The result, at this time, of these interacting tensions was an offer of a Departmental Inquiry under the chairmanship of Sir A.P. Muddiman, with extremely limited terms of reference. It was charged with an examination of the Government of India Act to see what remedies were necessary and possible within the structure of that Act (99).

Meanwhile, Willingdon, who alone among the Governors in India had been able to operate the reforms fairly successfully, continued to lobby for quick action, although he had left India. He felt that leaders could not emerge in India unless some responsibility was given, and more of it must be given to the Indians, and given at once, or the alternative would be the production of another Ireland in India (100). Willingdon was convinced that any return to the old days and to the path of the die-hards

would result in a revolution in India which could be suppressed for a time, but which would ultimately succeed through sheer numbers(101).

It is possible that Willingdon was expounding, although from a different viewpoint, a view which was as alarmist as that of the die-hards, for the Government of India had earlier refused to pay heed to such warnings and had continued to take a calmer view of the Indian situation (102). At the same time, there was evidently a visible ground-swell of political discontent in India, which needed to be deflected, if it was to be prevented from overwhelming the Raj. An attempt was made in this direction by Mrs Annie Besant. As General Secretary of the 'National Convention', a coalition of moderate politicians in India, she led, in July 1924,a deputation to the Prime Minister, and stated on their behalf that the Government should either do or say something which would tend to make India believe that the Government was sincere in its desire to help India to freedom (103).

Mrs Besant suggested that either a Commission should be appointed which could receive the Constitution Bill drafted by the National Convention, or, alternatively, such a Bill would be introduced as a Private Bill in Parliament. This Bill, which came to be called the Commonwealth of India Bill, was adopted by the National Convention, then cast in Parliamentary form by Henry Slesser and Arthur Henderson Jr. (104). By this time, of course, the Labour Party had ceased to hold office, and could take up a more sympathetic stance on India once again, and Mrs Besant tried to get Ramsay MacDonald to become one of the Parliamentary sponsors of the Bill (105). Although she failed to persuade MacDonald (it is probable that as leader of the Party MacDonald wanted to keep his options open), the Bill was sponsored by leading Labour MPs such as George Lansbury, Josiah Wedgwood, Hugh Dalton and Henry Lees-Smith. The Bill could not, however, have much success. While it

must have seemed too radical in Britain, it was unacceptable to the Swarajists, who had had no hand in its formulation, and, as they were becoming the clearly dominant group in India, a Bill remote from them had little chance of being accepted officially. Besides, events such as the General Strike of 1926 overtook it in England, and ultimately it was sidetracked by the appointment of a Statutory Commission in 1927, and the consequent events.

If the inability or unwillingness of the Labour Party when it was in office to take any effective steps to meet Indian aspirations disillusioned Indian leaders, what evoked their overt hostility was the position that the Labour Party adopted on the Bengal Ordinance. The Governor of Bengal, Lord Lytton, had sought special powers to contain what he and his government regarded as the rapidly growing terrorist movement, arguing that even the Swarajist leaders in Bengal, Subhas Chandra Bose and C.R. Das, were financing the terrorists (106). Reading was reluctant to sanction the adoption of such special powers, partly because he felt that the result would be to unite Indian politicians of all shades (107). The Cabinet in London was also unwilling to accept Lytton's arguments, and it agreed with Reading that existing measures should be fully tried and that new legislation was not necessary (108).

Josiah Wedgwood, who was opposed in principle to such coercive legislation, nevertheless proposed that it should be used as a bargaining counter. His idea was that the Cabinet should agree to the special powers requested by Lytton, with the proviso that Lytton should offer 'office' to C.R. Das (109). He reiterated this idea in Cabinet, arguing, with C.P. Trevelyan, that the proposed coercive measures should be accompanied by conciliatory measures (110). Olivier and Chelmsford demurred, however, as they were unwilling to couple

concessions of any kind with a measure designed to repress violent crime (111).

In the end, the arguments of the Bengal government persuaded the Viceroy to support its demand for special legislation, and the Home Government had no choice but to comply. It had no choice because of its inner weaknesses, and the dominance of anti-Indian views, along with the necessity of appearing to be opposed to terrorist violence. It had no choice also because the Cabinet was divided in its attitudes, and it would appear that Chelmsford and Olivier tilted the balance (112). As a sop to its conscience, and to possible critics, the Cabinet expressed its desire that the powers sanctioned should be limited to acts which involved physical violence, although Chelmsford felt that this need not hinder action (113). The Cabinet also expressed its anxiety that the Viceroy should immediately devise some political policy which would rescue India from drifting further into the revolutionary movement (114).

In India, the Ordinance did evoke an angry response from all shades of political opinion, but Olivier dismissed it as indicating the practical weakness of the Indian politician (115). But Olivier could not help criticizing the Ordinance for prohibiting the employment of Counsel to defend persons proceeded against under it: he could see that there were reasons for the prohibition, but felt that it was an objectionable clause, and that Reading, a former Chief Justice, must find it disagreeable to take up and defend such an attitude (116).

The fall of the Labour Government and the return of the Conservatives with a large majority in November 1924 could not have made much difference to Indian nationalists, since the preceding Labour administration had done little to meet their demands, and in fact had initiated repressive legislation. Arthur Hirtzel, Under-Secretary of

State at the India Office, did think that, if the Labour Party had continued in power, a determined effort might have been made to go beyond the recommendations of the Muddiman Committee Report (117). But, given the political constraints which operated, it was extremely unlikely that the Labour Party would have gone much further with Indian reforms. British public opinion was also an obstacle which at this juncture was still insuperable.

It must have been recognized in India that the Labour Party had been a prisoner of Parliamentary politics, and that it was therefore rendered incapable of effecting any significant changes in the Indian constitution. But even an ardent moderate like Srinivasa Sastri, one of the leading Indian liberals, was moved to remark that history had taught him that nothing could be got out of England except by agitation (118).

But, if the Labour Government had been struggling with its conscience and with those who wanted a sterner attitude adopted, the new Government was avowedly imperialist, and also hostile to Indian nationalism. The Cabinet chosen by Stanley Baldwin was replete with figures not too friendly to Indian nationalism - Lord Curzon, Winston Churchill, Joynson-Hicks, and the Secretary of State for India, Lord Birkenhead.

Birkenhead, for example, thought that it was inconceivable that India would ever be fit for Dominion self-government, and doubted that re-examination in 1929 (at this time he was certain that the date of the statutory inquiry should not be altered) would suggest even the slightest extension of the reforms (119). Birkenhead came to the India Office with the clear conviction, fostered by his reading of Indian history, that the British Government in India, resting as it did upon prestige, could stand anything but a suspicion of weakness (120).

The Cabinet as a whole, Birkenhead pointed out to the Viceroy,

was under the influence of a reaction from the 'Montagu Reforms', as it was thought that too much had been given away, under the Coalition, and since (121).

But, inherently hostile to Indian nationalism as it was, the new Government too had to confront and attempt to solve the problem of Indian political change. Acts of terrorism might be extinguished by special legislation, but the smouldering fires of nationalism were not, could not be,quenched by temporary expedients such as departmental inquiries. A way had to be found to snuff out these slowly burning fires, and at the same time keep India firmly within the Empire. It must have been evident that this could not be done with an unbridled use of force, although this was always being urged by various people, for the nationalist movement was now too strong to be put down by force alone. The composition of the new Cabinet perhaps was another factor in determining the policy that it would adopt towards India, for, unlike previous Conservative Cabinets, this one was dominated by businessmen, Stanley Baldwin himself being an industrial capitalist of the first rank (122).

It was only logical that these businessmen should have sought to restore peaceful conditions in India, so that India could continue to be an arena for profitable investment by British capital. The growth of the Indian business class, quickened during the Great War and subsequent years, had already proved to be an important element in shaping the nature and strategy of the nationalist movement. Indian capitalists were seeking greater economic freedom, and thus providing the economic component (and, in the process, the economic wherewithal) of the nationalist movement. India was no longer a mere producer of raw materials. It was quickly becoming a rival to British industry, even if on a limited scale, and in limited commercial spheres. The time had come

for British commercial interests to retain the association of the Indian capitalists, albeit in a subordinate role, and this, it must have seemed at that time, could be done only through a solution of the political problem, not by coercion, but across the green baize table.

This, however, was a very difficult proposition for a Conservative Government. To overcome imperial hubris and forsake the traditions of the Empire, to negotiate with the very people who were insidiously and persistently undermining the very foundations of that Empire, must have seemed an impossible idea. Yet, if India was to be prevented from sliding down the slippery slopes of nationalism towards independence, it had to be done.

Initially, it did seem to Birkenhead and others that the Swarajists were losing ground in India. Birkenhead saw the development of what he called a promising split between the moderates and the Swarajists, and hoped that it would grow (123). Willingdon too, probably deriving his information from the India Office, thought that the Swarajists were nearly finished (124). Perhaps the moderates in India were still nurturing hopes that the Government would act on the Muddiman Committee Report, hopes that may have been reinforced by the fact that Reading was visiting London (125). The Muddiman Committee had presented two reports, the majority confining themselves strictly to the terms of reference under which the Committee had been set up and therefore recommending minor modifications to the Government of India Act, while the minority recommended radical alteration of the Act, and suggested the replacement of Dyarchy with a unitary system of responsible governments in the provinces, as well as at the centre. The Legislative Assembly had adopted a resolution recommending the acceptance by the Government of the minority report, and in fact going beyond it.

The Indian leaders did not have to wait long for the response of the Government. After talks with Reading, Birkenhead made a statement in the House of Lords on 7 July 1925, in which he rejected the minority report of the Muddiman Committee and stated that the Government would consider the majority report to see what steps could be taken as a consequence (126). He also reiterated the sentiments expressed by Lloyd George in 1922, but in much more emphatic terms. The Act of 1919 had been an experiment, he said, and declared that the Government would not be 'diverted from its high obligations by the tactics of restless impatience. The door of acceleration is not open to menace; still less is to be stormed by violence' (127). Birkenhead did not fail to repeat the argument that India was not yet a nation, and, as if to support his argument, threw down a challenge to the critics in India: if they thought that their greater knowledge of Indian conditions qualified them to succeed where they claimed the British had failed, 'let them produce a constitution which carries behind it a fair measure of general agreement among the great peoples of India' (128).

Birkenhead was probably counting on the fact that, in addition to the lack of national unity, Indians lacked political unity, and would therefore be unable to produce any such constitution. It had indeed been an enduring tenet of British attitudes to India, that India was not a nation, and the continual conflicts that appeared to cleave Indian society along religious, political and economic lines seemed to confirm this idea.

On the other hand, attitudes are conditioned and shaped also by the existing notions, and observers of the Indian scene tended to see the divisions and ignored the rapidly forming web of relationships that was creating a unity of purpose and, in the process, developing a national consciousness. It can also be argued that the negation of nationalism was a means of rationalizing continued

subordination of India. If the nationhood of India was denied, then it would be logically easier to argue that the politicians who were demanding self-government did not represent the people of India, and could therefore be ignored. It was in the nature of the political structure of India that there should be contending factions and groups, all vying for scarce political rewards. But there was an external force, which, while contributing to these divisions, also, paradoxically, provided the unifying force. This was the common desire for freedom, although the measure of freedom desired might have been varied.

It is possible that Birkenhead, when he made the challenge to Indian leaders, was aware that they might have been able, because of this common desire, to sink their differences long enough to forge a constitution, because he did not promise that such a constitution would be accepted, or even that it would be presented to Parliament. He stated merely that it would be carefully examined by the Government of India, by himself, and by the Statutory Commission, whenever that body might be appointed (129). It is also interesting that, in making such a statement, he sought to attempt to detach the moderates from the extremists, by expressing the hope that the liberals, reinforced by new moderate elements, would play a great part in the constitution-making of the future, thus illustrating one of the cornerstones of British policy, namely the necessity of securing the support of moderates, in order to undermine the political influence of extremists.

Not surprisingly, Birkenhead's speech <u>was</u> seen as a successful attempt to rally the Indian moderates to the side of the Government, while shattering false Indian hopes and boosting the morale of the Services in India (130). Birkenhead's object was to embarrass the Swarajists while satisfying official opinion in India, noted an India Office official, adding that he <u>could</u> have made a <u>Morning</u>

Post speech, aimed at cheering up the English in India (131).

There were several reasons why attempts were continually made to dislodge, and, if possible, destroy the Swarajists. First, they were, unlike the moderates, making increasingly untenable demands, such as full, responsible government. Second, they were putting across these demands and sustaining them, using political tactics that seemed to the British to be at once strange and abhorrent. Third, the attitudes of the British to the Swarajist, or the extremist nationalist, were conditioned by their strongly held notion that he (or she) was, in many ways, a contemptible creature (132). It was not just the fact that the moderate delivered eloquent speeches in calm, measured tones to request politely the grant of some concession or other, whereas the Swarajist demanded freedom in violent language, and used unacceptable tactics like political and economic boycott that estranged the latter more and more from his political masters. It is likely that the Swarajists were in fact reacting to the attitudes of the British. There was also the related fact that the British tended to see the worst of the Indian politician, and did not attempt to see Indian problems from an Indian angle.

Edward Thompson, the noted missionary and writer, recognized this to be a key problem. In a letter to The Times Literary Supplement, he wrote (133):

> Our attitude, not that of Indians is the key to the situation. A change of heart on the part of Indians, however desirable, would be ineffective. Both parties in an imperial relationship can be exasperated to the point of violence, but only one side is efficiently armed.

In fact, Thompson himself made an attempt to correct the imbalance in attitudes, in his book on the Mutiny of 1857 entitled The Other Side of the Medal, in which he sought to present a more balanced view of the events of that 'Red Year'. The Mutiny and its memories still lived

on, and its events were even, on occasion, re-enacted for visiting dignitaries.(134). It was an important element in shaping the psychological perspectives of the Briton, official or non-official. The Amritsar Affair and its consequences served, not to counter this perspective, but, paradoxically, to strengthen it. When, in the libel case between Sir Michael O'Dwyer and Sir Sankaran Nair, Mr Justice McCardie, delivering judgment in favour of O'Dwyer, made certain obiter dicta indicating that the force used by General Dyer was necessary, and that he was wrongly punished, he was demonstrating an unjudicial sentiment, but expressing a widely felt opinion (135). Lord Olivier, when he was Secretary of State,had felt, in fact, that such opinions as the British held about the nationalists in India, that they were all irreconcilably anti-British, and that they were seditious, made for political difficulties (136).

The argument that can be advanced is not that the psychological attitudes determined the political policy actually adopted at any given time, but that they tended to influence policy. That is to say, it was very difficult for any British official or politician to view with equanimity the idea of negotiating with or treating as an equal any Indian leader. But in the ultimate analysis political realities had to be faced, and this meant that Swarajists had to be reckoned with.

This must have been one of the reasons why Birkenhead, who had declared against an advancement of the date of the statutory inquiry into the 1919 Act when he came to the India Office in November 1924, began, by the end of 1925, to consider the idea of an early inquiry seriously. No doubt, the reason for the change that he actually advanced was that this would preclude a more radical Commission being appointed by a Labour Government that might come to power in the future (137). But it does seem very likely that he was hoping through this means to

further sharpen the divisions among the Swarajists. Indeed, at the very time that Birkenhead was consulting Reading about this idea, Hilton Young was describing how the more reasonable wing (as he put it) of the Swaraj Party was inclined to split off to accept an earlier revision of the constitution in return for co-operation in the mean time (138). The Viceroy too thought that an early appointment of the Commission would have a distinctly favourable effect on the political situation in India (139). It may be safely surmised, therefore, that it was not purely for the sake of pre-empting a Labour-Party-appointed Commission that Birkenhead decided to advance the date of the required inquiry. Interestingly, in a statement of policy, the Independent Labour Party also indicated that neither India nor Britain could wait until 1929 for the statutory inquiry, and that the Labour Party should press for immediate action (140). Having virtually decided upon the advancement of the date, Birkenhead then took up the question of the composition of the Commission. He was inclined to think that it should include Indians (141).

Ironically, Lord Irwin, who had succeeded Reading to the Viceroyalty, and who had been of the opinion that the Indian leaders let their hearts mesmerize their heads, and who had been told that they were singularly responsive to ordinary courtesy, nevertheless advised Birkenhead against the inclusion of Indians (142). He reinforced this by suggesting that the best defence for not having Indians would be to have only members of both Houses of Parliament on the Commission (143). A new Viceroy, still coming to grips with the immense complexities of the Indian political scene, succumbed to his official advisers, and tilted the balance in favour of an all-British Parliamentary Commission, and thus contributed to the storm unleashed by that tactical blunder.

It can be argued that the predominant reason for the decision to appoint a Parliamentary Commission without including Indians was the feeling that Indian nationalism was too weak a force. The five years of 'peace' had created the impression that the force of nationalism, which in any case had been regarded as insignificant, had spent itself. Thus, Sir Warden Chilcott, a die-hard MP, could write in March 1926 that no 'important' section or Party in India desired to see the end of the 'White Raj' (144). The illusion of peace created, or rather reinforced, the illusion of Indian nationalism as a spent force. This illusion was naturally stronger in Britain, and as most of those expressing opinions on this issue had been exposed to Indian nationalism in its nascent period, they too reinforced the illusion. The British image of Indian nationalism remained virtually unaltered in the five years after the end of the non-co-operation movement, and it was this fact which led Irwin and Birkenhead to launch an all-British Commission.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. Max Beloff, Imperial Sunset Volume I: Britain's Liberal Empire, 1897-1921, London, 1969, p. 344

2. For a discussion of this idea of a general crisis, see John Gallagher, 'Nationalisms and the Crisis of Empire, 1919-1922', Modern Asian Studies, 15 (1981), pp. 355-368

3. The theory of empires resting upon the support of local collaborators is set out in Ronald Robinson, 'Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration', in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (eds.), Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, London, 1972, pp. 117-42; the Indian case is considered in Anil Seal, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth Century, Cambridge, 1968; see also Anil Seal, 'Imperialism and Nationalism' in John Gallagher, Anil Seal and Gordon Johnson, (eds.), Locality, Province and Nation: Essays on Indian Politics, 1870-1940, Cambridge, 1973

4. Judith Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power: Indian Politics, 1915-1922, Cambridge, 1972

5. D.A. Low, 'The Government of India and the First Non-Cooperation Movement, 1920-1922', Journal of Asian Studies, 25 (1966), pp. 241-59

6. Algernon Rumbold, Watershed in India 1914-1922, London 1979, pp. iv, 315-22

7. The Times, 18 January 1922

8. The Times, 25 January 1922

9. See, for example, leader in The Times, 25 January 1922, and letter to the Editor from Sir Hugh S. Barnes, a former member of the Council of India, in The Times, 22 February 1922

10. Speech to the 1920 Club, reported in The Times, 10 February 1922

11. For example, H.H. Dodwell (ed.), The Cambridge History of India, Volume VI: The Indian Empire, 1858-1918, Cambridge, 1932, p. vi; John Strachey, India,its Administration and Progress, London, 1911, pp. 1-5

12. Daily Mail, 10 March 1922

13. Observer, 12 March 1922

14. The Times, 18 January 1922, 10 February 1922, and 15 February 1922

15. Punch, 22 February 1922

16. See Michael Kinnear, The Fall of Lloyd George, London, 1973

17. Chelmsford to Reading, 1 March 1922, Reading Papers, 238/22. See also Winston Churchill to Clementine Churchill, 11 February 1922, in Martin Gilbert (ed.), Winston Churchill, Volume IV Companion, Part 3, London, 1977, p. 1768.

18. The Times, 21 February 1922

19. Montagu to Reading, 1 February 1922, Reading Papers, 238/4

20. Chelmsford to Reading, 1 March 1922, Reading Papers, 238/22

21. Maurice Cowling, The Impact of Labour, 1920-1924, Cambridge, 1971

22. 'The Indian Paradox' (Editorial Article), New Statesman, 11 February 1922, pp. 522-3

23. Edward Hyams, The New Statesman: The History of the First Fifty Years , London, 1963, p. 135

24. See, for example, Willingdon to Reading, 4 March 1922, Reading Papers, 118/106

25. H.V. Cobb to Lord Lytton, 5 March 1922, Lytton Papers, 27.

26. ibid.

27. Daily Herald, 10 March 1922

28. Daily Herald, 11 March 1922

29. Daily Mail, 11 March 1922; The Times, 12 March 1922; Daily Telegraph, 13 March 1922

30. Chelmsford to Reading, 30 March 1922, Reading Papers, 118/104

31. Lord Montagu of Beaulieu to Reading, 18 May 1922, Reading Papers, 238/22

32. Daily Herald, 20 March 1922

33. Lord Cromer to Harcourt Butler, 19 August 1922, Butler Papers, 51.

34. The Times, 2 February 1922

35. W.H. Pease to the Secretary of State, 27 March 1922, L/P&J/6/1798, India Office Records

36. Lloyd George to Reading, 26 July 1922, Reading Papers, 238/22

37. 157 H.C.Deb.5s, 2 August 1922, 1507 ff.

38. loc. cit.

39. Peel to Reading, 10 August 1922, Reading Papers, 238/4

40. Observer, 19 March 1922

41. Michael F. O'Dwyer, 'India without Mr. Montagu and Gandhi', Fortnightly Review, 112 (August 1922), pp. 212-29

42. J.R. Chancellor to Lytton, 30 September 1922, Lytton Papers, 27

43. See, for example, G.M. Chesney, 'The Passing of the ICS', Fortnightly Review, 113 (May 1923), pp. 828-36

44. Lloyd George to Reading, 26 July 1922, Reading Papers, 238/22

45. David C. Potter, 'Manpower Shortage and the End of Colonialism: the Case of the Indian Civil Service',Modern Asian Studies, 7 (1973), pp. 47-73; a similar argument is in Colin Cross, The Fall of the British Empire, 1918-1968, London, 1968, pp. 42-3

46. T.H. Beaglehole, 'From Rulers to Servants: the I.C.S. and the British Demission of Power in India', Modern Asian Studies, 11 (1977), pp. 237-55

47. R. Coupland to Malcolm Seton, 16 January 1924, Seton Papers, 12; see also, H.G. Haig to S.F. Stewart, 23 April 1932, Stewart Papers, 10

48. Philip Mason, A Shaft of Sunlight: Memories of a Varied Life, London, 1978, p. 76

49. For details of the methods used by the India Office, see David C. Potter, 'Manpower Shortage'.

50. See Clive Dewey, 'The End of the Imperialism of Free Trade: the Eclipse of the Lancashire Lobby and the Concession of Fiscal Autonomy to India', in Clive Dewey and A.G. Hopkins (eds.), The Imperial Impact: Studies in the Economic History of Africa and India, London, 1978, pp. 35-67

51. The Times, 25 February 1922

52. The Times, 4 March 1922

53. Legislative Assembly, Official Record, 19 September 1921

54. See the Minutes of the Meeting held on 26 July 1922, copy enclosed with S.K. Brown to Geoffrey de Montmorency, 16 August 1922, Reading Papers, 238/22. See also Private Telegram, Reading to Peel, 13 January 1923, enclosed with Peel to Bonar Law, 15 January 1923, in Bonar Law Papers, 111/28. In this telegram, Reading had pointed out that while he constantly considered the problems of the Government at home, he also had to deal with an enthusiastic protectionistic majority in the Legislature and in the country, and any impression that British interests alone were important would be fatal.

55. See Charles E. Low, 'The Future Development of Indian Industries', Asiatic Review, 20 (January 1924), pp. 99-121

56. See the Round Table, 14 (December 1923), p. 98

57. 'Recent Indian Trade Statistics (Compiled from Official Sources)', Asiatic Review, 22 (January 1926), pp. 102-12

58. Gilbert Slater, 'Protection for India' [Paper read to the East India Association, 19 March 1923.] Asiatic Review, 19 (April 1923), pp. 262-76

59. The Times, 22 March 1922

60. J.H. Oldham to Lothian, 31 December 1921, Lothian Papers, 19

61. H.A.L. Fisher to Lytton, 12 April 1922, Lytton Papers, 27

62. Willingdon to Reading, 27 March 1922, Reading Papers, 118/106

63. Montagu to Lytton, 30 September 1922, Lytton Papers, 25

64. Minutes of Ministers' Conference, 9 February 1922, quoted in Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. 4, Companion, Part 3, London 1977, pp. 1762-3. See also Churchill's speech at the Kenya Club dinner, 27 January 1922, in which he said that 'the democratic principles of Europe are by no means suited to the development of Asiatic and African people.': Robert Rhodes James (ed.), Winston S. Churchill, His Complete Speeches, 1897-1963, Volume III, 1914-1922, New York, 1974, pp. 3172-4

65. Henry Craik, 'Britain's Responsibility in India', Asiatic Review, 18 (April 1922), pp. 188-96

66. The Times, 5 January 1923

67. See P.G. Robb, The Government of India and Reform: Policies Towards Politics and the Constitution, 1916-1921, Oxford, 1976.

68. The Times, 26 January 1923

69. The Times, 2 January 1923

70. Bhupendranath Basu to Lord Olivier, 27 March 1924, copy enclosed with Basu to Beatrice Webb, 27 March 1924, Passfield Papers, II.4.h.

71. Beatrice Webb Diary, Typescript, entry for 28 June 1926

72. J.H. Oldham to Lothian, 31 December 1921, Lothian Papers, 19

73. See L/P&J/1792, No. 1161, India Office Records. This account is based on this file.

74. William Marris to Malcolm Seton, 30 March 1923, Seton Papers, 11

75. Note, 23 April 1923, by Malcolm Seton, Seton Papers, 11. Seton thought that there were close parallels here with the early stages of the Sinn Fein programme in Ireland, where the object was to capture local bodies and use them as centres of aggressive nationalism. In a private letter to Reading, Peel indicated that, if the flying of the Swaraj flag were permitted, it would be construed as a sign of weakness on the part of the Government of India. (Peel to Reading, 2 May 1923, extract in Seton Papers, 11.)

76. Note by William Duke, L/P&J/1792, No. 1161, India Office Records.

77. Reading to Lloyd George, 3 May 1923, Lloyd George Papers, G/16/8/1

78. Indo-British Association, The Crumbling of an Empire, London, 1922. The Indo-British Association was a right-wing organization committed to the perpetuation of British rule over India. Although it became defunct in 1922, the ideas it espoused lingered on.

79. Peel to Reading, 21 January 1924, Reading Papers, 238/7

80. 'Al. Carthill', The Lost Dominion, London, 1924, p. 327. According to Francis Humphrys, contemporary readers thought that the author hiding under the pseudonym was Bampfylde Fuller: see Humphrys to Reading, 19 July 1924, Reading Papers, 238/22. It was actually B.C.H. Calcraft Kennedy of the ICS.

81. Quoted in Wilfred Wellock, 'Gandhi', Socialist Review,24 (December 1924), pp. 204-7

82. See the New Leader, 1 February 1924

83. Leslie Wilson to Henry Page Croft, 4 February 1924, Croft Papers, 1/20. See also Leslie Wilson to Winston Churchill, 19 April 1924, in Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. V, Companion, Part 1, pp. 146-7

84. Earl Winterton to Lytton, 23 April 1924, Lytton Papers, 25

85. MacDonald to P.R. Das, 28 February 1924, MacDonald Papers,2. P.R. Das was a brother of the Swarajist leader, C.R. Das.

86. See for example draft note on the policy to be followed by the Conservatives, by Henry Page Croft, copy enclosed with Croft to L.S. Amery, 29 January 1924, Croft Papers, 1/2.

87. George Lloyd to Reading, 5 March 1924, Reading Papers, 238/22 The result was, Lloyd wrote, to cast further doubts on the capacity of Indians for self-government.

88. Michael F. O'Dwyer, 'Three Years of Reform in India: A Plea for the Indian Masses', Fortnightly Review, 115 (March 1924), pp. 353-69

89. Reginald Coupland to Malcolm Seton, 16 January 1924, Seton Papers, 12

90. Alan Clark (ed.), 'A Good Innings': The Private Papers of Viscount Lee of Fareham, London, 1974, p. 245 (diary entry of Ruth Lee for 14 January- 2 February 1924)

91. Lord Meston, 'Indian Reform: the Second Stage', Contemporary Review, 125 (April 1925), pp. 409-15

92. See telegram, Malcolm Hailey to the Private Secretary to the Viceroy, 16 April 1924, Reading Papers, 238/22.

93. Partha Sarathi Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914-1964, London, 1975, p. 104

94. Olivier to Reading, 26 June 1924, Reading Papers, 238/7. Not very surprisingly, Conservatives were usually very reluctant to establish any direct links with Indian nationalists. Peel, for instance, reacted angrily when Motilal Nehru sent him a copy of an election manifesto of the Swaraj Party: see Peel to Reading, 12 December 1923, Reading Papers, 238/6

95. Thomas Jones, Whitehall Diary (ed. Keith Middlemas), Vol. 1. London, 1969, p. 272 (entry for 19 March 1924). Jones stated that,according to Maurice Hankey, Lord Arnold,the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies,had suggested that someone should be sent to India, but the Cabinet decided in favour of a conference.

96. Partha Sarathi Gupta, Imperialism, p. 103 et seq.

97. Cabinet Paper 208 (24), Public Record Office

98. Copy of the draft telegram to the Viceroy which according to the marginal note by Olivier was not sent, but sections of which were incorporated into a private letter to the Viceroy. MacDonald Papers, 35.

99. 61 H.L.Deb.5s., 1062. The Committee consisted of: Sir Alexander Muddiman, Home Member, Sir Muhammad Shafi, Law Member, GoI, Maharajah of Burdwan, Sir T.B. Sapru, Sir Arthur Froom, Sir Sivaswami Aiyar, Sir H. Moncrieff Smith, Secretary to the GoI, Mr M.A. Jinnah, Mr R.P. Paranjpye. The Cabinet hoped to get the support of the Swarajists for this Committee, by securing increased participation for Swarajist members, but the Viceroy felt that this would dishearten friends of the Government. Olivier to Reading, 31 May 1924, and Reading to Olivier, 2 June 1924, copies in MacDonald Papers, 81. In the event, no Swarajists took part.

100. Willingdon to Baldwin, 29 August 1924, Baldwin Papers, 102

101. Willingdon to Baldwin, 4 September 1924, Baldwin Papers, 102

102. See Olivier to Reading, 15 May 1924, Reading Papers, 238/7

103. The delegation which met the Prime Minister on 18 July 1924 consisted of Annie Besant, Syed Ali Imam, Shanmukam Chetty, MLA, Krishna Gupta, T. Rangachariar, A. Ranganathan MLC, K.C. Roy, Head of the Indian Press Association, Ishwar Saran, ex MLA, V.S. Srinivasa Sastri. In addition to the Prime Minister, Olivier was also present. See PREM 1/40, Public Record Office

104. L. Haden Guest to MacDonald, 4 December 1925, MacDonald Papers, 1170

105. Annie Besant to MacDonald, 2 November 1925, MacDonald Papers, 1170

106. Lytton to Reading, 26 June 1924, copy in MacDonald Papers, 36

107. Reading to Olivier, 9 July 1924, copy in MacDonald Papers, 36

108. Telegram, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 31 July 1924, MacDonald Papers, 36

109. Josiah C. Wedgwood to MacDonald, 12 September 1924, MacDonald Papers, 36

110. Cabinet Minutes, copy in MacDonald Papers, 36

111. See Olivier to MacDonald, 15 September 1924, MacDonald Papers, 36

112. Chelmsford to Reading, 25 November 1924, Reading Papers, 118/104. See also Telegram, Malcolm Hailey to Viceroy's Private Secretary, 24 April 1924, Reading Papers, 238/22.

113. Chelmsford to Reading, 24 September 1924, Reading Papers, 238/22.

114. ibid.

115. Olivier to Reading, 18 December 1924, Reading Papers, 238/22

116. ibid.

117. Arthur Hirtzel to Harcourt Butler, 4 December 1924, Butler Papers, 59

118. Quoted in Alan Clark (ed.), 'A Good Innings', p. 247 (Ruth Lee's diary entry for 25 February 1924)

119. Birkenhead to Reading, 4 December 1924, Reading Papers, 238/7

120. Birkenhead to Reading, 13 November 1924, Reading Papers, 238/7

121. Birkenhead to Reading, 20 November 1924, Reading Papers, 238/7. It is interesting that Birkenhead referred to the 'Montagu Reforms', thus apparently absolving Chelmsford.

122. A.J.P. Taylor, English History, 1914-1945, Harmondsworth, 1975, pp. 301-2

123. Birkenhead to Reading, 5 March 1925, Reading Papers, 238/8

124. Willingdon to Reading, 5 March 1925, Reading Papers, 238/22

125. Olivier to Reading, 11 March 1925, Reading Papers, 238/22 Olivier conjectured that the impending visit of Reading to England might lead people to believe that some action on the Muddiman Report was being considered and this might alleviate political tensions in India.

126. 61 H.L.Deb.5s., 1069 et seq.

127. ibid., 1077

128. ibid., 1086

129. ibid.

130. Hardinge to Birkenhead, 7 July 1925, copy in Baldwin Papers, 102. See also Lytton to Birkenhead, 13 July 1925, ibid. Lytton reported that Indians were pleasantly surprised by the note of sympathy in the speech, while Europeans might have liked a more challenging tone.

131. R.H.A Carter (Private Secretary to the Secretary of State) to Ronald Waterhouse, 15 July 1925, Baldwin Papers, 102

132. See for example Lytton to Baldwin, 12 August 1925, Baldwin Papers, 102, in which Lytton drew a denigratory picture of the Bengali politician. See also Lytton to Goschen, 15 January 1926, Goschen Papers, 3, in which Lytton declared that Dyarchy was unsuitable, not because of any inherent defects, but because it was incompatible with the mentality of the people.

133. Times Literary Supplement, 12 November 1925, p. 756

134. Alan Clark, (ed.), 'A Good Innings', pp. 246-7. (Ruth Lee's diary entry for 9 February 1924. She remarked that the re-enactment brought tears to the eyes of the spectators.)

135. See the Daily Telegraph, 6 June 1924

136. Olivier to Reading, 31 July 1924, Reading Papers, 238/7

137. Birkenhead to Reading, 10 December 1925, quoted in Partha Sarathi Gupta, Imperialism, p. 112. It is not clear why Birkenhead should have anticipated an early election at this stage and a possible Labour victory. He was perhaps reacting to the coal crisis of July 1925

138. Hilton Young to Lloyd George, 31 December 1925, Lloyd George Papers, G/10/14

139. Reading to Birkenhead, 11 February 1926, Reading Papers, 238/100

140. India Today: a Report on Conditions in India and an Outline of Policy, by the ILP Indian Advisory Committee, Independent Labour Party, London, no date (but internal evidence suggests early 1926).

141. Birkenhead to Irwin, 29 July 1926, Halifax Papers, 2

142. Irwin to Baldwin, 28 April 1926, Baldwin Papers, 102
Irwin to Birkenhead, 19 August 1926, Halifax Papers, 2

143. Irwin to Birkenhead, 17 November 1926, Halifax Papers, 2

144. Report of visit to India by Warden Chilcott, copy in Reading Papers, 238/82

## 3. The Gathering Storm: The Simon Commission Decision and the Aftermath, 1927-9

The decisions to advance the date of the statutory inquiry into the working of the Act of 1919 and to exclude Indians from the Royal Commission marked the beginning of a new phase in Anglo-Indian relations. They did not,however, indicate any shift in the way Indian politics was perceived. Indeed, the decisions, fraught as they were with serious consequences, can be understood only in the context of a continued misperception of the Indian scene.

The appointment of a Parliamentary Commission to report on Indian constitutional reforms naturally generated a renewed interest in India, and the subsequent controversy and boycott of the Commission in India sharpened the interest. The British public became more aware of the Indian problem, as it was debated and analysed much more frequently than before. Nevertheless, the dominant tendency was to persist in viewing Indian nationalism as a weak force, and, despite the emergence of alternative images of Indian society and politics, it would appear that traditional ideas still held sway.

In January 1927, the Swarajists in the Bengal Legislative Council lost a motion to refuse payment of Ministers' salaries. The Times detected in this event an indication that the Indian electorate was rapidly moving towards co-operation with the Government, and thought that the defeat of the Swarajists in Bengal would hasten the

growth of the 'responsivist' movement in other provinces (1). Nearly five years had elapsed since the cessation of the non-co-operation movement, and India, it seemed to British observers, had entered a period of political calm. This notion - that in India resurgent moderates were vanquishing extremist relicts of a previous era - now became crucial. Such a notion reinforced the tendency to view the extremists as being a weak and insignificant minority. Conversely, it renewed hopes that the Indian moderates could once more be rallied to the banner of the Raj.

In the end, it was this, more than anything else, that led to the decision to exclude Indians from the Statutory Commission. This decision, which widened the gulf between the Indian nationalists and the British Government, was the result of several factors. However, it is fully explicable only if one takes into account the British conviction that the extremist nationalists were not significant, and that it was still possible to reconstitute the moderates into a political force.

The Government of India Act of 1919 did not specify the membership of the Commission to be appointed under Section 84A of the Act, although the Joint Committee of Parliament had recommended that it should be a Parliamentary Commission. There were Indian expectations, therefore, that, when the time came to hold the required inquiry, Indian political aspirations would be acknowledged by the inclusion of Indians in the Commission. Indeed, the Secretary of State for India, Birkenhead, had been inclined to think that Indians should be included, partly for pragmatic reasons: he thought that there would inevitably be dissensions among the Indians, and that this might be of some political use to Britain, especially if the Commission reported against any advance (2). Sir John Simon, who was to be chosen to be the chairman of the Commission, also thought that it would be logi-

cal to have Indians on the Commission, and therefore that it should not be a purely Parliamentary Commission (3).

The Viceroy, Irwin, together with his advisers in India, saw the issue differently. They were convinced that, if all the various Indian interests were to be fairly represented, the inclusion of Indians would make the proposed Commission too large and unwieldy (4). They were convinced, too, that a boycott move would not succeed. Since they were in India, they supposedly had a more intimate knowledge of Indian political conditions. Their opinions proved to be very influential, therefore, and the Cabinet took the decision to appoint an all-Party Parliamentary Commission. In any case, the members of the Cabinet, and the officials of the India Office were, in effect, influenced by the same inherited images about India that influenced the Viceroy and his advisers. These images of an India divided by religious strife were perhaps intensified by the more frequent communal rioting during this period, and thus prevented the British from perceiving the nuances of Indian politics with greater sensitivity.

It is necessary to indicate that the term 'the British', as used in the discussion here, refers to the dominant élite, or to those expounding the dominant ideology. Not all viewed the Indian problem from the same perspective. For example, W.A.J. Archbold argued forcefully that the only solution to the problem of constitutional reform in India was a federal system devised, not by a Royal Commission, but by an Indian constituent assembly (5). Archbold knew India well, and perhaps his suggestions stemmed from his deeper knowledge of the Indian situation. His idea of an Indian constituent assembly, although qualified by the argument that its members did not need to be elected, was probably too far ahead of its time to be acceptable. It indicated, nevertheless, that there were individuals in Britain who were beginning

to consider the Indian question from viewpoints different from those adopted by the dominant élite.

So strong was the dominant conviction that Indians would receive the announcement about the Commission, if not with zealous enthusiasm, then at least with an optimistic wariness, that the actual reaction of the Indians came as a surprise. The announcement, on 8 November 1927, that a purely Parliamentary Commission would be inquiring into the question of Indian constitutional reforms united Indian leaders of various political persuasions as no other British action had done for a long time. Moderates and extremists alike denounced the decision to exclude Indians, and the chorus of protests culminated in a resolve to boycott the Commission when it arrived in India (6).

What was most perplexing was the attitude of the moderates. Boycott of the Commission by the extremists was anticipated, and was therefore easily understood. But when other groups also joined the Indian National Congress in the decision to boycott, and persons like Tej Bahadur Sapru chose also to join the boycott campaign, the British were puzzled, so much so that the Viceroy could only attribute this seemingly inexplicable behaviour of the Indian moderates to personal pique at having been ignored (7). Such a conclusion could only have been arrived at because of a lack of awareness about the intensity of nationalist sentiment in India.

It was this lack which also led, in spite of the apparent depth of Indian feelings on the issue, to the conjecture that the boycott campaign would not succeed. Birkenhead, for example, expressed the hope that the Congress plan to boycott the Statutory Commission would quickly fizzle out, while Valentine Chirol of The Times, an expert on Indian affairs, was even more emphatic in his belief that the boycott would never succeed (8).

If in India there was virtually unanimous opposition to the idea of an Inquiry Commission without any Indian members, in Britain the idea had few enemies and many friends. As Birkenhead wrote to Irwin, the announcement was received very well, with only the Daily News, the Manchester Guardian and the Westminster Gazette expressing indignation at the non-inclusion of Indians (9). The Times declared that the 'Imperial Parliament is the sole authority which can deflect or hasten the course of reform', and that no other kind of Commission was either possible or desirable (10). When Sir Robert Horne, Unionist MP for the Hillhead division of Glasgow, and a director of several companies, including the P&O shipping company, said in Glasgow that it was right that the Commission was composed entirely of British people, he was cheered (11). Lord Ronaldshay, former Governor of Bengal, speaking at a London Missionary Society luncheon said that, while Indians might resent the composition of the Commission, he believed that the decision of the Government was correct, and that he regretted the hostility of the Indian moderates (12).

Support for the Government's action was evident even in Parliament, and came from all directions. The first debate was in the House of Lords, on 24 November 1927, when, in addition to Lord Birkenhead, only Lords Reading, Olivier and Chelmsford spoke (13). Birkenhead referred, inter alia, to the suggestion he had made earlier, that Indians should formulate their own constitution and present it to Parliament, and said that it was still open. Olivier, who had been Secretary of State in the first Labour Government, expressed his support for the Commission, said that there ought to have been more consultation with Indian representatives, and hoped that the failure to do so did not arise from the notion that the British were going to India like a physician to cure the ills of India, or an examiner going

to India to examine the fitness of Indians for self-government.

Although in the Commons too the Government decision was approved without a division, there were a few dissenting voices (14). Colonel Josiah Wedgwood, the Labour MP for Newcastle-under-Lyme, declared that sending the Commission to India would widen the gulf between Britain and India, and added prophetically that the process would take a long time, and that the legislation that would be introduced, in 1930, 1931, or 1932, 'will not depend upon the report of this Commission, but upon the actual state of affairs in India at that time' (15).

An amendment to the main resolution was moved by Mr Shapurji Saklatvala, the Communist MP for North Battersea, suggesting that Motilal Nehru should be invited to the Bar of the House, to explain Indian sentiments and to guide the House before the names of the members of the Commission were submitted to the King. In moving the amendment, Saklatvala attacked the attempts at unanimity, stating, 'While you make a hideous picture of the Indian people, you try to make a virtuous picture of yourselves, and you know that both are untrue' (16).

Even those Labour Members who supported the resolution did not do so wholeheartedly. Mr E. Thurtle, a Labour MP from Shoreditch, referred to the tendency to exaggerate the differences that existed among the Indians (these had been cited as one of the reasons for not including Indians in the Commission), and declared that the Government was using this concern for minorities as 'a screen for the continuance of British dominance of India' (17).

In effect, however, only three speakers in the House of Commons opposed the Government resolution. Britain thus appeared to present a solid phalanx of support for the Commission. But, underneath this façade of unanimity, cracks of dissent began to appear. It was in

fact to preserve the image of all-Party support that Irwin had mooted the idea of securing statements of support from MacDonald, Olivier, Wedgwood and others (18). Birkenhead did not think this would be possible: while MacDonald could be induced to state that he did not oppose the proposal, the other Labour Members would not show any great enthusiasm (19).

MacDonald became in fact an ardent supporter of the Statutory Commission, and successfully parried the criticism of his left-wing colleagues, who attempted to secure the withdrawal of the Labour Party representatives from the Commission.

The Labour Party's stance on the Statutory Commission is an illustration of an inherent ambivalence in its attitude towards the British Empire. For most people, the Labour Party was essentially anti-imperialist. Thus a prospective member of the Labour Party sought assurances from MacDonald that the Party would support the Empire as it then stood (20). A retired Colonel argued that a large number of affluent people, who were with the Labour Party as regards socialism, were prevented from supporting it because they believed that the Party was opposed to imperialism (21).

Such beliefs were probably derived from the Labour Party's ideological and rhetorical statements on the Empire and imperialism, and its public support for self-determination for India. In practice, however, the Party was constrained by the needs of electoral politics. As a Party claiming to support and represent the British worker, it could not actually seek to dismantle the structures of Empire without losing ground to its political rivals, especially since it was difficult to argue convincingly that the Empire was inimical to the interests of the British worker (22).

The converse argument, that the Empire was directly beneficial

to the British people, and even the British worker, was easier to establish. For instance, an economist, F.L. McDougall, writing in The Times, argued that, but for the export trade to the British Empire, Britain would have suffered from a much more severe industrial depression (23). No doubt McDougall was not here addressing himself to the British worker, but the idea that he was expressing was a widely prevalent one, and one, moreover, that apparently seemed logical.

There were radical journals and pamphlets which attempted to demonstrate to the British worker that imperialism was exploitative, not only of the worker in the colonies, but of the worker at home as well (24). But such arguments were too abstract, and appeared to be too far removed from reality to be convincing and persuasive.

The Labour Party was therefore compelled to adopt a cautious attitude towards imperial questions. At the same time, however, there were within the Party groups and individuals who were not only intellectually committed to the idea of dismantling the Empire, but who sought to work actively towards that goal (25).

The Labour Party's attitudes towards the Empire were shaped in effect by the interaction between the ideas of the moderate leadership and those of the radical factions. This was particularly apparent in its attitudes towards Indian reform.

In its Annual Conferences, the Labour Party adopted resolutions which committed the Party to the idea of self-government and self-determination for India. When it came to detail, however, the Party was averse to proposing any radical change. Thus, in a memorandum drafted in November 1927, the Labour Party Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions (LPACIQ) suggested that, in any new Indian constitution, there should be a provision to protect the existing treaties between the British Government and the Indian Princes (26). Here,

obviously, the considerations of practical politics quite vanquished the Party's ideological opposition to aristocratic remnants of a feudal society.

The ambivalence of the Labour Party towards Indian constitutional reform was reflected also in the opinions of its members. The views of F.W. Pethick-Lawrence, the Labour MP who was later to become the Secretary of State for India, serve as a striking example. Pethick-Lawrence visited India in the winter of 1926-7, and set down his opinions on Indian politics in a letter which he later circulated to several Party leaders (27). In this letter, written on the voyage back to Britain, Pethick-Lawrence asserted that the 'educated Hindu' of every caste, every region and every political persuasion was 'passionately desirous' of self-government, and of self-determination as complete as that possessed by the self-governing Dominions, although what was desired was not so much immediate self-government as a precise timetable for securing it. The Muslims too were in favour of self-government, he thought, provided their interests were protected. What is of particular interest is that Pethick-Lawrence should also have utilized the separate categories of 'Hindu' and 'Muslim' for a description of the Indian political situation. While it was true that the communal problem was more acute at that time than it had been for several years, and thus brought the differences into a starker relief, the tendency of observers of the Indian scene to perceive Indian politics through such categories also served to prevent the perception of Indian nationalism as nationalism. The predominant image of India was that it was divided by religion, and that nationalism, seen as Hindu nationalism, was incapable of overcoming these divisions.

Indeed, Pethick-Lawrence himself felt that the three main obstacles to self-government in India were the army, the princely states,

and the communal problem (28). But he was certain that time would overcome these problems, and hence concluded that, although the granting of self-government to India was inevitable, it could not be immediately effected, needing at least 25 years as a period of transition.

These observations were in fact echoed in another LPACIQ memorandum, in which it was argued that Britain should make 'liberal concessions' in good time, and that a precise timetable should be fixed, for devolution in India, and for the training of Indians to take charge of the administration (29).

The Labour Party was committed in principle to the notion of granting self-government to India. But practical politics and the political reality of India as perceived by the leaders of the Party prevented the Party from giving wholehearted support to the principle. There was another important reason for the ambivalence of the Labour Party. It was the idea that the Indian nationalist leadership represented an oppressive and exploitative élite. Support for such an élite seemed therefore to imply a tacit acceptance of exploitation and oppression of the Indian masses.

The caution induced in the Party by such an idea could, however, be interpreted as being an implicit prop for imperialism. The Communist writer Clemens Dutt attacked the Labour Party's argument that, without a guarantee that the interests of the Indian workers and peasants would be protected, the Party could not agree to any transfer of power in India, calling it a 'cover for support of imperialism' (30). Similarly V.H. Rutherford, a former Liberal MP and a member of the Labour Party, accused his Party of having acted as the agent of British capitalism while it held office (31).

Despite the apparent contradictions in its attitudes, the Labour Party was assumed, nevertheless, to be more sympathetic to Indian nationalist aspirations. It was for this reason that Irwin felt apprehensive that the Labour members of the Statutory Commission might produce a separate report (32). Similar ideas were entertained by the Conservative Party leaders in Britain as well. At a meeting of Government Whips held in July 1927 to discuss the probable composition of the Commission, the Chief Whip, Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell, expressed the opinion that it would almost be impossible to prevent the Labour Party from appointing extremists, and thought that George Lansbury and Ben Spoor might be nominated (33). Birkenhead declared that he would absolutely refuse to accept such people, but was hopeful of securing 'reasonably moderate representatives' through negotiation (34).

Birkenhead had in fact already discussed the issue with MacDonald, pointing out (to overcome possible Labour objections) that Indians could be associated at a later stage, and, if the Indians were 'reasonable and moderate, there is every probability that they may exercise a profound influence' (35). The idea of Labour participation in the Commission had implicitly been accepted in principle by MacDonald, who was clearly concerned that Labour MPs might be approached directly rather than through him (36). If Birkenhead had directly approached MPs, he could not perhaps have secured more 'reasonably moderate' representatives than the ones ultimately chosen: Stephen Walsh and Clement Attlee. Birkenhead tried, in fact, to get Lord Thomson nominated as a Labour representative, when Stephen Walsh showed some initial reluctance, but MacDonald did not think that the Party Executive would approve (37).

The Labour Party was thus committed to the idea of the Statutory Commission, despite serious misgivings in the Party. These misgivings were reflected in the resolution adopted at the Annual Confe-

rence of the Party held in October 1927 at Blackpool. This resolution reaffirmed the right of the Indian people to 'full self-government and self-determination', and added, apropos the proposed Commission, that it 'should be so constituted, and its method of doing its work so arranged, that it will enjoy the confidence and cooperation of the Indian people' (38).

When it became clear, after the announcement of 8 November, that the Commission was not likely to have either the co-operation or the confidence of the Indian people, the apprehensions of the Labour Party's Executive - of its left wing, at any rate - seemed to have been realized. MacDonald, Philip Snowden and George Lansbury met the Secretary of State to discuss the issue (39). The Executive of the Labour Party, unhappy about the outcome of this discussion, and dissatisfied about the statement that Birkenhead proposed to make, drafted a statement of its own, to be read to a Party meeting on 24 November (40). In this statement, the suggestion put forward was that the Commission should consult on equal terms with a Commission appointed by the Indian legislature, that both Commissions should have joint meetings for taking evidence (though they could also take evidence separately), and, most significantly, that the reports of the two Commissions should be presented to the Joint Committee of Parliament. The representatives of the Labour Party should remain on the Commission, the draft concluded, only if these conditions were met.

Interestingly, MacDonald sent the draft to Birkenhead for amendments (41). Birkenhead suggested the exclusion of the concluding passage, perhaps because of its minatory tone (42). In any case, it was unlikely that the suggestion of two Commissions functioning on an equal plane would have been accepted. Simon himself rejected it right away, arguing that it was impractical and conducive to

accentuating differences (43).

MacDonald clung to the idea, however, for it alone offered him a reasonable defence against critics. One such critic was Wilfred Wellock, a Labour MP. He wrote to MacDonald, declaring that he was opposed to participation in the Commission by the Labour Party, and that there was not much point in suggesting that Indians could appoint their own Commission, since only the report of the Simon Commission would carry any weight (44). MacDonald insisted, however, that the idea of two Commissions functioning on an equal plane was a correct one (45). MacDonald was apparently upset by the criticism that emanated from within the Party, and he tried to suggest that it was criticism inspired by 'outside bodies' (46).

MacDonald responded in a similar fashion when Peter Freeman, a prospective Labour candidate for the Parliamentary constituency of Brecon and Radnor, sent him a circular entitled 'Affairs in India' (47). In this circular, which he had also sent to 200 local Labour Parties and to a few MPs, Freeman argued that, in view of the report on labour conditions in India by Purcell and Hallsworth, and the several Labour Party resolutions on India, the attitude of the Party should be changed (48). As if to indicate the direction of the change that he desired, Freeman appended to his circular a draft resolution to the effect that, in view of the Indian boycott, the Labour Party should withdraw its representatives from the Commission, unless equality of status was given to the representatives of the Indian people, that is, to the Indian 'Commission'.

In his reply, MacDonald expressed regret that Freeman should have taken such action without consulting those 'who had the matter in hand', and added that the impression he had got from some leading Indians he had met had been neither helpful nor hopeful (49).

MacDonald had committed the Party to participation in the Statutory Commission, and, despite the sustained pressure from various angles, he was unwilling to retreat. He tried, therefore, to assert that the Party's support for the Commission did not contradict the Party's resolutions on India (50). This was a viewpoint echoed by George Lansbury also, in his speech to the Commons (51). The very fact that reference had to be made to the compatibility of the Labour Party's resolutions on India and its support for the Commission perhaps underlines the apparent contradictions that were seen by Party members at that time. It is likely, however, that the resolutions were seen as expressions of an ideal to be attained, while the Statutory Commission was perceived as a step towards that goal, which in any case most Labour members considered to be a distant one.

Labour's stance on the Commission issue did not, it would appear, completely destroy the Indian trust in a sympathetic Labour Government acting at a later stage to redress Indian grievances, for Simon reported that a hope was being entertained in India that, if the boycott continued, the existing Commission would be replaced by another, containing Indians, and that this hope was being nurtured by the 'irresponsible talk' of an MP, also in India, at the same time as the Commission (52). The tacit assumption was that this new Commission would be set up by a future Labour Government. Simon suggested therefore that MacDonald should send a telegram repudiating this idea and explicitly stating that no responsible Government in England would go any further in the future (53).

Birkenhead consulted MacDonald, who then sent a telegram to Vernon Hartshorn, in the terms suggested by Simon (54). This gesture, which could only have served to strengthen Simon's position in India - at least with those already co-operating with the Commission -

was naturally acknowledged as a generous gesture by the Cabinet (55). It also gave the impression that once again Indian issues had been placed above Party politics (56).

The boycott, which surprised Simon by its intensity and because of the support it received from the moderate Indian politician, continued, in spite of the concessions made, ostensibly to satisfy Indian demands for equality of status for the Indian 'Commissioners' (57). But these concessions had been made, Birkenhead admitted, not because of any 'positive contribution the select Indian Committee may make,but because it would appeal to the Indian amour propre' (58)

In fact, this idea of placating the Indians by making innocuous concessions seems to have arisen from the notion that the Indians had an inferiority complex which led them to reject British overtures as patronizing gestures. Indian political behaviour did not seem explicable in terms of normal categories, and thus seemed to necessitate the invocation of an 'inferiority complex' as an explanatory factor.

The psychological explanation for Indian politics was espoused by various people across the British political spectrum. Reading, for example, agreed with Irwin that a great deal of Indian politics could be explained by the Indian sense of being treated as inferior by the British (59). Even a left-wing Labour Member of Parliament, Ernest Thurtle, once asserted in the Commons that there was 'some strange and very strong inferiority complex in the Indian mind' (60). Ramsay MacDonald, explaining to the diplomat Sir Esmé Howard why he could not meet him, remarked that he (MacDonald) had been interviewing some Indians 'who...are very touchy', and, as he wished to smooth the way for the Simon Commission, he could not allow anything to

interfere with the interview (61). Geoffrey Dawson, editor of The Times, met Motilal Nehru and Purushottamdas Thakurdas, and came away with the impression that both were suffering acutely from 'suspiciousness and an inferiority complex' (62).

Sir John Simon himself subscribed to preconceptions about the Indian mentality, and these preconceptions would undoubtedly have influenced the way in which he looked at Indian politics and society. In his note on the first visit of the Commission to India, Simon attempted to explain the boycott by arguing that 'the methods of the Oriental Bazaar come so natural to an Indian politician that he finds it almost impossible to believe that the first word may also be the last' (63). Even the resolution of the Legislative Assembly to boycott the Commission need not be considered too significant, Simon argued, because 'Indian politicians are so totally destitute of moral courage that they find it almost impossible to resist supporting the most extreme proposition' (64).

Casting about for more reasons for the Indian refusal to cooperate, Simon produced an even more amazing explanation. An Indian Committee would be unable to write a report at all, Simon declared, because 'the task of reviewing and revising the present constitution of India is one of extreme difficulty in any case', and the Indian mind was 'not good at construction' (65).

Perhaps there is a touch of implicit self-glorification in such reasoning. But assertions like these also reflected the prevailing notions of British superiority. It was not entirely a coincidence that the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, chose to conclude the Commons debate on the appointment of the Commission with a quotation from Milton which read (66):

> When God wants a hard thing done,
> He tells it to his Englishman.

Some of these opinions might have been mere rhetoric engendered in anger and passion. Others were the result of a desire to interpret Indian political behaviour in psychological terms. What is significant here is that these opinions were based on certain traditional assumptions about the Indian character, and even a Commission ostensibly going to India with an open, inquiring attitude carried these assumptions with it as intellectual baggage.

There was also a tendency to see the Indian boycott as demonstrative of a lack of political wisdom. Thus, The Times argued that, if the boycott represented the degree of political judgement that now prevailed in India, the Commission needed to go no further than Bombay (67). Similarly, Sir Reginald Craddock remarked that the boycott demonstrated 'the complete lack of any political commonsense on the part of the extremist politician' (68). Birkenhead too thought on similar lines, and, with bitter irony, wrote to Irwin that the 'extremists' in the Assembly and some of the provincial councils were providing valuable evidence about the political sagacity and fitness for further responsibility of the Indian Party leader (69).

Another curious feature of the British perceptions of the Indian boycott was the refusal to see it as an expression of Indian nationalism. Instead, the traditional view of India as a mere geographical expression was revived, and Indian politics were seen only in terms of warring factions, religions and castes. This perspective, like the psychological one, prevented the policy-makers from seeing the strength of nationalism in India. Even when Muslims joined the boycott, they were dismissed as being insignificant and non-representative, and their decision was attributed to factional fighting (70). The Indian National Congress was never seen as a secular national Party cutting across communal barriers. The Times

persisted in seeing only the 'Hindu' Parties as opponents of British rule (71). Sir Michael O'Dwyer went further, and saw Swarajist politics as the attempt to resurrect Brahmin domination in India (72).

Another influential publicist who subscribed to this theory of a Brahmin revival, and thus implicitly rejected the Congress contention that it was an Indian Party, was Sir Reginald Craddock. In an article in the Contemporary Review, Sir Reginald not only equated Indian militants with Brahmins, but suggested that for them 'History has no meaning, and words and facts bear no relation to one another' (73). Craddock went on to state that the task of governing India was beyond the capacity of Indians, not because of any intellectual defect, but because 'India is too divided into races, creeds, nations and languages to enable any composite body on any sort of democratic basis to command the obedience of the whole' (74).

This picture of an India too divided to be capable of self-government is a constantly recurrent theme. It is a notion which reflected the British view of India, and, in the process, tended to reinforce that view (75). Since such notions were widely prevalent, it is difficult to dismiss the possibility that the Simon Commission went to India with a set of preconceived notions about the country and its politics. Even before the Commission was officially constituted, The Times had suggested that the Commission should function as a rapporteur rather than as a judge, merely distilling common principles and elements from a free expression of a variety of opinions (76). The Times returned again and again to this notion of impartial rapporteurs functioning like those at the League of Nations at Geneva, the implication being that, if the Commission did function thus - and The Times had no doubt that the Commission was qualified to do so - Indians did not need to see any dangers in their exclusion (77).

Birkenhead also thought that the attitude of the Commissioners' minds should be 'receptive, analytic and non-commital' (78).

It was extremely unlikely, however, that any Member of Parliament could have gone to India at that time without prejudices, preconceptions and an entire perceptual apparatus inherited from the past. Even Simon, despite his legal training and liberal outlook, could not have entirely rid himself of the images of India which had been imprinted on generations of British people. In fact, Simon had returned from an earlier private visit to India convinced that the Oriental was not 'really adapted to an English scheme of Parliamentary Government' (79).

Perhaps it was impossible for any member of the British intelligentsia who had any interest in India to remain objective and unbiased at a time when a flood of publications about India began to appear, partly stimulated by the renewed interest in India resulting from the appointment of the Simon Commission.

Of these, the book that stirred up the greatest interest was Katherine Mayo's Mother India. Published in Britain by Jonathan Cape in July 1927, this book, with its lurid and controversial depiction of India, became a bestseller and a cause célèbre (80).

Katherine Mayo was an American writer who had already published several polemical books (81). In one of these, Mayo argued that the people of the Philippines were better off under the rule of the USA, and that self-government would be hostile to their interests (82). In Mother India, ostensibly an investigation of Indian society, Mayo set out a similar theme. According to her, the inordinate and uncontrolled sexuality of the Indian male not only sapped his physical energy, but also destroyed the moral basis of Indian society, leading to abuses like child marriage. It was a direct

and dramatic indictment of Indian character, and, although Mayo did not explicitly refer to the Indian capacity for self-government, her criticism of Indian society seemed to suggest that Indians were unfit for political responsibility.

It is significant that Katherine Mayo should have chosen to focus her attention on the supposedly excessive sexuality of the Indian male. Franz Fanon has shown how imperialism, racialism, and the attribution of hypersexuality to subject peoples were interrelated (83). Mayo's Mother India is an interesting example of this argument, for it also portrayed an India being corrupted by the force of sexual indulgence.

Ordinarily, perhaps, the book might not have attracted much attention. There had been a long tradition of books which sought to present a bleak and critical image of India, and Katherine Mayo did not produce anything extraordinarily new. But her book appeared at a critical juncture. India was about to be examined by a Royal Commission, and Indian affairs were generally attracting much more attention. To those who still tended to see Indian society through Victorian spectacles, Mayo's book appeared to reinforce the ancient images. Mother India acquired, therefore, a notoriety out of all proportion to its worth as an objective report, and the little-known author became famous as the fearless dissector of Indian society. It was read by new recruits to the ICS (84). Winston Churchill admired the book (85). Clifford Sharp, the editor of the New Statesman, wrote a lengthy review, in which he described Mother India as the 'most fascinating, the most depressing and at the same time the most important and truthful book that has been written about India for a good deal more than a generation' (86). Sharp went on to add that the book made the claim for Swaraj seem nonsense and the desire

to grant it, almost a crime (87).

The correspondence provoked by the fulsome praise bestowed on Mayo's book by the New Statesman review showed that not everyone was convinced by Mayo's assertions, while it also indicated the fact that the book struck a responsive chord in several minds. For example, H.J. Maynard, a former ICS officer, questioned the validity of several of Mayo's statements, while 'D.M.L.' declared that it was impossible to make generalizations about India, a country with so many variations (88). Another correspondent, 'BM/PWMS', sprang to the reviewer's defence, arguing that, but for the British, the Hindu would have 'sunk to the lowest depths of barbarism under the evil practices and gross superstitions fostered by Brahminism' (89). G. Wren-Howard, a director of Jonathan Cape, the publishers of Mother India, argued that Mayo wrote the book from a totally unprejudiced viewpoint, and that her sole object was the 'betterment of the world' (90).

Even those who thought that Katherine Mayo's analysis lacked precision and rigour were of the opinion that there was sufficient merit in the book to make it noteworthy. Thus Professor L.F. Rushbrook Williams, reviewing the book for the Asiatic Review, accused Mayo of 'undue simplification' and lack of care in the use of statistics, and yet concluded that, with all its weaknesses, the book was 'notable' (91).

Significantly, many reviewers saw the book as striking evidence for delaying constitutional reforms in India. Clifford Sharp did so. So too did Lord Meston. He admitted that the picture painted by Mayo was highly coloured and too sweeping, but, since many of the evils described by her were deeprooted and widespread, the continued presence of the British was necessary to combat those

evils (92).

The implication in such remarks was not lost on Indians. They had already been smarting under the blow of being excluded from the Statutory Commission. The publication of Mayo's book and the enthusiastic reviews which greeted it in Britain seemed to them to suggest a conspiracy to denigrate India. There was also conjecture that the book was officially sponsored to discredit India and delay constitutional reform. Denials by the India Office had no effect on such conjectures. The fact that a copy of Mother India was sent anonymously to every MP fanned the rumours of an official conspiracy. Indian suspicions were further heightened when The Times refused to publish a letter from a group of incensed Indians, including Tej Bahadur Sapru, A.C. Chatterjee and Chimanlal Setalvad, all highly regarded Indian liberals. Geoffrey Dawson, the editor, had invoked a rule whereby The Times would not accept controversial correspondence on any writing but their own, and later published an editorial explaining that The Times had at no time given any special prominence to Mother India. This did not, however, quell Indian anger, and suspicions lingered (94).

There is no evidence to indicate that there had been a conspiracy between the British Government and Katherine Mayo to denigrate India. There was the usual official co-operation and perhaps a little more than usual unofficial help (95). But there was no need for a conspiracy. Katherine Mayo was merely echoing a line of thought that was predominant in Britain at that juncture.

For example, R.J. Minney, a journalist who had worked for a while with the Englishman in Calcutta, declared, in his Shiva or the Future of India, that (96):

> ...left to herself India can accomplish nothing. The three hundred million people have neither the

> wish nor the will to attain predominance or prosperity. They are content to jog on along life's easiest path, sleeping, copulating, praying, over indulging in each of these necessary functions and though they know it not, burdening the nation with the price of their folly.

In India and the West: A Study in Cooperation. F.S. Marvin, one time Professor of Modern History at the University of Egypt, and a positivist writer, reiterated the traditional picture of India at the eve of the British conquest as a decaying, anarchic and impoverished society, and went on to assert that 'Great Britain will and should remain in a position of power in India for at least a considerable time' (97). Sir Claude Hill, a former member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, envisaged a similar period of probation and experimentation before India could become a Dominion (98).

Minney, Marvin and Hill were in effect enunciating a widely held view about the nature of Indian society and about the necessity of continuing British rule. But in all such writing there was an inherent paradox: that defects should persist in Indian society after nearly a century of British rule. This paradox was either ignored or resolved by accusing Indians of an unwillingness to change (99).

Works critical of India and Indians held the stage because they apparently struck a responsive chord in Britain. They did not conflict with prevailing notions of Indian backwardness. Indeed, on the contrary, they reinforced existing stereotypes, and thus made it more difficult to break them down.

Attempts were made, nevertheless, to construct alternative frameworks of perception. Several publications appeared at this time which presented India in a more favourable light. A few were responses to Mother India (100). Others were more general (101).

But they were often derisively dismissed in reviews (102). They were usually put out by the smaller publishing firms, and had a limited readership. Above all, since they were going against the grain of British thinking on India, these alternative images could not easily dislodge the older, traditional images. Their existence indicates, however, that, despite the hegemony of imperialist ideas about India, voices of dissent were beginning to be raised. Sections of the British intelligentsia were slowly moving away from the intellectual constructs of imperialism.

The strongest criticism of British rule in India came, not surprisingly, from Communist writers. In his booklet, How Britain Rules India, R. Page Arnot rejected the traditional view of Britain as the benevolent rescuer of India, and argued that it was British merchant capital which had entered India, and, by transferring wealth to Britain, enabled the rapid development of industrial capital there (103). Communist writers castigated not only British imperialism in India, but also the leadership of the Indian nationalist movement (104). The latter were, according to the Communist critique, representatives of the bourgeoisie, and therefore tended to make compromises with imperialism in order to acquire and preserve the dominant position. There were inherent contradictions between imperialism and the national bourgeoisie. Yet, if the latter were to seek dominance over the masses, they needed to strike bargains with the imperialist rulers. Similarly, imperialists also needed to compromise with the national bourgeoisie, so that control of the Indian economy could be continued, even if the control was hemmed in to some extent.

There was, therefore, a curious convergence of views between the Communists and the imperial ideologues, vis-à-vis Indian nationalists. Both saw the nationalist leadership as an exploitative

minority, and both cast themselves in the role of champions of the Indian masses. The difference lay in the way Communists and imperialists envisaged the future development of Indian society.

Communist writers saw the nationalists as striving to prevent a revolutionary upsurge of the Indian masses , through negotiation of compromises with the imperialist rulers. They anticipated that ultimately the Indian masses would succeed in their struggle against both the imperialists and the national bourgeoisie.

Imperialist writers, on the other hand, while viewing the nationalists as a power-hungry, oppressive minority, sought to visualize an unchanged India, in which feudal structures would remain intact, with the British exercising an overarching suzerainty. Imperialism must and will preserve feudal structures in colonial societies, for, although it can often make the necessary compromises with an emergent national bourgeoisie, in the long run the colonial bourgeoisie and the imperial power will find few areas of compatibility. There is, however, no such fundamental contradiction between imperialism and feudalism. Not surprisingly, therefore, critics of Indian nationalism quite often sought to make a case for the support of Indian Princes.

It is true that any practical programme for Indian constitutional reform had to take cognizance of, and accommodate, the Indian Princes. But arguments advanced on this problem often went further; they suggested, in fact, that rule by the Indian Princes would be more suitable for India than a Westminster-style democracy (105).

An industrializing India was not in the economic interests of Britain. On the other hand, India remaining a feudal society was in British interests, since it would then continue to be a producer of raw materials and a consumer of British industrial

products. The problem was, of course, rather more complex, since the Indian economy could not remain static, if Britain were to derive any profits from trading with India. Indian agriculture had to be made more productive, if the profits of imperialism were to be maximized. Yet, if India remained a feudal economy with pockets of controlled capitalism, it was unlikely that the economy could have become more productive. However, if the Indian bourgeoisie were allowed to develop freely, they were likely to corner the Indian market. There were inherent contradictions in the imperialist position, and these could not easily be resolved by a simple solution such as buttressing feudal elements or preserving a feudal economy. Nevertheless, the tendency to see India as continuing to be a primarily feudal and agricultural country seems explicable in terms of that being in the economic interests of Britain.

It is because of the reluctance to see any change in the social, economic and political structures of India that the British took such serious note of the embryonic Communist movement, which was ostensibly aimed at the liberation of the Indian masses. It was not, however, the fear that the Communists would engineer a revolution that sharpened the hostility of the Government of India and the British Government. The fledgling Indian Communist Party and its supporters had managed to spread their influence into some industrial areas, and they took an active part in the mill strikes of 1926 and 1927. But, significantly, no real and tangible links developed between the Communists and the nationalist movement, because the Communists saw the nationalist leadership as class enemies of the masses, and the common element of anti-imperialism was not sufficient to overcome this ideological barrier. Thus, imperial interests were not immediately threatened by the possibility of combined action by the

Communists and the nationalists. Even the possibility of such action vanished when Jawaharlal Nehru, the leader of the radicals in the Indian National Congress, broke off the links between the Congress and the League Against Imperialism (106).

The Government of India decided, nevertheless, to destroy the emergent Communist movement in India, and launched a trial of most of the major leaders, who included some Englishmen. One of the reasons for this action was the traditional fear of an expansionist Russia. If in the 19th century it was the threat, real or imagined, of an expanding Czarist Empire, now it was the Soviet Union which was seen as waiting on the frontiers of India, and attempting, through the Comintern, to insidiously plot the overthrow of the British Raj in India. Sir Francis Younghusband, the veteran exponent of Lord Curzon's forward policy, declared in a speech to the Oxford Luncheon Club that the Bolshevik menace to India was far greater than that which had been posed by the Czarist Government (107). The Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir William Birdwood, did not hesitate to use the Bolshevik menace as a convenient argument. Especially because of it, he told the Indian Council of State, the expenditure on defence could not be reduced to Rs 50 crores as recommended by the Inchcape Committee (108).

The launching of the trial of the Indian Communists, which came to be known as the Meerut Conspiracy Trial, generated little interest in Britain, if only because all the major Parties were united in their opposition to the Communists. There were Communist sympathizers in the trade unions, and in the Labour Party itself, but there was much mutual hostility between the Communists and the Labour Party. The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) saw the Labour Party as an ally of capitalism and imperialism, and this of

course was unacceptable to the leaders of the Labour Party. In fact, they saw the CPGB as 'the most bitter enemies' of the Party and of organized labour (109). It is because of the hostility between British trade unions and the Communists that The Times was able to suggest that it would be useful to encourage links between the trade unions in Britain and Indian labour organizations, so that the Communist influence in India could be exorcised (110).

The Governments in India and Britain had much less to fear from the activities of the Communists than from the efforts that the Congress had begun to make to reach sections of rural populations that had hitherto been left out in the political wilderness. It was with the advent of Gandhi on the Indian political scene that the Congress had begun transforming itself from a Party purely of the urban middle classes to one which sought to widen the base of its support, and one example of this growing tendency to draw in elements of rural India was the launching of a movement in Bardoli in 1928 (111). Bardoli had already had a taste of modern agitational politics in 1918, and now, as the Simon Commission was touring India, the fairly prosperous peasants of Bardoli, in Gujerat, under the leadership of Vallabhai Patel, bestirred themselves once again to defy the might of the Raj, in order to secure a revenue concession. The Secretary of State was perturbed by the turn the agitation was taking, and especially by the stand that the government of Bombay appeared to be taking, that it was more important to conciliate public opinion in India than to take stern measures to stamp out what was in effect an anti-Government agitation (112).

Birkenhead thought, in fact, that, despite the possibility of any repressive action reducing the prospects of Indian co-operation with the Simon Commission, reassertion of Government authority

was more important, for it was 'surely impossible to tolerate the sort of unofficial government which seems to have been set up...', and it seemed to him 'imperative before things go any further to demonstrate unmistakably that Government can and will govern' (113). In phrases later to be echoed by Winston Churchill as Prime Minister, Birkenhead declared to Sir Leslie Wilson, the Governor of Bombay, while asking him to take effective measures for restoring order, 'I cannot, while I am Secretary of State, have any part of British India in which the King's writ does not run' (114). The apparent reluctance of the Government authorities in India to take stern measures against the agitators appears to have caused concern, not only in the Cabinet, but also in the Conservative Party (115).

This concern was also a reflection of the slowly growing awareness that Indian nationalism was acquiring a harder edge. Several writers were still depicting the Indian nationalist movement as the preserve of an urban, high-caste Hindu coterie. But the almost united rejection of the Simon Commission, and the boycott movement that followed, began to raise doubts and compelled reconsiderations. Attempts were made to dismiss the participation of different sections of society on the grounds that ignorant masses were being duped by artful leaders or being bought by the power of money (116). But the events in India began to subtly alter perceptions. As early as September 1928, Irwin was beginning to be concerned by the degree to which 'Indian political thought' had moved to the left, and especially by the extent to which the moderates were willing to make terms with the proponents of the idea of independence (117).

By the time the Indian National Congress met at Calcutta in December 1928, Irwin was even more convinced about the shift in Indian politics. Describing the Calcutta Congress to the new Secretary of State for India, Peel, Irwin stated that there was a noticeable

swing to the left, and that independence had ceased to be an academic ideal (118). Irwin was also persuaded that it was necessary to split what he considered was the 'artificial unity' among the different Indian groups, and felt that Simon was also inclined to think on similar lines (119). Perhaps they thought that it was possible to split the Indian nationalists because, as Geoffrey Dawson put it, some of the moderates were beginning to be frightened of the independence wing (120).

There was not much hope perhaps that the Simon Commission would recommend anything that would achieve such a split among the nationalists. Given the attitudes of the Commissioners, it was extremely unlikely that they would have suggested any major advance. Even the 'Nehru Report' (the constitution drafted by the Indian All Parties Committee) was dismissed by Simon as a 'very empty performance, mostly copied from the Australian Constitution, and evading nearly all the difficulties' (121). Vernon Hartshorn, one of the Labour members of the Commission, also urged MacDonald not to take notice of the Nehru Report, as responsible self-government could not be granted immediately (122). Meanwhile, Burnham had, according to Lane-Fox, made up his mind to write a separate report on die-hard lines (123).

The Statutory Commission had gone to India with certain preconceived notions about India, Indian nationalism and Indian character. It could not have been otherwise. The various Commissioners might have brought forensic detachment to their task, but they could not have left behind in Britain their intellectual heritage, the images of India that formed the paradigms of their perception. However assiduously and dispassionately the members might have collected the evidence for their report, that evidence must necessarily have been selectively filtered because of their preconceptions.

While the Statutory Commission was carrying on its work, the Labour Party came to power in Britain after the General Election of May 1929. The Indian extremists had, by this time, lost faith in the capacity or willingness of the Labour Party to implement any real and tangible changes in India. But there were still some people who hoped that the Labour Government would at least make an immediate pronouncement about the granting of Dominion status for India (124). Ramsay MacDonald, Prime Minister for a second time, regretted the fact that some Indians were still suspicious of the Labour Party, but felt that no statement could be made while a Commission was inquiring into the question of constitutional reform and was about to present a report (125). Although Labour was in power, it was again a minority Government. Its Cabinet was dominated by the right wing (126). It was preoccupied with international affairs. The new Government was unlikely to do much to alter the Indian situation.

The Government attempted, however, to do something in Egypt. Lloyd George thought this was dangerous. Whatever the Simon Commission recommended might appear so far short of what had been offered to Egypt that it would seem inadequate and ungenerous, and would lead, Lloyd George felt, to the rejection by the Indian nationalists of a reasonable scheme of reform (127).

What cast a maleficent shadow on the Indian reforms programme was not, however, the Egyptian proposals of the Labour Government. It was the British reaction to the 31 October declaration by Irwin. In a long statement that also set out the plan for a Round Table Conference, Irwin declared (128):

> I am authorised on behalf of His Majesty's Government, to state clearly that in their judgment it is implicit in the declaration of 1917 that the natural issue of India's constitutional progress, as there contemplated, is the attainment of Dominion status.

On the face of it, the declaration was innocuous, and was merely reiterating what had been stated before by several British spokesmen. Yet it unleashed a storm of protests and thus negated its primary purposes.

These were the defusion of a potentially explosive situation, and also the destruction of the 'artificial' unity between the opponents of the Empire in India. The Congress threat to launch a civil disobedience movement if Dominion status was not granted by the end of 1929 could not be dismissed too lightly, especially since Irwin was convinced that the left wing of the Congress was rapidly gaining ground. This appears to have been one of the factors that led to the declaration, although it had to remain a hidden factor for obvious reasons (129).

On the other hand, the belief that the moderates could still be detached from the extremists did not entirely evaporate. Motilal Nehru had, for instance, told Geoffrey Dawson that the demand for Dominion status was not seriously meant; what was really needed was that an assurance should be given that Dominion status was on the way (130). Irwin seems to have seized upon such an idea. He was convinced that Indians understood by the phrase 'Dominion status' a declaration of intent rather than the actual achievement of immediate Dominion status (131). It has been suggested that Irwin was deliberately attempting to exploit the difference between the British perception of the phrase and the Indian one (132). But this was evident in Irwin's expressed opinions. Where Irwin erred was to think that Indians would be satisfied with a mere declaration of British intentions. The ascendancy of the extremists in the Congress had perhaps rendered such acceptance of a mere declaration virtually impossible. Irwin erred too in thinking that the British reaction

would be muted. This is even more surprising, since it had become clear early that both the Liberals and the Conservatives were hostile to the idea.

Lord Crewe for example thought that it was a 'mistaken stirring of the pot' while the process of cooking was going on (133). Lord Salisbury was shocked that such a declaration was to be made before the Simon Commission had reported (134). Reading, Simon and Peel also privately expressed their opposition to the idea (135). Birkenhead tried to get a letter on the subject published in The Times, perhaps hoping that premature publicity would prevent the declaration. But Geoffrey Dawson dissuaded him (136).

Irwin knew of the opposition. Yet he made the declaration , with minor amendments. Almost every newspaper and journal in Britain criticized the declaration. Among the leading newspapers, only The Times supported Irwin's action, arguing that the declaration contained no promises and revealed no change of policy (137). Indeed, Irwin had, in the course of the statement, asserted that, in the view of the Government, it would be improper to forecast any constitutional change before the Statutory Commission had reported. Why then was there such an outcry (138)?

Some contemporary observers of the controversy felt that opponents of Baldwin were attempting to make political capital out of the acquiescence, albeit conditional, of Baldwin in the making of the declaration (139). There was probably also the expectation that a fatal blow could be struck at the Government itself. But both Baldwin and the Government were able to weather the storm, partly because the immediate Indian response seemed to be conciliatory and optimistic.

The deeper, more important reason for the British response to

the Irwin declaration was that, despite all protestations to the contrary, the fact that the declaration was made at all was taken to mean a new departure in policy, and the British public was not yet prepared to alter its images of India. The idea of India as a fully fledged Dominion did not fit into the existing paradigm about India. The British reaction took away the meaning of the declaration and turned it into an empty, rhetorical exercise. The declaration had been intended to be a bridge between Britain and the Indian moderates. The reaction in Britain, however, undermined its structure and rendered it useless. As Irwin put it later (140),

> I cannot doubt that the choice by public men in England of an attitude and language so lacking in imagination and sympathy was not without its influence at a formative moment in shaping Indian political opinion upon the question of the relation of the new India towards the British Commonwealth and strengthened the demand for independence.

Between 1927 and 1929, the decisions of Britain regarding India reflected the continued predominance of inherited ideas about India. Although there were groups and individuals struggling to erect alternative structures of perception, the dominant ideas were those that persisted in viewing India as a backward place, and one in which, moreover, the British presence would be required for a very long time to come.

The arguments for continued British rule in India stemmed from two sources. One was the ideological reluctance to perceive possibilities of change in India. Received images, reinforced by constant reiteration, prevented important elements of British society from accepting either the validity of Indian nationalism or the notion that political change in India was desirable. The other source was the material one of British economic interests. India was still an important market for British exports. And it seemed to British businessmen that greater political freedom for India would spell economic

ruin for them. Their apprehensions were probably increased by a statement which the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce made on 21 October 1929, just a few days before Irwin made his controversial declaration. In this statement the Federation declared (141):

> There can be no self-government in India if she is to be denied the power to devise and follow a national economic policy, including the right, if her interests require it, of making economic discrimination against non-national interests.

No more explicit declaration could have been made of Indian economic intentions, and that would have been reason enough for British business interests to have insisted on retaining political control.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. The Times, 24 January 1927

2. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India, 12 July 1927, on 'The Statutory Commission on Indian Constitutional Reforms', in Cabinet Paper 187 (27), PRO CAB 24, provides a useful resumé of the discussions regarding membership.

3. Simon to Birkenhead, 17 June 1927, Simon Papers, 61

4. The Second Earl of Birkenhead, Halifax: The Life of Lord Halifax, p. 239

5. W.A.J. Archbold, 'Federalism in India', the Contemporary Review, 131 (May 1927), pp. 612-16

6. For details of the Indian reaction and the subsequent boycott campaign, see S.R. Bakshi, Simon Commission and Indian Nationalism, New Delhi, 1977

7. Irwin to Reading, 28 November 1927, Reading Papers, 118/107

8. Birkenhead to Goschen, 19 January 1928, Goschen Papers, 3
Valentine Chirol to Simon, 1 December 1927, Simon Papers, 61

9. Birkenhead to Irwin, 10 November 1927, Private Office Files (L/PO) 412, India Office Records

10. The Times, 9 November 1927; see also Geoffrey Dawson to Harcourt Butler, 1 November 1927, Harcourt Butler Papers, 50

11. The Times, 12 November 1927

12. The Times, 17 November 1927

13. 69 H.L.Deb.5s (24 November 1927) 249 et seq.

14. 210 H.C.Deb.5s (25 November 1927) 2235 et seq.

15. ibid., 2236-43

16. ibid., 2272-84

17. ibid., 2252-54

18. Telegram, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 27 October 1927. L/PO/412, India Office Records

19. Telegram, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 28 October 1927, ibid.

20. John R. Spencer to Ramsay MacDonald, 20 November 1927, MacDonald Papers, 1437

21. H.H. Haig to MacDonald, 1 March 1928, MacDonald Papers, 1438

22. Even the historiographic debate on this question has not been conclusive. For a recent discussion, see Henry Pelling, Popular Politics and Society in Late Victorian Britain, 2nd Ed., London, 1979, Chapter 5.

23. The Times, 19 February 1927

24. For example, the Labour Monthly

25. For a comprehensive survey of the Labour Party's attitudes towards imperial questions, see Partha Sarathi Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914-1964, London, 1975

26. Draft note (November 1927) by D. Graham Pole, for the Labour Party Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions, copy in MacDonald Papers, 1283

27. Circular letter, 12 January 1927, enclosed with Pethick-Lawrence to MacDonald, 4 February 1927, MacDonald Papers, 1172

28. ibid.

29. Memorandum 39A, June 1927, Labour Party Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions, in MacDonald Papers, 1283

30. Clemens Dutt, 'The Indian Struggle for Independence', Labour Monthly, 10, 3 (March 1928), pp. 155-62

31. V.H. Rutherford, India and the Labour Party, London, 1928, p. 20

32. Birkenhead, Halifax, p. 239

33. Notes (by Earl Winterton) of the meeting of Government Whips, 14 July 1927, L/PO/412, India Office Records. The Whips felt that E.R. Mitchell, Arthur Hayday and G.M. Gillett should be appointed as the Labour representatives

34. ibid.

35. Birkenhead to MacDonald, 13 July 1927, MacDonald Papers, 1172

36. MacDonald to Birkenhead, 6 July 1927, ibid.

37. Birkenhead to MacDonald, 23 September 1927 and MacDonald to Birkenhead, 26 September 1927, ibid.

38. Labour Party, Report of the Annual Conference, 1927

39. MacDonald to Birkenhead, 10 November 1927, Birkenhead to MacDonald, 11 November 1927, MacDonald Papers, 1172

40. Enclosure with MacDonald to Birkenhead, 23 November 1927, ibid.

41. MacDonald to Birkenhead, 23 November 1927, ibid.

42. Amended draft enclosed with R.H.F. Carter to R. Rosenberg, 23 November 1927, ibid.

43. Simon to Baldwin, 25 November 1927, Baldwin Papers, 102

44. Wilfred Wellock to MacDonald, 21 February 1928, MacDonald Papers, 1173

45. MacDonald to Wellock, 22 February 1928, ibid.

46. ibid.

47. Enclosure with Peter Freeman to MacDonald, 2 July 1928, MacDonald Papers, 1173

48. ibid. Freeman's reference was to A.A. Purcell and J. Hallsworth, Report on Labour Conditions in India, London, 1928. Purcell and Hallsworth had gone to India on behalf of the TUC in the winter of 1927-8. Their conclusions were not very favourable to the nationalists, who, according to them, exploited the workers for political purposes. It is not clear, therefore, why Freeman invoked this report. In fact, MacDonald used private information from Purcell to defend, in the Forward (19 May 1928), Labour's participation in the Commission.

49. The 'leading' Indians MacDonald had met were M.A. Jinnah and Srinivasa Iyengar. Both seem to have shown MacDonald the wide gulf that separated Indian nationalists and the Labour Party. See MacDonald to Iyengar, 6 July 1928, MacDonald Papers, 1438, and Jinnah to MacDonald, 3 July 1928, MacDonald Papers, 1173.

50. MacDonald to V. Karandikar, 12 November 1927, MacDonald Papers, 1172

51. 210 H.C.Deb.5s (25 November 1927)

52. Telegram, Simon to Birkenhead, 14 February 1928, in Cabinet Paper 45 (28), PRO CAB 24

53. ibid.

54. Cabinet Minutes, CAB 7 (28) 1, PRO

55. Birkenhead to MacDonald, 16 February 1928, MacDonald Papers, 1173

56. Reading to Irwin, 1 March 1928, Reading Papers, 118/107

57. Cabinet Paper 199 (28), 21 June 1928, PRO

58. Telegram, Birkenhead to Irwin, 28 February 1928, in Cabinet Paper 67 (28), PRO

59. Reading to Irwin, 1 March 1928, Reading Papers, 118/107

60. 210 H.C.Deb.5s. (25 November 1927), c.2254

61. MacDonald to Esmé Howard, 2 July 1928, MacDonald Papers, 1438

62. Memorandum of talk with Motilal Nehru, 15 February 1929, Dawson Papers, 74

63. Cabinet Paper 199 (28), PRO

64. ibid.

65. ibid.

66. 210 H.C.Deb.5s.c.2298

67. The Times, 3 February 1928

68. Letter to the Editor, The Times, 6 February 1928

69. Birkenhead to Irwin, 1 March 1928, in Cabinet Paper 67 (28), PRO

70. The Times, 4 January 1928

71. The Times, 19 January 1928

72. The Times, 18 April 1928

73. Reginald Craddock, 'Indian Reforms and the Simon Commission' Contemporary Review, 133 (April 1928), pp. 433-41

74. ibid.

75. See, for example, anonymous article, 'The Indian Statutory Commission', Edinburgh Review, 247 (January 1928), pp. 163-77

76. The Times, 1 November 1927

77. The Times, 19 January 1928

78. Birkenhead to Irwin, 19 January 1928, quoted in 2nd Earl of Birkenhead, Halifax, pp. 514-15

79. John Barnes and David Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, Vol I 1896-1929, London, 1980, entry for 5 March 1926, pp. 444-5

80. Katherine Mayo, Mother India, London, 1927; for a discussion of the background to this book and the reactions to it in the USA and in Britain, see Manoranjan Jha, Katherine Mayo and India, New Delhi, 1971

81. Katherine Mayo, 'That Damn Y', Boston, 1920

82. Katherine Mayo, The Isles of Fear: The Truth about the Philippines, London, 1925

83. Franz Fanon, Black Skins White Masks, (translated by C.I. Markmann), New York, 1967, pp. 154 ff.

84. T.H. Beaglehole, 'From Rulers to Servants: The ICS and the British Demission of Power in India', Modern Asian Studies, 11, 2 (1977), pp. 237-55

85. See Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. V. Companion, Part 1, London, 1979, p. 1042

86. New Statesman, 16 July 1927, pp. 448-9. The review, entitled 'India as it is', was signed 'C.S.'. The initials stood for Clifford Sharp. See Edward Hyams, The New Statesman: The History of the First Fifty Years, London, 1963, p. 135

87. ibid.

88. New Statesman, 23 July 1927, pp. 475-6

89. New Statesman, 30 July 1927, pp. 505-6

90. ibid., p. 507

91. Asiatic Review, 23, 76 (October 1927), pp. 687-9

92. Spectator, 16 July 1927

93. Dawson to Harcourt Butler, 1 November 1927, Harcourt Butler Papers, 50; The Times, 27 March 1928

94. When Dawson visited India in December 1928, the Bombay Chronicle suggested (19 December 1928) that all nationalist papers should publish a picture of Dawson with the caption that he was the British journalist who was a friend of Katherine Mayo and who refused to publish Indian letters on the subject.

95. Jha, Katherine Mayo.

96. R.J. Minney, Shiva or the Future of India, London, 1929, p. 8 This book was banned in India: N.G. Barrier, Banned: Controversial Literature and Political Control in British India, Columbia, Missouri, 1974, p. 96. Mother India was not banned, although demands for a ban were made.

97. F.S. Marvin, India and the West: A Study in Cooperation, London, 1927, p. 13

98. Claude H. Hill, India - Stepmother, London, 1929, p. 323

99. See Michael O'Dwyer's letter to the Editor, The Times, 13 July 1927 and also Dwyer to MacDonald, 30 January 1928, MacDonald Papers, 1173

100. J.A. Chapman, India: Its Character, A Reply to 'Mother India', Oxford, 1928; Ernest Wood, An Englishman Defends Mother India, Madras,1928

101. H.G. Alexander, The Indian Ferment: A Traveller's Tale, London, 1929; Francis H. Skrine, India's Hope. London, 1929; D. Graham Pole, I Refer to India, London, 1929

102. See for example review by Michael O'Dwyer of V.H. Rutherford, Modern India: Its Problems and their Solution, London, 1927, and R. Palme Dutt, Modern India, London 1927, in Edinburgh Review, 246 (July 1927), pp. 165-78

103. R. Page Arnot, How Britain Rules India, London, 1929

104. See Arnot, op. cit., R. Palme Dutt, Modern India, London 1927

105. Walter Lawrence, The India We Served, London, 1928

106. For details of this controversy, see Alan J. Mackenzie, 'British Marxists and Imperialism', Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1979

107. The Times, 23 May 1927

108. The Times, 7 March 1927

109. MacDonald to A.C. Collins, Secretary of Harrow Road and Maida Vale Ward of the North Paddington Divisional Labour Party, 4 March 1927, MacDonald Papers, 1172; see also the Industrial Review, 3,4 (April 1929) for text of statement by the TUC attacking Saklatvala for his remarks about the TUC joining in the oppression and exploitation of Indian workers. The Times, 11 February 1928, had reported that the Executive of the Comintern had expressed disgust at Labour attempts to persuade Indian nationalists to accept the Simon Commission.

110. The Times, 14 June 1928

111. See David Hardimann, Peasant Nationalists of Gujerat, Kheda District 1917-1934, Delhi, 1981

112. Telegram, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 10 July 1928, in Cabinet Paper, 215 (28), PRO

113. Telegram, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 4 July 1928, in ibid.

114. Telegram, Secretary of State to Governor of Bombay, 6 July 1928, ibid.

115. Telegram, Secretary of State to Governor of Bombay, 18 July 1928, in Cabinet Paper 249 (28), PRO

116. See for example Simon to Baldwin, 8 March 1928, Baldwin Papers 102; MacDonald to Simon, 6 February 1929, MacDonald Papers, 1174

117. Irwin to Birkenhead, 6 September 1929, extract in Cabinet Paper 288 (28), PRO

118. See Irwin to Peel, 2 January 1929, and Telegram, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 19 January 1929, in Cabinet Paper 12 (29), PRO

119. Irwin to Baldwin, 10 January 1929, Baldwin Papers, 103; Irwin to Reading, 18 January 1929, Reading Papers, 118/107

120. Memorandum by Geoffrey Dawson, 25 March 1929 (written on the way back to Britain), Dawson Papers, 74

121. Simon to MacDonald, 11 December 1928, MacDonald Papers, 1174

122. Vernon Hartshorn to MacDonald, 28 February 1929, ibid.

123. Lane-Fox to Baldwin, 3 February 1929, Baldwin Papers, 103

124. G.A. Natesan to MacDonald, 20 June 1929, MacDonald Papers, 672

125. MacDonald to Natesan, 8 July 1929, ibid.

126. Philip Snowden, Autobiography, 2, p. 767, quoted in A.J.P. Taylor, English History, p. 343

127. Lloyd George to Reading, 14 August 1929, Reading Papers, 118/27. Reading to Lloyd George, 2 September 1929, ibid., showed Reading's agreement.

128. For the full text of the Irwin declaration of 31 October 1929, see Government of India, India in 1929-30, Calcutta, 1931, pp. 466-8

129. MacDonald to J.L. Garvin, 5 November 1929, MacDonald Papers, 1515

130. Memorandum of talk with Motilal Nehru, 15 February 1929, Dawson Papers, 74

131. Memorandum, November 1929, by Irwin. Copy enclosed with Irwin to Samuel Hoare, 16 January 1935, Templewood Papers, 76

132. Gillian Peele, 'A Note on the Irwin Declaration', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 1 (1973), pp. 331-7

133. Crewe to Simon, 26 October 1929, Simon Papers, 62

134. Salisbury to Baldwin, 23 October 1929, Baldwin Papers, 103

135. Reading to Benn, 27 October 1929, copy in Lloyd George Papers, 16/10/10; Peel to Baldwin, 23 October 1929, Baldwin Papers, 103

136. See Dawson to Birkenhead, 22 October 1929, Dawson Papers, 74

137. The Times, 1 November 1929

138. See, for various views on the controversy, Birkenhead, Halifax pp. 268-75; John Simon, Retrospect: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Viscount Simon GCC.S.I., G.C.V.O., London, 1952, pp. 150-4; Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. V, 1922-1929, London, 1976, pp. 352-5; Earl of Halifax, Fulness of Days,London, 1957, pp. 117-23

139. See J.C.C. Davidson to Irwin, 9 November 1929, in R.R. James, Memoirs of a Conservative, J.C.C. Davidson's Memoirs and Papers, 1910-1937, London, 1969, pp. 308-10; Arthur Hirtzel to Wedgwood Benn, 3 November 1929, Stansgate Papers, 223/15

140. Halifax, Fulness of Days, p. 123

141. Quoted in UK Parliament, Report Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms, Session 1932-33, Vol. IIc, Minutes of Evidence, Memorandum 74, p. 1655

## 4. Responses to Radicalism: From the Lahore Congress to the Gandhi-Irwin Pact

The resolution of the Indian National Congress at Lahore on 31 December 1929, declaring complete independence as its goal, marked a decisive turning point in the history of Indian nationalism. Mere declarations from London would no longer be enough, it seemed, to stave off the ascendance of extremists. The spirit of militant nationalism displayed at Lahore struck observers of the Congress as being remarkable.

One such observer was Professor J.L. Morison of Armstrong College, Newcastle on Tyne. In a letter he wrote from Lahore, Morison declared (1):

> The present movement is a deep all-India affair. It's no use pretending that it is the concern of the Indian 'intelligenzia'. No doubt the great mass here is naturally uninterested in all-India politics, but most of the leaders come from that mass, are representative of it, are related to it with an intimacy lacking even in the best English administrators...In other words we are dealing, not with a pathological state, but with something fine and wholesome, and in the end as irresistible as a law of nature.

Morison went on to argue that Indians should be given 'complete self-government' which included the right to secede from the Empire, as anything else was a sham. The tone of the letter surprised Thomas Jones, the Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet, who had always regarded Morison as as 'ardent imperialist' (2). Obviously the surge of natio-

nalism that Morison witnessed at Lahore was sufficient to overcome his imperialist sentiments.

Even in distant London, the events at Lahore created some apprehension. There was a significant fall in the prices of Indian securities and Government stocks on the London Stock Exchange, primarily as a result of the Congress resolution on the repudiation of debts (3). But, if investors were visibly alarmed, others took a more sanguine view. The Times declared that 'It would be a profound mistake to underrate the influence of the Congress Party', but that there was nothing in 'their latest manifestations which should cause unusual surprise or deflect in the slightest degree the course of British policy' (4). The crux of this policy, according to The Times, was to rally the moderates in India.

A similar stance was adopted by the Spectator. Expressing dismay at what it called the folly of the Congress in declaring for complete independence and in proposing civil disobedience, the Spectator argued in favour of a firm response, but without provocative restrictions and repression (5). It went on to clarify its position in response to a letter from Charles G. Spencer, a former judge of the Madras High Court, who had stated that in India there was a need for 'far-sighted statesmen, not men who pardon rebels and try to placate irreconcilables' (6). The editor replied that the Spectator supported the Viceroy, Irwin, because the 'only means of ensuring that India remains within the British Commonwealth is to enlist liberal and constitutional elements on our side', and complete

self-government without limitations was the goal that could never be lost sight of (7).

The idea that moderate elements in India should be wooed away from the extremists and to the side of the Government had been one of the important determinants of British policy in the preceding years. As extremism raised its head once more, this idea came to the fore again. Wedgwood Benn, the Secretary of State for India, was for example keen that, in meeting the threat posed by the Congress, the Government of India should ensure that moderate opinion would be carried with the Government in enforcing the law (8).

Some entertained the hope that the very extremism shown at Lahore would push the Indian moderates towards the Government (9). The Manchester Guardian, for example, argued that Indian moderates had a chance to regain control of India's political course because Congress had decided to base its policy on emotions and not upon facts. It suggested that the moderates should form a Party (10). It felt that the Indian moderates should be supported by demonstration through definite action that Britain was determined to remove the obstacles in the path towards Dominion status (11).

An influential section of British opinion was thus urging the continuation of the traditional policy of supporting moderate elements in India in order to defeat the extremists. But not all were convinced of the efficacy of such a policy, which necessarily involved a cautious and moderate response to moves by the Congress, for severe

repression would have further alienated the moderates. To several right-wing elements in Britain, this very caution and moderation seemed to be the cause of the problems in India. The Daily Mail and the Morning Post argued in fact that it was the weakness of the Viceroy, Irwin, that was causing all the problems(12). Lucy Houston, the eccentric and right-wing owner of the Saturday Review, even wrote to the Prime Minister, urging the recall of Irwin and his replacement by Lord Lloyd, who, according to her, should be given a carte blanche (13). The Daily Mail too echoed this idea (14).

Sir Reginald Craddock, the die-hard Conservative and former Indian Civil Servant who had just published The Dilemma in India, sent a note to the Secretary of State, recommending a firm and forceful counterattack by Government as soon as Congress began a civil disobedience movement, especially through a special ordinance that would give the Government wide powers (15).

But it was not only Conservative die-hards who were urging more forceful action in India. Lloyd George also attacked the policy of moderation being adopted by the Government (16). And Reading, asked to comment on the draft of a speech that Irwin was proposing to make to the Legislative Assembly in India (setting out Government policy), declared that the speech would give the impression that the Government was vacillating and apprehensive about the consequences of action against the extremists (17).

It is probable that some of the criticism stemmed from a desire to make political capital out of the Indian

problem, although Indian policy was in effect still being pursued on non-partisan lines. There was also a tacit fear, perhaps, that India was on the brink of irrepressible revolution, that she would indeed become the 'lost dominion'. It was probably to allay such fears that Earl Russell, the Under-Secretary of State for India, declared at a meeting in Cambridge that, whatever might be the nature of the Simon Report, or of the discussions at the proposed Round Table Conference, Dominion status for India was not possible for a long time (18). Russell's intention might have been to silence British critics of the Government's India policy. In India, however, his remarks had the opposite effect. Russell attempted to repair the damage by explaining that he had been misreported, and that he was merely pointing out that there had to be a long period of transition. Indians saw his statement as the inadvertent revelation of the true policy that the Government sought to adopt. Motilal Nehru, for example, declared that Russell had blurted out the 'unvarnished truth', and that the later repudiations could change nothing (19).

The Government was obviously caught in a critical position. In India, it had to tread cautiously to avoid the alienation of the moderates. At the same time, it could not ignore the domestic critics of its policy in India. Its task was further complicated by the state of the economy, especially its impact on the textile industry of Lancashire. On the one hand, the growing demands in India for protection could not be brushed aside. On the other hand, British textile interests were also exerting an increasing

pressure on the Government, seeking to remove all barriers that restricted British trade with India.

This conflict of economic interests had always been a recurrent theme in the imperial relationship; the situation in 1930 was more critical than it had ever been. Unemployment in Lancashire was rising as the world economic crisis bit deeper into the British economy. At the same time, political and economic conditions were interacting to increase the likelihood of a total exclusion of the products of Lancashire. The possible loss of the Indian market at a time when competition from Japan, Germany, and the United States was threatening an already weakened British industry could not have been viewed with equanimity.

India was not the only market for the goods of Lancashire. Nevertheless, it was undoubtedly the most important at that time. As T.M. Ainscough, the Senior British Trade Commissioner in India, pointed out in a speech to the Royal Empire Society,India absorbed 11½% of the total UK export trade, and 28% of the UK cotton piecegoods exports (20). The loss of such a market at a critical juncture could not have been contemplated with detachment.

The Labour Government was perhaps perplexed also because it was committed on the one hand to support the British worker, while on the other it had professedly greater sympathies for Indian nationalism than the other Parties. It tried to persuade the Government of India to modify the duties on cotton goods imported into India, by arguing, inter alia, that the tariff would have serious results not only for the poor of Lancashire, but also for the poor of

India (21). The Viceroy would have none of this, however. He pointed out that the purchasers of Lancashire products were mostly not the poor, and that in any case Indian interests had to be put first, because there was a strong desire among Indians for protection, and a dangerous political situation would be created if this desire was starved altogether (22). As a palliative, Irwin suggested, the Government of India was willing to propose a 5% protective duty to be imposed on plain grey goods from outside the British Empire, as this might be acceptable to Bombay interests (23). The President of the Board of Trade welcomed this idea, but pointed out to the Cabinet that it would cover only 19 million rupees' worth of goods out of a total of 427 million rupees' worth of goods imported into India (24).

Naturally Lancashire became a focal point, and in the succeeding years the chief actors in the imperial drama all at one time or another perforce made a pilgrimage to Lancashire, to court the people of that area, workers and capitalists alike. But it was not only the cotton trade and Lancashire that pointed to the growing contradiction in imperial policy, namely the need to reconcile the opposing economic interests of commercial forces in India and in Britain. Shipping was another area of contention: Indian shipping interests sought reservation of coastal shipping for themselves, while British shipping companies opposed this (25).

There was therefore a strong economic component in the desire to contain the Indian nationalist movement. But this was rarely used as an argument, since it could only have lent further credence to the Indian view that

Britain was reluctant to yield her Indian sceptre because that would damage British economic interests. The arguments revolved instead around traditional themes.

A correspondent to the Spectator declared that the Indian extremists represented no one but themselves, and that they should be dealt with firmly, as otherwise the 'martial races', who would not tolerate domination by a class they despised, would rise up in rebellion (26).

H.S Barnes, a former member of the Council of India, catalogued the benefits conferred by Britain on India, implying that Indians ought to be grateful, and suggested that friends of Britain should be rallied by a declaration that the British had no intention of leaving India, either then or in the future (27).

Arthur Conan Doyle, the famous creator of Sherlock Holmes, thought that the agitation in India should be countered by asking Muslims if they would be prepared to obey laws passed by a Hindu majority, and by asking Untouchables if they wished to be left to the mercy of the Brahmins (28).

J.B. Macfarlan, a retired Lieutenant-Colonel who had served in India, asserted that a large majority of Indians placed greater trust in British rule than in native administration (29). And Michael O'Dwyer blandly declared that the Government merely needed to acquaint the Indian people with the 'true facts' to get them onto the Government side (30).

All these ideas were based on traditional images of India. Their reiteration strengthened the stereotypes,

and precluded a proper understanding of the Indian situation. If the Indian people remained ignorant of the 'true facts', the British public also saw the Indian problem through the distorting prism of preconceptions and prejudices. Faced with a challenge to the British Empire in India, the British people were more unwilling than ever to reject their inherited ideas about India, and this unwillingness certainly prevented them from accepting ideas of compromise at that juncture.

Not everyone was entirely oblivious of the economic element involved in the relationship between India and Britain. F. Anderson, an engineer in India, in a letter to the Liberal leader, Herbert Samuel, expressed his happiness that Samuel (and, he hoped, the Party) was not committed to the granting of self-government to India, for it would mean the repudiation of every obligation by a Congress Government, which was the only possible Government, and Indian fiscal autonomy would help neither the unemployment problem nor free trade (31). John Dellbridge, an author who had spent some time in India, was more explicit and emphatic. In a pamphlet published in January 1930, he declared that the reason why Britain was in India was that India was a paying proposition 'well worth exploiting', and that 'the most bemused of hypocrites would hesitate before asking anyone to believe that we entered India in order to hold it in trust for India' (32). Dellbridge was no friend of India, for he repeated stereotypes to the effect that India was not a nation, and that the Bengali was a physical coward, and he defended Katherine Mayo by

declaring that her Mother India was nothing but the truth. Yet he was putting across an economic motive for Britain's continued dominance of India. His pamphlet reflected the idea that India was still profitable and therefore should be kept firmly within the British Empire.

Of course, there were others who recognized that there might be economic reasons for the Indian unrest. C.J. O'Donnell, who had been in India in the ICS, and who had later represented Walworth as a Liberal MP, argued in his Why India is Rebellious that the Indian peasant had no interest in constitution-building, but sought a change of Government because of discontent arising from impoverishment, and the 'agitators' derived their strength from this discontent (33). O'Donnell rejected the dominant idea that the Indian agitators were few in number and that they did not represent the rural masses, and indicated that, on the contrary, they were largely from that class. O'Donnell's Indian service had mostly been in Bengal, and, although he had retired in 1900, before the anti-partition agitation, he had apparently sensed the rural roots of Bengali nationalism, and had been led to conclude that Indian nationalism was not an elitist phenomenon.

There was a great deal of truth in the argument that the Indian nationalist leaders were taking advantage of, and were deriving their strength from, the economic discontent of the Indian people. Indeed, the attempt made by Gandhi in January 1930 to seek a rapprochement with the Government through the eleven-point programme has been seen to be a deliberate and careful attempt to draw sup-

port from every class and social group (34). In reality, of course, the eleven-point programme, if accepted, would have been of great benefit to the Indian bourgeoisie, since among various items it included the reduction of the rupee-sterling ratio, a protective tariff on foreign cloth, and the passage of the Coastal Traffic Reservation Bill. But these were the very items that the Viceroy, as the representative of the King-Emperor, could not accept, as they conflicted with the interests of Britain. To Gandhi, these constituted the essence of independence (35). But he must have known that the Viceroy could not accept these eleven demands, and could only have made this infructuous peace overture to satisfy his conscience that he had tried to avert the imminent conflict with the Government (36).

But attempts were actually made by Gandhi's British friends to persuade the Home Government to accept or at any rate explore their feasibility. C.F. Andrews, for example, argued that Gandhi's eleven-point programme represented a minimum, but a real offer, and felt that the Secretary of State should go to India and discuss it with Gandhi and the other Indian leaders, preceding this by the release of all the political prisoners (37).

It was, however, a futile hope, since the policy of the Government had been stated by Irwin in his speech to the Legislative Assembly, in which he had reiterated the policy expressed in his declaration of October 1929, stating that the declaration of the goal, and the actual attainment of that goal, were two separate things, and that the Round Table Conference would meet only for the purpose

of elucidating and harmonizing opinion, the Government having the responsibility for the drafting of proposals for the consideration of Parliament (38).

Besides, opinion in Britain tended at this juncture to await the Report of the Statutory Commission, and in fact to ignore the idea of the Conference (39). So, as the Indian National Congress tested its strength through 'Independence Day' celebrations on 26 January 1930, the Government of India and the British Government prepared for the coming conflict, buttressed certainly by the thought that, while any firm measures would be supported by the public at home, the idea of the Round Table Conference would keep alive moderate support in India.

Gandhi made, it would seem, another attempt to seek a compromise, by directly approaching the Prime Minister. He sent a letter to MacDonald through S.R. Bomanji (40). But nothing came of this, perhaps because Gandhi merely reiterated the eleven points he had already set out (41).

Having exhausted all possible paths to a peaceful resolution of the problem without injury to the Congress position, Gandhi finally cast the die by sending a letter to Irwin in which he set out a list of the evils resulting from British rule which he held to be the cause of India's ruin, and declared that, if Irwin could not see his way to deal with these evils, he would embark on civil disobedience (42). Irwin's Private Secretary sent a terse reply, expressing the Viceroy's regret that Gandhi contemplated a course of action that would involve violation of the law and danger to the public peace (43). Wedgwood Benn

thought that the reply was precisely right (44). The time had passed for confabulations with people who had now become, for all practical purposes, the enemy. There remained, after all, the hope of retaining the support of the Indian moderates, and policy continued to be influenced by that idea.

Wedgwood Benn thought that the use of force by the Government should be confined to the suppression of violence whether actual or intended, as this would make it possible to retain the tacit assent of 'thinking people' (45). In fact, to Benn, the effect on the Indian public of the methods adopted by the Government of India was much more important than opinion in Britain (46). Irwin, on the other hand, was concerned by the reaction of the British Press to the apparent inaction of the Government of India, in case they decided not to arrest Gandhi immediately (47).

Initially, there was little concern in Britain about the events in India, and the House of Commons extended its full support for the Viceroy (48). The Secretary of State was even hopeful that the civil disobedience movement would soon disappear, leaving the Government free to fight with the terrorists, which, he thought, was a much more satisfactory job to undertake (49). But, as the movement in India took hold of the popular imagination, and more and more people began to defy the law, it became clear that it was no transient phenomenon. Within a few days of Benn's optimistic epistle to Irwin, Sydney Webb, the Colonial Secretary, was writing to his wife that the prospects in India were very bad, and that serious trouble, much worse than 'the present', was feared (50). Sydney

Webb was probably reacting to the news of the mutiny of some soldiers of the 2/18 Garhwal Regiment in Peshawar, but the events following the arrest of Gandhi on 29 April 1930, especially the riots in Sholapur, served to deepen the anxiety of the British Cabinet.

Not surprisingly, the Prime Minister replied with anger to C.F. Andrews, who had suggested that the salt tax, and the strong measures that the Government was taking in India, should be abolished, and that Gandhi should be called to a conference (51). Andrews' letter obviously came at a wrong time, just as the Cabinet was considering the critical situation in India, and MacDonald replied in very strong terms. Are not Gandhi's hands red with the blood of his fellow countrymen, he asked, and categorically asserted that the Government could not allow either Gandhi or anyone else to deflect them from the liberal political policy that they were going to pursue in India (52). Apparently stung by the suggestion that his Government had adopted strong measures, MacDonald went on to ask Andrews whether or not he was aiding and abetting the most ordinary kind of revolution in India, adding that there was no cheap and easy attitude which could be adopted at the time (53).

It is extremely likely that the Cabinet and MacDonald did think that they, and Irwin in India, were meeting the crisis in India with as much restraint as was possible. The philosophy that underpinned the Government's policy was summed up by Wedgwood Benn, who felt that the main difference between war on civil disobedience and an international war was that, in the case of the latter, a knockout

blow might be justified, while in the case of the former the use of force by the Government was intended to lead up to an armistice, thus retaining public support (54). In other words, the policy to be followed was one that would not alienate public support, implying thereby the support of the moderates, as the extremists, by definition, were the main actors in the conflict.

But if the Government was banking on the moderates, not all were convinced that such support would be forthcoming. Sir John Simon, in the throes of completing his Report, felt that there was no use in relying on the moderates, and doubted very much whether even Sapru and Jinnah would have the courage to stand out from the 'swirling mob' (55). He was not alone in thinking that the moderates were incapable of producing a countervailing force to combat the forces of disorder. Indeed, Irwin was concerned that, if references were made in Britain to the 'craven spirit' of the moderates, the effect in India would be bad (56).

The Daily Mail and the Daily Telegraph, unconcerned about the effect in India, were doing exactly that, painting a lurid picture of Indian events, stirring up in Britain a feeling that the Indians were unfit for self-government, and that the Indian Government was reacting too weakly (57). Lord Beaverbrook, the proprietor of the Daily Express, also thought on similar lines. 'The day that a policy of repression is decided on will mark the end of the crisis', he wrote to Arthur Brisbane, and added that, whereas the English were never free to bomb towns or

machine-gun people in Ireland, they could do so in India, and the 'rebellion' would be crushed if the decision was taken to bomb or use machine guns (58).

The Sunday Chronicle sought at this point to project a bleak image of India by reproducing selected extracts from Mother India. C.F. Andrews thought that such a publication at a time when the Indian Press was itself subject to the strict controls of the Press Ordinance was bound to create an indignant reaction, and wanted MacDonald to intercede through Baldwin to prevent publication (59). Wedgwood Benn did manage to secure postponement of the publication of the extracts, but perhaps lost some of the advantage since the Sunday Chronicle indicated that it was putting off publication at the request of the India Office (60).

Irwin had noticed that the Press in Britain was giving the impression that the Government of India was pursuing a weak policy, and asked Benn to get the Press to understand that the Government had acted with vigour and quickness, and that the policy followed had been justified by the results (61). If Irwin was anxious to appear to be firmly in control, he was also, at the same time, very concerned about the possible repercussions of Government policy, especially that adopted in the North-West Frontier Province, on the Muslims. In fact, Irwin was so apprehensive that Muslims might join the movement that he asked Benn to privately suggest to Simon that he should avoid either by language or in substance anything in his Report that could discourage the Muslims (62).

In Britain, while one section of the Press was call-

ing for more forceful action, the events in India began to arouse growing concern among the intelligentsia, and those who saw in India an unnecessary conflict. The Society of Friends sent a deputation to the Secretary of State to urge him to find a peaceful solution. Gilbert Murray, Arnold Toynbee and Philip Kerr had discussions with Benn as a result of Murray's proposal to publish an expression of non-political opinion signed by distinguished philosophers and men of letters, pleading for understanding (63). Horace Alexander planned to go to India 'to help build a bridge', as he put it (64). The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom adopted a series of resolutions calling on the Government to declare an amnesty for political prisoners, to announce that the object of the Round Table Conference was to formulate a scheme for full responsible government in India, and so on (65).

The Government, at this juncture, was not very receptive to suggestions about policy. Wedgwood Benn saw the role of the Government as a neutral arbiter, maintaining peace, not in the interests of Britain, but of India, while being conscious both of the national sentiment in India and of public opinion in Europe and the USA (66). The Labour Government had the difficult task of reconciling their sympathy for Indian nationalism (which the Party had proclaimed again and again from various platforms) with the imperial task of maintaining order in India. That this dilemma exercised the Cabinet is revealed by an entry in Beatrice Webb's diary. Following Gandhi's arrest, she recorded (67):

> It is not prejudice in favour of autocratic British rule in the mind of the Labour Cabinet and the Viceroy that blocks the way to granting immediate Dominion status, but sheer perplexity as to how on earth to do it, without tumbling India into a state of civil war.

This was not merely a moral dilemma of maintaining order in India without seeming to retreat from positions held in the past, but one which had immediate practical ramifications. Civil disobedience was not showing signs of petering out, as the Government had hoped (68). Yet the Government had to seek ways of restoring peace, firstly to create conditions in which the proposed Round Table Conference could take place effectively and usefully, and secondly to resurrect a dying economy (69). But, at the same time, the Government of India could not appear to be surrendering to the nationalist movement.

It was this attitude that led the Government of India to scotch all moves made between May and July 1930 to secure some settlement of the problem. The first move, paradoxically enough, was made by Indian commercial interests. Although they were supporting the civil disobedience movement because in the long run it would, if successful, secure for them the financial and commercial autonomy they desired so much, in the short term, the boycott campaign and the general political instability were affecting their interests as much as those of British commerce (70).

The initiative was taken by Husseinbhoy Laljee, the President of the Indian Merchants' Chamber. He proposed that they would persuade Gandhi to call off the movement if the Viceroy could declare support for full responsible government and fiscal autonomy, and stated the terms of reference for the Round Table Conference (71). The Vice-

roy felt that there could be no negotiations before the movement actually ceased.because it was 'very important that no impression should anywhere be created that we are prepared to open negotiations with Gandhi' (72). For the same reason, Irwin refused to meet George Slocombe, the Correspondent of the Daily Herald who had earlier brought off a dramatic journalistic feat by interviewing Gandhi in jail (73). But Slocombe, perhaps with a journalist's feel for the political pulse, told the Private Secretary to the Viceroy that there could be no administrative solution, and that sooner or later negotiations would be necessary (74). Indeed, already Benn, while admitting that it might be premature to talk of one, made references to a possible armistice in the future, arguing that the Government should leave a way open for continuing with positive steps towards constitutional reform through discreet use of repressive measures (75).

Parthasarathi Gupta has argued that Benn did not interfere with the Viceroy's tactics in dealing with the civil disobedience movement (76). While this is true, in so far as no explicit directives were forwarded to Irwin, it is apparent from the various letters and telegrams cited that Benn was strenuously attempting to create a framework in which the Government, while carrying out its task of governing, did not shut the door completely on possibilities of peacemaking without loss of face.

As noted, Benn had informed Irwin that he wished to keep the path to an armistice open, and was not too concerned about the effect upon public opinion in Britain. Irwin, however, was conscious of the possible effect that

his policies might have on the British public, and it could have been this that led him to reject the attempts made by Slocombe and Laljee. Besides, Irwin had formed the opinion that in some senses the civil disobedience movement was artificial in its inception and that it was maintained artificially; he saw commercial and economic discontent as having only a minor, insignificant, role, and he hoped that the Report of the Statutory Commission would help in combating the movement (77). He was inclined, therefore, to await developments, rather than diminish the reputation of the Government by entering into what he obviously thought were premature attempts to negotiate a peace.

If Irwin hoped that the Report of the Statutory Commission would pave the way to peace, his hopes were soon to be dashed when the Report was published on 10 June 1930. In recommending only provincial autonomy, and even that hedged in by several safeguards, it fell far short of what the Indian nationalists had been demanding. Inevitably, it was rejected by them. It was clear, too, that the Government could not, in that political climate, back the Report, if it hoped to secure any co-operation from Indians.

In Britain, the Report was received with virtually universal acclamation. For one thing, it closely corresponded to the existing image of India as being as yet unready for any substantial movement towards Dominion status.

Besides, the unanimity of the Report, which Simon had engineered, tended to lend it a more forceful influence, and reinforced the hoary tradition of a non-partisan attitude towards India (78). The Report quickly became a

bestseller, an unusual occurrence for a publication of HMSO, and that too on India (79). Two broadcasts made by Simon over the BBC presented to a wider audience a summary of the Report. It was used as a text-book in one school (80). The King thought that it was the 'most accurate, faithful picture ever portrayed' of India, and he hoped that the Government would regard it as the core of their policy (81). Clifford Sharp, the editor of the New Statesman, wrote to Simon that he would extend his unqualified support for the Report, and that, in his opinion, talk of going beyond it was nonsensical (82).

A few critical voices were also raised. The Daily Herald, which had praised the first volume of the Report as being an admirable survey of the Indian scene, dismissed the second volume for virtually recommending a continuation of the existing situation (83). Harold Laski pointed out the main flaw of the Report. Writing in the Daily Herald, Laski declared (84):

> As a piece of analysis its finely meshed structure could hardly be bettered. Its argument is closely knit, its logical power superb. Everything is there save an understanding of the Indian mind.

The 'Simon Report', as it came to be called, undoubtedly captured the minds of the members of the intelligentsia, and laid the framework in which they would view Indian constitutional developments during this period.

Simon began to feel unhappy, however, as it became clear to him that his Report (as he certainly seems to have felt) was going to be shunted off onto a branch line. Already, he had been upset that the Nation had made adverse remarks about Volume I of the Report, and had tried

to get Meston to write to the journal criticizing the review (85). But now he was unwilling to face the prospect of the Report being shelved. Forwarding the second volume to the Warden of All Souls College, Simon remarked that he wished the Government of India would call for a careful perusal of the Report, rather than encourage the idea that it would be scrapped, because it was fatal to give the Indians the impression that they only needed to raise a clamour to compel a retreat (86). Simon thought that Benn was preparing to shelve the Report, and even presumed that he might not have read it at all (87). He tried, therefore, to whip up support in the Press, and to increase the readership of the Report (88). The decision to exclude Simon, and the other Commissioners, from the Round Table Conference seemed the coup de grâce, and Irwin's explanations did not mollify him (89).

The Conservative Party decided to back the Simon Report, though some of its members must have felt that it went too far in recommending provincial autonomy. Soon after it was published, Birkenhead wrote to Baldwin that all the evidence indicated a tendency to shelve it, and that the Round Table Conference would try to destroy it, but that it should be 'our purpose, as far as we can, to render this impossible' (90). Already, Austen Chamberlain had conveyed to the Prime Minister the Conservative Party's opinion that the Government should back the Simon Report (91). There was general concern in London, particularly among Conservatives, that Irwin might, in a speech that he proposed to make, give away too much, and give the impression that the Round Table Conference was

going to meet to frame a Dominion status constitution. Baldwin, Chamberlain, Lloyd George and Reading met the Prime Minister and forcefully suggested that Irwin should make no reference to Dominion status in his speech (92).

But Irwin was increasingly convinced that it would be a mistake to ignore the force of nationalist feeling in India, and that the real problem was how to keep a contented India within the Empire (93). When the Conservatives sent him a message, therefore, suggesting that the Viceroy should not, even to win the support of the moderates, make any new announcement regarding Dominion status, and that the Simon Report should not be disregarded, Irwin reacted angrily (94). The Conservatives were apprehensive that the Government might go much beyond the recommendations of the Simon Commission, and agree to a transfer of responsibility at the centre. Irwin thought that such Conservative ideas were deplorable evidence of the gulf existing between the progressive opinions held by the British in India and those held by the Conservatives at home (95). He was unwilling to modify his stand, and decided to indicate in his speech to the Legislative Assembly that the Conference would not be fettered by the Simon Report, and that agreement reached at the Round Table Conference would form the basis of the Government's proposals to Parliament (96).

It is clear that Irwin was responding to the growing strength of the civil disobedience movement, and was therefore prepared to take a more progressive stance. He was so anxious, indeed, that no impression should be given that the Government was backing the Simon Report that he

asked Benn not to associate the Government of India or the Viceroy with a letter of thanks that Benn was writing to Simon, and even suggested that the word 'monument' should not be used to describe the Report, as it suggested immutability (97)!

But it was not only Irwin who was perturbed by the situation in India, and was consequently persuaded to adopt a more progressive stance. H.N. Gladstone, a Liberal who had spent many years in Calcutta as a businessman, and who had been a member of the 1913 Royal Commission on Indian Finance and Currency, was convinced that people in Britain did not realize the gravity of the situation, and that it was Gandhi and the Congress Party that held the trump cards, not the Government (98).

Herbert Lewis, who reported the views of Gladstone to Lloyd George, was himself of the opinion that, although great forces could be rallied to the side of the Government, it would be difficult to prevent the disaffected areas from inflicting 'immense damage on trade and employment' of British people (99). Lewis also sent a memorandum written by a 'distinguished and highly placed' official to Lloyd George (100). In this memorandum, which was essentially a critique of Reginald Craddock's book, The Dilemma of India, the official agreed with Craddock's opinion that an Indian administration would be corrupt and inefficient, and that the minorities in India would suffer under Indian rule. On the other hand, he rejected Craddock's idea that there would be internecine war, as well as the 'martial races' theory. More importantly, the official pointed out that it would be wrong to argue that the

masses in India were in favour of a continuation of British rule, as the insurrections spreading in India could not be understood if it were thought that only a handful of lawyers believed in them. Government without the consent of the governed was impossible without the use of force, and this would not be supported for long by a democracy as in Britain. His suggestion, therefore, was the immediate grant of almost complete self-government, the British Army remaining in India while the Indian forces were being built up.

This was a radical and unusual view, but it was not likely to have influenced Lloyd George. He and Reading continued to hold views which were, as compared with the position adopted by Irwin or Benn, reactionary. But other Liberals held different views. Herbert Samuel, for instance, felt that the first thing to do was to create a better atmosphere through some gesture, and that too much was being made of the responsibility of Parliament (101). Rather too optimistically, Samuel thought that, after the second reading of the Bill following upon the Round Table Conference, a Joint Committee of equal numbers of Indian and British members should meet in Delhi to discuss details. Lothian had expressed the idea, long before the Report was published, that there should be an absolutely unconditional conference of all parties in India, with the Government of India, to see if an agreement could be reached. If there were signs of such an agreement, the Secretary of State or a British delegation should go to India, consolidate the agreement, and return to Britain with an Indian delegation to induce Parliament to ratify

it (102). J.A. Spender thought that a reference to Dominion status would be good, for it would strike the right note (103).

If the Liberal Party, one of whose members had been Chairman of the Statutory Commission, were unable to agree about Indian policy, the Labour Party, who had two representatives in the Commission, were not in a much better position. Two memoranda prepared by the Labour Party's Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions were both critical of the Simon Report (104).

In one, G.T. Garratt argued that the proposals gave too much power to the Governors, thus creating a new system of Dyarchy, while in the other Sir John Maynard suggested that the Report failed to satisfy Indian amour propre. Attlee, who had been asked to comment on these memoranda, naturally defended the Report, but saw no use in his comments being forwarded to the Advisory Committee as its members, in his view, had 'fixed ideas on India and are not likely to be affected by the exposition of a contrary view' (105).

The divisions in the Parties, and the multiplicity of opinions, were reflected in the variety of opinions and attitudes held by individuals and groups as well. Beatrice Webb told Walter Layton that a conference of the Indian interests alone should be called to get an agreed constitution, and that, if they could not agree (she thought they were not likely to agree), Britain should help as an impartial arbitrator (106). Layton thought it might have to come to that, but not as yet. Beatrice Webb, like the anonymous official whose opinions were referred to earlier,

felt that, while Indians might not be able to govern themselves, they could make it wholly impracticable for Britain to govern them, as neither her means nor her public opinion would permit any Government to reconquer India by force of arms (107).

One group of individuals published a letter in the Manchester Guardian, urging the Government to emphasize that representatives of both Britain and India would meet on a basis of equality, and with a view to arriving at proposals for the attainment of Dominion status, subject only to transitional safeguards (108).

Mrs Annie Besant was also going round Britain, addressing meetings, where she criticized the Simon Report, and talking to MPs, trying to get support for the moribund Commonwealth of India Bill (109).

Meanwhile, Irwin made a bold attempt to find a solution through negotiation. He had earlier rejected attempts made by Husseinbhoy Laljee and George Slocombe to mediate. That was in May. Even in late June, Irwin and his Council rejected a suggestion made by Purushottamdas Thakurdas that Motilal Nehru, who had gone to Bombay, should be allowed to meet Gandhi, because, Irwin telegraphed to Benn, allowing 'the two prime movers' of the civil disobedience movement to meet would 'encourage our enemies and dishearten our friends' (110).

Within a few days, however, Irwin was willing to permit two moderate leaders, T.B. Sapru and M.R. Jayakar, to act as mediators between the Indian nationalists and the Government. This dramatic change in Irwin's attitude was due to several factors. Firstly, there was the obvious

need for a solution. Secondly, there was the disparate nature of British reactions. If there had been a clear and decisive directive from Britain at this juncture, Irwin might have continued to hesitate to embark on any negotiations. Thirdly, the Labour Government, and in particular the Secretary of State, Benn, was constantly urging Irwin to keep the door open to an ultimate settlement. He had been making specific references to an armistice, and he continued to suggest the need for moderation (111). Irwin could not have failed to be influenced by this constant urging of restraint. All that was needed was a specific opportunity, a sign that could be seized.

This came in the form of a statement that Motilal Nehru gave to George Slocombe, the Correspondent of the Daily Herald (112). This statement, intended to be the opening gambit in an elaborate move towards peace, suggested that the British Government and the Government of India should make private assurances that they would support the demand for full responsible self-government in India. Motilal Nehru would then carry such assurances to Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, and, if they agreed, the civil disobedience movement would be called off, the Government of India could withdraw all repressive measures and release political prisoners, and Congress would participate in the Round Table Conference.

Irwin thought that the statement marked a retreat from the Lahore Congress position to the one that had obtained when he had met Motilal Nehru and other Indian leaders on 23 December 1929 (113). Correctly perceiving it as a peace overture, Irwin persuaded a not too willing Council to

agree to a postponement of the action proposed against the Congress, and the consequent arrest of Motilal Nehru, as such action would have seemed too much like a rejection of the proferred olive branch (114). Irwin might also have been influenced by the concern already expressed by Benn that action against the Congress, necessary as it might have been, would jeopardize the Round Table Conference, especially as any resultant penalties must fall upon Motilal Nehru (115).

Such was the delicate balance in India, however, that the postponement of the action against the Congress and Motilal Nehru was extremely short-lived, and the Government felt compelled to proscribe the Working Committee of the Congress, and, as a result, to arrest Motilal Nehru, among others (116). Given the imperatives of action, this did not scuttle the peace plan entirely. With Sapru and Jayakar acting as intermediaries, the Government of India launched an attempt to secure an agreement from Gandhi and his colleagues to cease civil disobedience, and to take part in the Round Table Conference. Irwin's calculated gamble was based upon the premiss that success would be beneficial, while failure could be no worse than the existing impasse, and, besides, would have demonstrated to the public that Government policy was not one of undiluted repression (117). Both Irwin and Benn were conscious of the vital necessity to avoid giving the impression that the Government was bargaining with Gandhi (118).

At the same time, Irwin had to contend with the susceptibilities of his political adversaries, with whom he was attempting a dialogue, and could not be too reticent

and distant. There is no doubt that the Viceroy and his Council were keen to secure a settlement, and, to this end, even facilitated a joint meeting of all the principal architects of Congress policy, namely Gandhi, Motilal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhai Patel, and Syed Mahmud, as well as Sarojini Naidu and Jairamdas Daulatram.

In the end, despite much travelling by Sapru and Jayakar and various meetings with the principal actors, and several notes being exchanged, the negotiations resulted in failure. It has been suggested that one of the reasons for the failure was the influence of the more radical Jawaharlal Nehru on his father and the others (119). There is some validity in this argument, as Jawaharlal Nehru's diary reveals that he was reluctant to enter into peace negotiations (120). But he did participate in the negotiations, and, although it is probable that he exercised a restraining influence upon those willing to reach a compromise, individual predilections alone are not a sufficient explanation.

The negotiations failed, ultimately, because the Congress leaders could not have called off the civil disobedience movement at that juncture without risking the passing of the leadership to more extreme elements. The movement was not, at that time, at a low ebb. On the contrary, despite all the measures adopted by the Government, the various aspects of the movement were widespread and flourishing. Any sudden bottling up of the movement by those who had launched it and brought it to fever pitch could only have led to an undermining of their leadership and even to the disintegration of the Congress. The fact that the

Viceroy could only offer them a vaguely phrased assurance in return made it virtually impossible for the Congress to agree to a peaceful settlement.

Irwin could only offer vague assurances, since he lacked the power to commit himself to anything more. Already even the very act of holding talks, even if through intermediaries, had come in for strong criticism from the Conservative die-hards. Winston Churchill, ever the creator of the vivid image, spoke for the die-hards when he told a Conservative meeting at Thanet of how the Government of India, having arrested Gandhi for breaking the law, now permitted him to hold cabinet councils with fellow-conspirators, and waited 'cap in hand outside the cell door hoping to wheedle a few kind words out of their prisoner' (121). From the very beginning of the process of negotiating, in fact, the Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, had been conscious of the Conservative shadow falling across the path towards peace. In a marginal note on a copy of a telegram from the Viceroy that Wedgwood Benn had sent him, MacDonald had remarked, around 6 July 1930, that the Viceroy should be warned to be careful to protect himself, in the expressions used in his letters and conversations, against accusations of surrender or bargaining (122). As the protracted negotiations went on, MacDonald's anxiety about the effect of Irwin's actions on opinion in Britain increased, and he was particularly concerned that nothing should be done and no pledge given without the consent of the Cabinet (123).

MacDonald's fears were not entirely unfounded. Lord Hailsham, for instance, expressed his uneasiness at the

terms on which the Congress leaders would make peace (124). Churchill was even more emphatic. In a letter to Baldwin, Churchill stated that he was getting several letters which expressed the anxiety that the British position in India was being thrown away, and he hoped that Baldwin's friendship for Irwin would not be allowed to affect his judgement, or that of what significantly Churchill called 'your' Party (125).

It was therefore not easy for the British Cabinet to assent to any actual concession that would have been sufficiently attractive to the Congress leaders to persuade them to come to a settlement. The hands of the Viceroy were hence necessarily tied, and an unsuccessful result, though not expected, was the only possible result at that time. The attempt was made only because a Round Table Conference without the Congress participating would have been incomplete, and futile. Besides, the Government might have hoped to defuse the explosive situation created by the civil disobedience movement, a hope sustained by the partially accurate perception that the Indian business community was beginning to be tired of the struggle (126). At the same time, it must have been very evident to the Government, as it was to non-official observers, that the movement did not show any real signs of flagging.

Thus Horace Alexander, in Simla in August 1930, reported that what was happening in India was of the stuff of revolution, and thought that the movement would intensify (127). His perception that women provided the backbone of the movement was remarked also by Wedgwood Benn as being one of the disquieting features of the movement, along

with the fact that it had got a grip on the youth and communities other than Hindu (128). This recognition that the movement was something more than ordinary law-breaking, that it was inspired by an irrepressible national sentiment, was one of the reasons why the Government risked political calumny from the die-hards in Britain to attempt a truce (129). But of necessity it was the very intensity of the movement that prevented the Congress agreeing to a truce.

The Government, quite naturally, blamed the Congress for failing to seize the opportunity (130). Even before the Congress rejected the peace offer, MacDonald in particular saw it as the obstinate stumbling block to any constructive plan for India. If India did not get what she wanted, he wrote to Sir Muhammed Shafi, nobody could be blamed but Gandhi and the Congress (131). When Oswald Garrison Villard, the editor of the American radical journal, Nation, referred to the failure of the Labour Government to end the 'cruelties of the authorities in dealing with the followers of Ghandi (sic)', MacDonald replied as if he had been personally accused, asking Villard if he had learnt nothing from the fact that Gandhi, 'by declaring a sentimental non-resistance campaign, has spread hatred and caused bloodshed, has played into the very worst elements in Indian society, and has created a condition as different from his vague notions as night is from day' (132).

The strange strategy that Gandhi adopted and successfully used to launch and sustain the civil disobedience movement apparently proved a difficult problem, especially for a Labour Government. An armed rebellion could have been easily met with the full force of the State. But an

unarmed people offering passive resistance was an altogether different phenomenon, and the British Cabinet was never certain about how to meet it, for it not only had to contend with accusations of weakness from the die-hards in the Opposition, but charges of too much repression from its own left wing, and from American critics (133). This explains both the defensive attitude adopted by MacDonald and Benn, as also the policy of combining strong action against the civil disobedience movement with constant attempts to keep alive the concept of a Round Table Conference.

But this was not as easy as it might have seemed. The idea that the Conference should be only between the Government and the Indian delegates, mooted by Irwin, was scotched by the Cabinet, and it was decided that the Conference should include the opposition Parties but exclude the members of the Statutory Commission (134). It would have been virtually useless to have held a bi-lateral Conference at that time, as the Conservatives and the Liberals would not have accepted any proposal made by such a Conference.

The tradition that India had to be above Party politics was inevitably resurrected, not only to secure some necessary political support for the decisions of the Conference, but also, as Wedgwood Benn explained to Irwin, so that 'the decisions of organised parties on Indian affairs shall in no circumstances be conditioned by the exigencies of home politics' (135). There were in fact domestic crises gradually coming to the surface, which made it imperative for the Government to have the support of the other Parties, on India, at least. This too was fraught

with difficulties, for the suggestion that the Simon Commission's Report would be relegated to the background did not appeal either to the Conservatives or to the Liberals, and Simon himself was miffed by his exclusion from the Conference, but at the same time declined a proposal that he should be one of the Liberal delegates (136).

Simon's exclusion from the Conference did not, of course, mean that his influence was totally absent. As already pointed out, his Report, by articulating existing notions about India and giving them the weight and authority of a Royal Commission, had captured the minds of most of the British intelligentsia, and his radio broadcasts extended his sphere of influence. There is no doubt that the Report hovered like a dark cloud over the Conference Table, and Simon was careful to limit opportunities for public criticism of his Report. Thus, for instance, when Sir John Reith of the BBC proposed that Srinivasa Sastri should speak about the Conference, Simon scotched the idea, arguing that, while his own broadcasts had been mere statements of fact, Sastri would have made a tendentious speech (137).

Simon himself was involved in the background, and must surely have influenced the various delegates at the Round Table Conference; indeed, the Secretary of the Conservative Party delegation was led to remark towards the end of the Conference that Simon had the Conference in the hollow of his hand and could wreck any agreement that might be reached (138). Probably because of his exclusion, and certainly because of his attitudes to Indians, Simon held a very low opinion of the Indian delegates to the Conference. The list of people who were supposed to be qualified to

draw up a constitution for India made him laugh, he wrote to G.R. Lane Fox, and added that he would like to set them an elementary examination on the constitution of India or of any of the Dominions (139).

Irwin, in India, must have realized that such attitudes would only lead to a sterile and useless Conference, and perhaps for this reason urged the exclusion of Simon. He was in fact very concerned that the delegates of the different Parties in Britain should be chosen carefully. He wrote to Baldwin, for instance, pointing out the need for choosing as the Conservative delegates people who had a little of the 'human gift of sympathy and as little as possible of the superiority complex' (140).

Irwin tended to see the Indian problem in psychological terms, and, of course, since he was in India, had an entirely different perception of the Indian situation. India had, according to his perception, moved away from the status pupillaris which was the accepted conception of the Indian problem fifteen years before, and, Irwin thought, people like Reading tended to underestimate the force of genuine national feeling (141).

In the end, the Liberal and Conservative delegations consisted of people who, if not sympathetic to Indian aspirations, were not, at any rate, altogether hostile to them. The Liberal delegation was headed by Reading, and included Lord Lothian, Sir Robert Hamilton, and Isaac Foot. The Conservative delegates were Peel, Zetland, Samuel Hoare, and Oliver Stanley. Irwin was, in fact, satisfied with the composition of the Conservative delegation (142). The British delegations to the Round Table Conference thus repre-

sented a wide range of attitudes, and, although far outnumbered by the representatives from India, they wielded the crucial levers of decision-making power, since the supremacy of Parliament was never brought into question.

It was, in the ultimate analysis, immaterial who actually represented the various Parties, for the determinant factors were the Parties, and not their delegates. The individual personalities of the delegates would have helped to some extent in maintaining harmony in the Conference Chamber, making a reasonable dialogue between Britain and India possible. But the British delegates were subject, not merely to the mandates from their Parties, but also to the subtle influence of public opinion. It would therefore be instructive to attempt an assessment of what public opinion at this time was about India.

Not surprisingly, the very steps taken to convene a Conference, implying thereby a negotiated settlement with India, brought out the worst fears of the die-hards, and they decided to form an organization to counter what they held to be unwarranted surrender of British supremacy in India. This organization, called the Indian Empire Society, came into being in the autumn of 1930, as the delegates to the Round Table Conference were arriving in Britain, and very quickly became an important pressure group on Indian issues (143). Two other important groups also emerged in this period, the Commonwealth of India League, and the India Reconciliation Group, formed under the aegis of the Society of Friends (144). Their emergence and activity indicated a quickening interest in Indian affairs, and also the existence of a wide variety of opinions on India.

Initially, informed public opinion on India at this time tended to fall into two main categories. One school was willing to concede that some sort of self-governing autonomy might become necessary in the provinces, but was totally against any relaxation of British control at the centre. This line of thinking obviously had its intellectual roots in the Simon Report, and it is arguable also that the Report itself was articulating this opinion. The other school of thought held that the time had come for the transfer of substantial, if not total, responsibility at the centre as well. These were not clear polarities of opinion, but significant points on a broad spectrum of opinion. There were also, on the extreme ends of this spectrum, those who were for total independence for India, and those who were for a total rejection of Indian demands.

At the Round Table Conference itself, however, the Liberal and Conservative Parties adopted the stance that they would only consider the question of autonomy for the provinces. They were especially suspicious of any reference to the phrase 'Dominion status', and were eager to secure a common front, or a non-partisan British policy (145).

In the British context, such a common policy might have seemed desirable, and even possible, and, after all, it had been the tradition to present a common front to India. But, given the necessity of making it possible for Indians to accept any constitutional plan, and the fact that British opinion was polarized, it was not possible any longer to forge a common policy. There were imperatives for such a common front. One such was the germination of a National Government idea, to meet the domestic economic

crisis as well as the Indian problem (146). As yet, however, this idea was too vague and amorphous to determine Indian policy at this stage, and the attempts of the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party to get the Government to agree to a common policy did not succeed. Their desire to do so was increased by fears that the Government of India, in its despatch on the Simon Report, would go much beyond what they would consider safe, and that the Home Government would feel bound to go even further than that.

In fact, Irwin and the Government of India were trying to find a way to reconcile Indian opinion without departing too much from the Simon Report: this could be done, Irwin thought, by granting a fair measure of responsibility at the centre as well as provincial autonomy (147). This went against the grain of Conservative thinking, and Irwin must have been led to adopt that idea only because of his perception of the Indian problem from the position of a Viceroy in India. Irwin considered Simon's idea of a Central Government a fallacy and a fraud, as it was dependent on getting a 'tame' Assembly through indirect elections, which itself was, in Irwin's opinion, a delusion.

British opinion had been strongly influenced by the Simon Report, however, and rumours about the contents of the Government of India's despatch on the Report served to strengthen support for Simon's views. This was one reason why, initially, there was little optimism about the Round Table Conference. G.R. Lane Fox, a member of the Statutory Commission, anticipated 'no valuable result' from the Conference (148). The absence of representatives of the Con-

gress must also have given an air of some unreality to the Conference. At any rate, the Morning Post thought that the 'agitators in India' would reject whatever might be decided in the Conference, and that in the last resort it would be Parliament that would decide (149).

What transformed the situation to a large extent and averted a stalemate was the decision of the Indian Princes to accept the idea of an Indian Federation, of which they would be a part. The Morning Post thought that they did so because of changes in British India which affected their dominions, and a feeling that they must begin to protect themselves, since the British were apparently so weak as to surrender their power (150). But the Morning Post found consolation in this because it recognized good friends in the Indian States (151). Irwin thought that the Princes might have been motivated also by a desire to use the principle of Federation to escape or elude paramountcy, but that the actual consequences of Federation in practice would lead them to realize that the problem was not as easy as might have been supposed (152). The Daily Telegraph also pointed out that, though the Princes' attitude had opened up the way to a Federal India, several complex problems needed to be solved first (153).

If the Princes had not been aware of these problems, there was no lack of advisers to instruct them. Sir Walter Lawrence, for example, told the Maharajah of Bikaner, as he had advised Kashmir and Alwar, not to rush into Federation, but to wait and see what kind of units in British India they had to federate with (154).

Lawrence was one of those who felt that the first

step was to enable the provinces (restructured on national lines into a Maratha province, a Bengali province, and so on) to develop into self-governing units, and that, until this happened, a strong British Central Government ought to be maintained, as Indians were as yet unfit to govern themselves (155). There were others too who thought that the Round Table Conference should first deal with the provincial autonomy question before it proceeded to discuss the question of All-India Federation (156). J.L. Garvin, the editor of the Observer, tried to combine the concept of Federation with retention of British control, by arguing that what was needed in India was 'a great Federal system' with the 'strongest executive in the world', and including the Princes (157).

Evidently, British opinion was taken unawares, as it were, by the sudden decision of the Princes, and it was a while before it coalesced into any form of coherent proposals. It was recognized early on, and not only by the Morning Post, that the Princes would form a great conservative bulwark against the extremism of the Indian nationalists. Indeed, Irwin thought that, if the Government had suggested the inclusion of the Princes in the Federation, British Indian politicians would have suspected it of trying to block their aspirations, by invoking the conservative elements of the States (158). R. Wingate, an officer of the Indian Political Service, felt that the presence of the Princes in the Round Table Conference was one of its weaknesses, as the Princes were antagonistic to the democratic ideals of nationalist India (159). Horace Alexander saw another danger from the inclusion of the Princes in the

Federation. He thought that, however desirable their inclusion might be, it would delay social reform in India (160).

Though the responses to an All-India Federation which included the Princes were thus varied, and though the idea appeared to be very nebulous, it quickly took hold of the Conference. The Indian representatives must have seen it as the only possible way of securing, at that stage, any kind of responsible government at the centre, while the British must have recognized that, if ultimately more power was to be transferred to the Indians, the Princes would serve as a restraining influence. This did not mean, however, that the Round Table conference could proceed to hammer out the details of a future constitution for India based upon a federal idea.

For one thing, the feeling that the Indians were forcing the pace tended to make the British delegates more cautious (161). The attitudes of the British delegates were also coloured by a feeling that the Indians were gratuitously, and ungratefully, denigrating Britain's good work in India (162). The fact that the Indian delegates were using the Round Table Conference as a forum to criticize British rule in India was apparently especially galling to British observers (163).

What haunted the Conservative and Liberal delegations more than anything else was the spectre of 'Dominion status', which had in their eyes acquired an even more menacing aspect as far as India was concerned, after the deliberations of the Imperial Conferences,which were to culminate in the Statute of Westminster. Since the Labour Government was willing neither to accept a common British policy nor to

adopt any specific policy, the Conservative and Liberal delegates were perhaps even more sensitive than usual. So intense was this concern that even a misreported speech, in which MacDonald was quoted as having referred to 'Dominion Self-Government' for India, evoked instant and passionate questioning (164)

A further reason for their apprehension was the barrage kept up by some newspapers against what they considered as surrender to Indian extremists. The Daily Mail declared for example that the danger of the Government surrendering to the 'Indian wild men' and granting demands which could only lead to catastrophe was very real, and the danger was all the greater because some Conservatives seemed to think that they were bound by Irwin's 'rash and impulsive promises of Dominion status' (165). The Morning Post rejected the argument of Sapru and Jayakar that concessions to India would remove discontent, and stated that, on the contrary, they would only result in Indian politicians asking for more (166). These diehard theses were given their sharpest edge in a speech that Winston Churchill delivered, appropriately enough, at the first public meeting of the newly created Indian Empire Society. Churchill declared that the speeches at the Round Table Conference were creating false impressions, and added (167):

> The British Nation, we believe, has no intention whatever of relinquishing effectual control of Indian life and progress...No agreement reached at the Conference will be binding in any degree, morally or legally upon Parliament...The truth is that Gandhism and all it stands for will, sooner or later, have to be grappled with and finally crushed. It is no use trying to satisfy a tiger by feeding him with cat's meat.

Churchill's sharp attack on the Round Table Conference, and Indian nationalists, evoked the editorial commendation of the Daily Telegraph and the Evening News (168).

The Daily News and Chronicle, however, termed it a deplorable speech which would sabotage the work of the Round Table Conference, and called upon Baldwin to publicly repudiate Churchill's statement,so that the public did not assume that it represented Conservative opinion (169). The Times pointed out that this would not be necessary as Churchill was no more representative of the Conservative Party than the assassins of Calcutta represented the Indians at the Conference (170).

Although the Conservative leadership was sensitive to criticism emanating from the right wing of the Party, and was therefore more cautious, it was certainly willing to move forwards, if slowly.

The Conservative Shadow Cabinet decided, by the middle of December, to authorize the Party delegates not to oppose the principle of some responsibility at the centre, but at the same time to examine the position carefully,to see if sufficient safeguards could be devised (171). They had been reluctant earlier to go beyond Simon. Now, it would appear, they were emboldened by the fact that the Princes would be a counterweight at the centre. At the same time, they had to take note of die-hard cries of surrender, and insist upon several 'safeguards' and indeed the progress of constitution-making was to be slowed down considerably by this emphasis upon safeguards.

The Liberals were prepared to go further and faster. Reading's announcement in the Conference that the Liberals

were willing to support responsibility at the centre with safeguards was not intrinsically different from the position to which the Conservatives were gradually and slowly moving, but it nevertheless unleashed a storm of criticism from the right-wing, die-hard, Press. The Evening News declared that the support being extended by the Liberals and the Labour Party to responsibility at the centre would mean 'a large, if not a complete, displacement, in the management of Indian affairs, of the wisdom and experience of trained officials by the vagarious ebullience of Babu Jabberjees B.A.', and added that, unless the question of safeguards was settled, the status quo should be continued (172). The Daily Mail gave expression to what must have been the kernel of apprehension and fear that was at the back of the cry for safeguards, by pointing out that Reading's speech removed the last obstacle in the path of Indian separatists, and that, 'with an independent Indian Government,...there would be no security for the enormous British investments in India, there would be no guarantee of fair treatment for British shipping and British trade' (173).

Herein lay the real paradox of the Indian problem. If a greater degree of freedom for India was seen as a real threat to British economic interests, it was also recognized that it was no longer possible to hold down a restless India through repressive force, and trade could not flourish in conditions of anarchy. It was this recognition, perhaps, that led The Economist, the periodical that was, after all, aimed at the business community, to welcome Reading's speech, and to urge that the Prime

Minister should go at least as far (174). The Economist had no doubt whatever that the vast majority of the people in Britain would prefer that the necessary risk should be taken in India in going as far as possible to meet Indian aspirations,rather than invite the intolerable prospect of anarchy and repression by putting back the clock (175). The Observer, which had already declared its support for a federal structure with a strong Central Government, now saw no difficulty in extending its support to the method enunciated by Reading (which J.L. Garvin termed 'Dyarchy at the Centre') and called upon Conservatives to accept the principle which had now become inevitable (176).

The Manchester Guardian also pointed out that politically-conscious Indians were unanimously in favour of a Central Executive that was responsible to an elected legislature, and only the 'fundamentalists' led by Winston Churchill failed to recognize this (177).

The 'fundamentalists' were at this time in the ascendant, apparently. When the Conservative delegate, Samuel Hoare, spoke at the Round Table Conference the day after Reading's speech, he refused to commit the Conservatives to any specific policy such as had been implied by Reading. While not totally opposing the idea of responsibility at the centre, Hoare nevertheless raised several questions about the safeguards, and thus left the Conservative Party still uncommitted. It was a speech that naturally appealed to the die-hard Press. The Morning Post stated that the speech was all the more welcome 'after the surrender made by the Liberal delegates the day before', and

that the only safeguard worth considering was the power to enforce it (178). Irwin saw in the attitude of the Conservative Party an undue veneration of the Churchillian school, and, with a touch of wry humour indicative of his exasperation with his Party's refusal to see the reality of Indian problems, wrote to Hailey that he would change his Party allegiance if this continued (179). The Times too criticized the attitude of the Conservative Party, arguing that, if the Party was to pull its weight for peace and good government in India, it must change its emphasis, if not its policy (180).

The Daily Telegraph argued that, since the Conservatives were uncommitted, the Labour Government could not give much weight to the Reading statement (181). On the other hand, Labour left-wingers like Wilfred Wellock were urging that the Prime Minister ought to go beyond the Liberal statement. Wellock suggested that the Government should offer India Dominion status with generally accepted safeguards, and immediately grant a political amnesty so that the co-operation of all sections, including the Congress, could be secured for drawing up the new constitution (182). MacDonald of course rejected these proposals as impractical (183). Despite the overt support of the Liberals, the Prime Minister in his own statement to the Conference did not go beyond declaring that the Government recognized the principle of an Executive responsible to a Legislature if it was constituted on a federal basis, and that the precise nature and structure of the proposed Federation needed to be determined after further discussion with the Princes and the representatives of British India (184).

MacDonald and the Labour Government could hardly have moved further at that time, for the Conservatives were opposed to any definite programme of change, and the domestic economic crisis, particularly as it affected Lancashire, had its impact on Indian policy. The Labour Government could not have further alienated the workers in Lancashire by appearing to give India more freedom to restrict trade with Britain, and that was presumed to be one of the results of any political concessions to India. Besides, at that time, the furthest that most sections in Britain would have gone was to accept the federal principle, although there were individuals and groups on the political periphery who were suggesting that there should be an immediate announcement of Dominion status for India. Significantly, MacDonald avoided the use of this controversial term in his speech, and thus did not commit the Government to anything more than a further exploration of the ways in which a Federal Government could be created in India. The Round Table Conference did achieve certain tangible results. Most notably, it prepared the path for constitutional change in India, by preparing the British public to accept change. It also brought to the surface the divisions in the different Parties, and in particular in the Conservative Party, over the Indian question. At the same time, it left many major problems unsolved, especially the apparently knotty problem of communalism. As Ramsay MacDonald explained to M.R. Jayakar, even sincere attempts to construct a 'really good Constitution' for India foundered on the problem of community differences (185). In the eyes of the British, the religious question

loomed very large indeed, and perhaps prevented them from using other categories of perception. Thus, Sir Graham Bower, for example, felt that Indians thought in terms of religion where the English thought in terms of electorates and constituencies, and that Indians would continue to think in terms of religion till the end of time (186).

The British might not have deliberately fostered the differences between communities in order to divide and rule, but the tendency to see Indian politics primarily in terms of religious groups only helped to underline the differences. The refusal to see the Indian National Congress as anything but a Hindu Party is an example of this sectarian perception. If attempts by the Government of India to prevent Muslims as a community from joining the civil disobedience movement (as, for instance, by exempting them from the operation of the Sarda Act on the marriage of young children) can be seen as mere tactical moves to counter the nationalist movement, and if the real religious differences that existed in India explain the way the British saw Indian political groups, it still leaves inexplicable the tendency to see them only in religious terms.

In order to consolidate the work done by the Round Table Conference, and to ensure future co-operation by the Congress, the Government decided to release the leaders from prison to facilitate discussion of the Conference proposals. The leaders were surprised by this step, as only a few days earlier the Working Committee of the Congress had decided that the Prime Minister's statement at the Conference was too vague to justify any change in the Congress policy (187). On the very

day that the Congress leaders were released, which quite coincidentally but appropriately happened to be 26 January 1931, a day decided by the Congress to be 'Independence Day', Baldwin made a statement in the House of Commons, in which he pledged the Conservative Party's support for the policy of the Government in the development of India's constitution. This may have helped the moderates in the Congress to strengthen their position, and the subsequent 'split' in the Conservative Party did not alter the immediate political situation.

It was in response to this particular statement by Baldwin that Winston Churchill made his dramatic exit from the Business Committee or 'Shadow Cabinet' of the Party (188). Edward Cadogan, who had been a member of the Simon Commission, also wrote to Baldwin, pointing out that the Conservative Party ought to stand by the recommendations of the Statutory Commission, and that, if Baldwin chose to go beyond them in future, he, Cadogan, would be compelled to 'stand aside' and not seek re-election (189). H.A. Gwynne, the editor of the Morning Post, also informed Baldwin that, in his opinion, Baldwin's speech in the Commons contradicted the non-commital policy of the Conservative Party as expounded by Peel and Hoare at the Round Table Conference, and that Baldwin was enunciating a policy to which 85% of the rank and file were opposed (190). The policy of the Conservative Party should be, wrote Gwynne, to conserve something, to hold on to what had been shown to be good, and, above all, to hand down to future generations the Empire inherited from past generations (191).

As the battle lines were being drawn in the Conser-

vative Party over India, events moved forward in India, albeit slowly. Irwin hoped to strengthen the moderates in the Congress, and even hoped that there might be a split in the Congress (192). Gandhi began with a demand for an amnesty for political prisoners, and for an inquiry into excesses committed by the police (193). Irwin was willing to concede neither demand, although he did privately suggest to the Governor of Bombay that certain specific allegations made by Gandhi should be investigated (194). Gradually the pressure on Gandhi to seek a settlement began to increase, with commercial interests, represented by Purushottamdas Thakurdas and G.D. Birla,trying to persuade him, and the balance finally swung in the direction of the moderates when Sapru, Jayakar and Sastri met the Congress leaders, and probably convinced them of the value of the results of the Round Table Conference. The result was that Gandhi wrote to Irwin, seeking an interview.

Irwin was not very optimistic about any useful results flowing from such a meeting, but he decided to meet Gandhi, since a refusal to see him when he himself had sought the meeting might have alienated public opinion (195). Obviously Irwin was determined to make it possible for the Congress to make peace, and to make a constructive contribution to the process of constitution-making. This was a bold decision indeed, since the representative of the King-Emperor was agreeing to meet, on apparently equal terms, with a representative of the Party that had repudiated the right of the King-Emperor to rule India.

There was a natural reaction in the Conservative Party, and Baldwin was led to write to the Prime Minister,

pointing out that practically the whole of his Party was anxious about the protracted conversations with Gandhi, and especially about the rumour that there would be an enquiry into the conduct of the police (196). Baldwin was in fact being attacked for his apparent acquiescence in the Government's policy (197). But Baldwin had apparently decided that the Indian situation required this meeting between Gandhi and the Viceroy, and he did not protest too much.

The negotiations between Gandhi and Irwin were made possible by a combination of circumstances - a Labour Government in Britain, the triumph, if only momentary, of the moderate wing in the Congress, and the personal character of Irwin. Perhaps more than any other Viceroy of the twentieth century, Irwin was willing to see both sides of the question, and this enabled him to agree to the historic meeting with Gandhi.

When, after several days of prolonged negotiations, Irwin and Gandhi arranged a settlement (Benn had tried, unsuccessfully, to get the Viceroy to avoid the use of terms like 'settlement' or 'it has been arranged that', as he was concerned about the effect they would have on the British public), British response reflected the cleavage that had already emerged on India.

Reading immediately sent a congratulatory telegram to Irwin (198). The New Statesman and the Daily Herald hailed the agreement as a victory for common sense (199). The London Stock Exchange also reacted with optimism. Shares in the cotton industries moved upwards as also the prices of Indian loans (200). Businessmen evidently

saw the settlement as a harbinger of better times for trade with India.

Newspapers of the extreme right and left, however, viewed the settlement as a surrender. The Daily Worker declared that the agreement between Gandhi and Irwin completed the betrayal of the Indian people and exposed Gandhi's role as a servant of imperialism (201). The Daily Mail, on the other hand, used a full page 7 column headline to declare, 'The Viceroy Surrenders to Gandhi' (202).

The Conservatives were, as usual, bitterly divided, but Baldwin, perhaps sensing the political strength of his opponents, threw down a challenge to them in the House of Commons. Declaring that the settlement was not a surrender but a victory for common sense which enlarged the area of goodwill and co-operation, Baldwin added that, if those who gave concessions to India in a grudging spirit were in a majority, they should elect a new leader (203).

Churchill, representing the die-hards, declared that it was a Pyrrhic victory which illustrated the ceaseless landslide in British Parliamentary opinion (204). It would seem that the die-hards, while probably not strong enough to displace Baldwin from the leadership, were capable of exerting sufficient pressure on him to make some gesture of reasserting the imperial predilections of the Party. This can be the only reason why Baldwin issued a statement that the Party would not be represented at the Round Table Conference to be held in India as proposed. This would have been taken to imply Conservative criticism

of the Gandhi-Irwin settlement, without altogether seceding from the Conference principle itself. The reference to the Conference being held in India appears to have been ignored, however, by contemporary observers. For instance, Lionel Curtis thought that this was the gravest thing that had happened in years, and saw parallels in it with Baldwin's yielding in 1924 to the die-hards over the Irish Boundary Commission Question (205).

If British opinion was not unanimous in support of the Gandhi-Irwin settlement, nor was support in India whole-hearted, Jawaharlal Nehru, for example, publicly declaring his personal disappointment with it. But Irwin had achieved across the Conference table his immediate target, that of getting the Congress to cease civil disobedience, and, in principle, to accept the results of the first Round Table Conference. To the Indian National Congress, it was not a victory in so far as the settlement merely secured certain short-term results, but at the same time the settlement was a demonstration that the Congress was a political force that could not be ignored.

The Congress probably had to seek a settlement, for not only was it under pressure from Indian business interests, but it had to consider also the very real possibility of the movement taking forms which could not be controlled by the Congress. The intensification of the no-rent movements in the United Provinces and in the Andhra area of the Madras Presidency were signs of such an eventuality, and it was, as Sumit Sarkar has argued, in the interests of the Congress to terminate the civil disobedience movement (206). Similarly, it was in British

interests to agree to the compromise, because the settlement and the consequent peace would help the restoration of trade, and also preclude the emergence of more extreme forms of struggle. The pact was not in British interests in so far as it elevated the Congress to the status of an equal adversary. After this, the Congress could not be ignored. This effect of the pact was outweighed, however, by the desire and need for peace.

While the Gandhi-Irwin settlement was seen by some at least as a harbinger of peace, neither side considered it a permanent settlement. It was perceived more as a truce rather than a peace treaty. At any rate, Irwin, who did think that it was a step in the right direction, thought that it might not be permanent (207). Irwin recognized that the very act of negotiating with the Congress gave it an importance that could be damaging to British interests, but at the same time he was certain that there was no other course available to him when Gandhi himself sought an interview (208). Negotiations with the Congress were not seen by Irwin as indicating a loss of nerve or moral fibre, but on the contrary showed an attempt to come to terms with a rapidly changing reality (209).

In Irwin's view, if peace was to be re-established in India without the use of excessive coercive force, there was no real alternative to negotiated settlement. He recognized the dangers inherent in such an attempt, not only for his own personal prestige, but also for the political balance in India. Yet he took the remarkable step of meeting Gandhi on equal terms because of his personal conviction that it was the only possible path to

peace. He was aided in this, no doubt, by the support given to him by the Labour Government, which was, if only to a minimal extent, inclined to view Indian nationalism with a less narrow vision. The conjuncture of a British Government willing to conceive of negotiating with the opponents of Empire and a Viceroy whose personal temperament enabled him to come down from the Olympian heights of the viceregal throne to talk on equal terms with such opponents was probably fortuitous. Nevertheless, it was this conjuncture which made the Gandhi-Irwin settlement possible. It was not, however, solely a product of this conjuncture, for Gandhi and the Congress made the overtures without which such a settlement could not even have been conceived. On the other hand, it was the emergence, in Britain, of intellectual cleavages over India that perhaps enabled Irwin to attempt what in a previous period would have been unimaginable.

These cleavages appeared partly as a result of the dramatic concatenation of events beginning with the Lahore Congress and culminating with the Gandhi-Irwin pact. Intellectual perceptions of Indian nationalism were necessarily altered by these events. It was still possible even for a person like Edward Thompson to subscribe to such a traditional idea as that 'when an Indian takes over from a British official there is a loss of efficiency' (210). Yet it was clear that several members of the British intelligentsia were beginning to view India and Indian nationalism from new perspectives. The Simon Report had reinforced traditional ideas about India, ideas, moreover, which remained dominant. Nevertheless, politics

compelled the relegation of the Report to the sidelines. This helped the strengthening of new ideas. These new ideas were not yet fully formulated, but their emergence indicated undercurrents of change. India could no longer remain a non-partisan issue. Although there had been dissenters in previous periods too, a façade of unanimity had been maintained. The shock of the civil disobedience movement and the Gandhi-Irwin pact seemed to have shattered that façade, enabling different schools of thought to contend.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. J.L. Morison to Norman Leys, 11 January 1930, copy enclosed with Thomas Jones to A.J. Sylvester, 31 January 1930, Lloyd George Papers, G/10/13. Morison had asked Leys to pass on the letter to members of the Cabinet and to the Prime Minister through Thomas Jones.

2. See Thomas Jones, Whitehall Diary: Volume 2, 1926-1930 (ed. Keith Middlemas), London, 1969, pp. 238-40

3. See The Times, 1 January 1930, 3 January 1930. Significantly, the Stock Exchange had not reacted in a similar fashion to the Irwin Declaration of October 1929, suggesting that, despite the alarmist response of the politicians, investors did not think the Declaration implied any radical change in India.

4. The Times, 2 January 1930

5. Spectator, 4 January 1930, pp. 4-5

6. ibid., p. 18

7. ibid.

8. Telegram, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 17 January 1930, in Cabinet Paper 18 (30). D.A. Low, 'Civil Martial Law and the Civil Disobedience Movement, 1930-1934' in D.A. Low (ed.) Congress and the Raj: Facets of the Indian Struggle, 1917-1947, London, 1977, pp. 165-98, gives a succinct account of the policy-making process

9. See, for example, Stanley Jackson (Governor of Bengal) to Reading, 9 January 1930, Reading Papers, 238/82

10. Manchester Guardian, 2 January 1930

11. Manchester Guardian, 16 January 1930

12. Daily Mail, 4 January 1930; Morning Post, 28 December 1929

13. Lucy Houston to Ramsay MacDonald, 2 January 1930, MacDonald Papers, 1442

14. Daily Mail, 24 January 1930

15. Note by R.H. Craddock on 'Probable Course of a Civil Disobedience Campaign and the Best Method of Dealing with It', Stansgate Papers, 223/18. There is no date on the Note, but internal evidence suggests January 1930.

16. Lloyd George, 'Jerry Building in India for a Crash', Daily Mail, 13 January 1930.

17. Reading to Wedgwood Benn, 24 January 1930, Reading Papers, 238/82

18. The Times , 7 January 1930; Benn to Irwin, 9 January 1930, Halifax Papers, 6.

19. Manchester Guardian, 9 January 1930

20. United Empire, 21 (January 1930)

21. Telegram, Secretary of State to the Viceroy, 8 February 1930, in Cabinet Paper, 49 (30).

22. Telegram, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 12 February 1930, ibid.

23. ibid.

24. Memorandum by President, Board of Trade, 14 February 1930, Cabinet Paper 51 (30)

25. The Times, 6 January 1930, for report of the shipping conference held in India.

26. Letter to the Editor from Lt.Col. J.M. Fleming, Spectator, 18 January 1930, p. 90.

27. The Times, 30 January 1930

28. The Times, 14 January 1930, Letter to the Editor

29. The Times, 21 January 1930, Letter to the Editor

30. The Times, 16 January 1930, Letter to the Editor

31. F. Anderson to Herbert Samuel, 14 February 1930, Samuel Papers, A/155 (7)

32. John Dellbridge, Revolution in India? London, 1930

33. C.J. O'Donnell, Why India is Rebellious, London, 1930

34. S.Gopal, The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin, Oxford, 1957

35. Young India, 13 February 1930, Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, (hereafter Collected Works),Volume 42, New Delhi, 1970

36. Jawaharlal Nehru was alarmed by the apparent deviation from the proclaimed policy of the Congress. See Gandhi to Nehru, 6 February 1930, Collected Works, 42, p. 459

37. C.F. Andrews to Fenner Brockway, 5 February 1930, copy enclosed with Horace Alexander to Philip Noel-Baker, 15 February 1930, Noel-Baker Papers, 4/368

38. Legislative Assembly, Official Report, 25 January 1930

39. See Benn to Irwin, 13 February 1930, Halifax Papers, 6. Benn was apprehensive that the Report might not be sympathetic to Indians, and the British already seemed hostile to India. See also the letter to the Editor from Lieutenant-General George MacMunn, The Times, 15 January 1930

40. See S.R. Bomanji to Rose Rosenberg, 17 February 1930 and 27 February 1930, MacDonald Papers, 676. Bomanji had sought

an interview with MacDonald, stating that he had a letter from Gandhi which offered a way out of the impasse.

41. B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, The History of the Indian National Congress, Volume 1, 1885-1935, New Delhi, 1969, p. 366.

42. Gandhi to Irwin, 2 March 1930, Collected Works, 43, pp. 2-8

43. Private Secretary to the Viceroy to Gandhi, 247/II, Home Political, 1930, National Archives of India.

44. Telegram, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 8 March 1930, Halifax Papers, 11

45. Benn to Irwin, 20 March 1930, Halifax Papers, 6

46. Benn to Irwin, 10 April 1930, Halifax Papers, 6

47. Telegram, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 20 March 1930, Halifax Papers, 11.

48. Benn to Irwin, 10 April 1930, Halifax Papers, 6.

49. Benn to Irwin, 22 April 1930, Halifax Papers, 6

50. Sidney Webb to Beatrice Webb, 30 April 1930, in Norman Mackenzie (ed.), The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Volume II: Pilgrimage, Cambridge, 1978, p. 325

51. C.F. Andrews to MacDonald, 28 April 1930, MacDonald Papers, 1440

52. MacDonald to Andrews, 5 May 1930, loc. cit.

53. ibid.

54. Benn to Irwin, 1 May 1930, Halifax Papers, 6

55. Note, 1 May 1930, Simon Papers, 64. The lack of moral courage among Indian politicians was a recurrent theme with British observers.

56. Quoted in Russell to Peel, 23 May 1930, copy enclosed with Russell to Reading, 26 May 1930, Reading Papers, 103.

57. Daily Mail, 28 January 1930
Daily Telegraph, 2 January 1930

58. Beaverbrook to Arthur Brisbane, 28 May 1930, quoted in A.J.P. Taylor, Beaverbrook, London, 1972, p. 270.

59. C.F. Andrews to MacDonald, 28 April 1930, MacDonald Papers, 1440.

60. Benn to Irwin, 8 May 1930, Halifax Papers, 6

61. Telegram, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 8 May 1930, Halifax Papers, 11

62. Telegram, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 13 May 1930, Halifax Papers, 11. Telegram, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 18 May 1930, loc. cit. indicated the extent to which the Muslims of

the North West Frontier Province were agitated, and the nature of their growing support for the civil disobedience movement.

63. Benn to Irwin, 29 May 1930, 5 June 1930, Halifax Papers, 6.

64. Horace Alexander to Philip Noel-Baker, 2 July 1930, Noel-Baker Papers, 4/368

65 See the Papers of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, File 4/2. The League was founded in 1915 to bring together women of different political and philosophical outlooks to work for peace.

66. Benn to Irwin, 22 May 1930, Halifax Papers, 6. According to Benn, it was possible public reaction that led the Cabinet to decide against the use of tear gas in India.

67. Beatrice Webb, Diaries, Typescript, Vol. 44, entry for 4 May 1930

68. Benn to Irwin, 22 April 1930, Halifax Papers, 6; telegrams, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 17 March 1930, 20 March 1930, Halifax Papers, 11; Benn to Irwin, 5 June 1930, Halifax Papers, 6.

69. See 240 H.C.Deb.5s.943,254 H.C.Deb.5s.2089-90, 256 H.C.Deb. 5s.520-1, for figures revealing the adverse economic consequences of the civil disobedience movement.

70. The Home Member of the Government of India recognized this fact. See Note, 13 June 1930, by H.G. Haig in 257/V, Home Political, 1930, National Archives of India, and Sykes to Irwin, 25 March 1931, Halifax Papers, 8.

71. Telegram, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 25 May 1930, Halifax Papers, 11

72. ibid.

73. Telegram, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 29 May 1930, Halifax Papers, 11.

74. ibid.

75. Benn to Irwin, 8 May 1930, Halifax Papers, 6. Benn had made an earlier reference to an armistice: see Benn to Irwin, 1 May 1930, Halifax Papers, 6.

76. Partha Sarathi Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1917-1964, London, 1975, p. 205.

77. Telegram, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 2 June 1930, Halifax Papers, 11

78. Note, 9 May 1930, Simon Papers, 64 indicates for example that Attlee disliked Communal Electorates and second chambers, but for the sake of unanimity did not insist on these. Viscount Burnham was also expected to sign a separate Report, but was prevailed on not to do so.

79. W.R. Codling of (HMSO) to Simon, 31 July 1930, Simon Papers, 65, indicated that by that date 82,785 copies of the Report had been sold.

80. D.C. Somervell to Simon, 10 October 1930, Simon Papers, 66, informed Simon that the Report was being used as a classroom text in Tonbridge School.

81. Harold Nicolson, King George the Fifth: His Life and Reign, London, 1952, p. 506.

82. Clifford Sharp to Simon, 26 July 1930, Simon Papers, 65

83. Daily Herald, 10 June 1930, 24 June 1930.

84. Daily Herald, 19 July 1930

85. Simon to Meston, 17 June 1930, Meston Papers, 37.

86. Simon to the Warden of All Souls College (F.W. Pember), 30 June 1930, Simon Papers, 63.

87. Simon to Geoffrey Dawson, 30 June 1930, Simon Papers, 63; Simon to R. Craddock, 1 July 1930, Simon Papers, 65. Simon remarked to Craddock that the Government of India were reacting, not to the Report, but to Indian denunciations of it, and suggested that Craddock should write to The Times commending the spirit and range of the Report.

88. Simon to E.T. Scott (of the Manchester Guardian), 2 July 1930, Simon to Claude Hill, 3 July 1930, and Simon to R. Coupland, 5 July 1930, Simon Papers, 65.

89. Irwin to Simon, 1 August 1930, Simon Papers, 66

90. Birkenhead to Baldwin, 30 June 1930, Baldwin Papers, 104.

91. Telegram, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 27 June 1930, Halifax Papers, 11.

92. ibid.

93. Telegram, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 28 June 1930, Halifax Papers, 11

94. Text of the message from the Conservatives in telegram, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 4 July 1930, Halifax Papers, 11

95. Telegram, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 5 July 1930, Halifax Papers, 11

96. ibid.

97. Telegram, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 3 July 1930, Halifax Papers, 11

98. Herbert Lewis to Lloyd George, 28 June 1930, Lloyd George Papers,

G/12/1. Lewis was reporting a conversation he had had with H.N. Gladstone.

99. ibid.

100. Enclosure with Lewis to Lloyd George, 28 June 1930, Lloyd George Papers G/12/1

101. Reported in Benn to Irwin, 4 July 1930, Halifax Papers, 6

102. Lothian to J.L. Garvin, 5 June 1930, Lothian Papers, 248

103. Reported in Benn to Irwin, 4 July 1930, Halifax Papers, 6

104. Memorandum No. 80, Labour Party Advisory Committee on International Question (LPACIQ), by G.T. Garratt, and Memorandum No. 81, LPACIQ, by John Maynard, both in MacDonald Papers, 344 (4)

105. Note, 21 August 1930, by Attlee, in loc. cit.

106. Beatrice Webb, Typescript Diary, Volume 44, 9 July 1930.

107. ibid.

108. Manchester Guardian, 29 July 1930. The signatories were: Aberdeen and Temair, Alice Acland, Anna Barlow, Maurice Browne, C.R. Buxton, Kate D. Courtney, F. Lewis Donaldson, Robert F. Horton, Laurence Housman, L.P. Jacks, Hewlett Johnson, J.M Kenworthy, Harold J. Morland, Mary Murray, H.W. Nevinson, F.W. Norwood, Marian Parmoor, Alexandrina Peckover, Bertrand Russell, Frances Stewart, Ben Turner, Cecil H. Wilson.

109. Benn to Irwin, 27 June 1930, Halifax Papers, 6. See also the report in the Manchester Guardian, 14 July 1930.

110. Telegram, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 24 June 1930, Halifax Papers, 11

111. Benn to Irwin, 4 July 1930, Halifax Papers, 6.

112. Text of Statement in Sitaramayya, History of the Indian National Congress, I, p. 634.

113. Telegram, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 25 June 1930, Halifax Papers, 11.

114. ibid. According to Irwin, the English members of the Council were reluctant to agree to such a postponement, while the Indian members agreed with Irwin.

115. Telegram, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 19 June 1930, Halifax Papers, 11

116. Telegram, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 28 June 1930, Halifax Papers, 11

117. Telegram, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 13 July 1930, Halifax Papers, 11

118. Telegram, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 15 July 1930, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 16 July 1930, Halifax Papers, 11

119. R.J. Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity, 1917-1940, Oxford, 1974, p. 177; Judith M. Brown, Gandhi and Civil Disobedience: The Mahatma in Indian Politics, 1928-34, Cambridge, 1977, pp. 153-68

120. Diary entry for 1 August 1930, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, (ed. S. Gopal), Vol. 4, New Delhi, 1973, p. 373

121. Speech, 20 August 1930, in R.R. James (ed.), Winston S. Churchill His Complete Speeches, 1897-1963, Vol. V, 1928-1935, New York, 1974

122. See marginal comment on copy of Viceroy to Secretary of State, 5 July 1930, MacDonald Papers, 344 (3)

123. Note, 2 September 1930, and undated marginal comments, MacDonald Papers, 344 (3)

124. Hailsham to Baldwin, 1 September 1930, Baldwin Papers, 104.

125. Churchill to Baldwin, 24 September 1930, Baldwin Papers, 104

126. Irwin to Philip Chetwode, 26 June 1930, Halifax Papers, 19

127. Horace Alexander to Philip Noel-Baker, 25 August 1930, Noel-Baker Papers, 4/368

128. Benn to Irwin, 10 July 1930, Halifax Papers, 6.

129. Benn to Frederick Sykes, 31 July 1930, Sykes Papers, 2b

130. See the note prepared for Susan Lawrence's Presidential Address at the Labour Party Congress, enclosed with D.T. Monteath to H.B. Usher, 27 September 1930, MacDonald Papers, 673.

131. MacDonald to Muhammad Shafi, 14 July 1930, MacDonald Papers, 1440. See also MacDonald to Lillian D. Wald, 27 May 1930, ibid.

132. Villard to MacDonald, 25 October 1930, MacDonald to Villard, 27 October 1930, MacDonald Papers, 1440

133. For an example of criticism from within the Labour movement, see the New Leader, 24 October 1930, 'An Open Letter to the Prime Minister', by Walter Walsh.

134. Cabinet Papers, 242 (30), 266 (30).

135. Benn to Irwin, 4 July 1930, Halifax Papers, 6

136. Simon to Lloyd George, 30 July 1930, Simon Papers, 65.

137. Reith to Simon, 16 September 1930, Simon to Reith, 18 September 1930, Simon Papers, 66. See also Hilda Matheson to Lothian,

25 November 1930, Lothian Papers, 249.

138. Robert Stopford to J.T.A. Stopford, 16 December 1930, Stopford Papers, 2. Robert Stopford had earlier been secretary to Simon with the Statutory Commission.

139. Simon to G.R. Lane-Fox, 25 October 1930, Simon Papers, 66

140. Irwin to Baldwin, 5 August 1930, Baldwin Papers, 104.

141. ibid.

142. Irwin to Benn, 3 October 1930, Halifax Papers, 6.

143. Mark Hunter to Churchill, 11 October 1930, quoted in Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. V, 1922-1939, London, 1976, p. 370. Churchill became an important member of the Indian Empire Society, and in fact thought that the Society was 'feeding out of his hand' (Churchill to Randolph Churchill, 8 January 1931, in Martin Gilbert, Churchill, V, p. 379).

144. The Commonwealth of India League, founded by Annie Besant, was soon to be overshadowed by its offshoot, the India League, with Krishna Menon as its prime mover.

145. R.J. Moore, Crisis of Indian Unity, pp. 119-20

146. See the correspondence between J.B. Seeley and Reading in Reading Papers, 118/98. Seely tried to get discussions going on forming a National Government with Reading as head.

147. Irwin to Benn, 19 September 1930, Halifax Papers, 6.

148. G.R. Lane Fox to Robert Stopford, 19 September 1930, Stopford Papers, 6.

149. Morning Post, 8 October 1930

150. Morning Post, 19 November 1930

151. ibid.

152. Irwin to Walter Lawrence, 17 November 1930, Lawrence Papers,120

153. Daily Telegraph, 22 November 1930

154. Entry for 25 November 1930, Notebook, Lawrence Papers, 111

155. Memorandum by Walter Lawrence, no date, but clearly written circa October 1930, in Baldwin Papers, 104. Interestingly, Lawrence thought that some safe and 'generous' way must be found to enable Indians to govern themselves and for the British to leave India.

156. Daily Telegraph, 24 November 1930

157. Observer, 9 November 1930

158. Irwin to Walter Lawrence, 17 November 1930, Lawrence Papers, 120

159. Memorandum by R. Wingate, enclosed with Wingate to H.A. Gwynne, 19 December 1930, Gwynne Papers, 10.

160. Letter to the Editor, Manchester Guardian, 2 December 1930

161. Reading to Irwin, 21 November 1930, Reading Papers, 118/107.

162. Hailey to Irwin, 27 November 1930, 12 January 1931, Hailey Papers, 34

163. See, for example, entry for 25 November 1930, Notebook, Lawrence Papers, 111. Lawrence thought that it was a political blunder on the part of the Indians to show their ingratitude.

164. Robert Stopford to J.T.A. Stopford, 11 November 1930, Stopford Papers, 2. See also Hailey to Irwin, 14 November 1930, Hailey Papers, 34

165. Daily Mail, 10 November 1930

166. Morning Post, 19 November 1930

167. Daily Mail, 12 December 1930

168. Daily Telegraph, 12 December 1930, Evening News, 12 December 1930

169. Daily News and Chronicle, 12 December 1930

170. The Times, 13 December 1930

171. Robert Stopford to J.T.A. Stopford, 16 December 1930, Stopford Papers, 2.

172. Evening News, 6 January 1931

173. Daily Mail, 7 January 1931

174. The Economist, 10 January 1931

175. ibid.

176. Observer, 11 January 1931

177. Manchester Guardian, 5 January 1931

178. Morning Post, 7 January 1931

179. Irwin to Hailey, 10 January 1931, Hailey Papers, 34

180. The Times, 8 January 1931

181. Daily Telegraph, 9 January 1931

182. Wilfred Wellock to MacDonald, 13 January 1931, MacDonald Papers, 1441

183. MacDonald to Wellock, 14 January 1931, loc. cit.

184 Speech to the Round Table Conference, 19 January 1931, in B.N. Pandey (ed.), The Indian National Movement, 1885-1947: Select Documents, London, 1979

185. MacDonald to M.R.Jayakar, 12 January 1931, MacDonald Papers, 1441

186. Graham Bower to Lothian, 20 January 1931, Lothian Papers, 246

187. Sitaramayya, History of the Congress, 2, pp. 424-5; Gandhi to Narandas Gandhi, 19-26 January 1931, Collected Works, 45, p. 124, Jawaharlal Nehru, Diary, 26 January 1931, Selected Works, 4, p. 461.

188. Churchill to Baldwin, 27 January 1931, Baldwin Papers, 104

189. Edward Cadogan to Baldwin, 29 January 1931, and 30 January 1931, Baldwin Papers, 104.

190. H.A. Gwynne to Baldwin, 1 February 1931, Baldwin Papers, 104

191. ibid.

192. Irwin to Benn, 26 January 1931, Halifax Papers, 6
Irwin to Hailey, 2 February 1931, Hailey Papers, 34

193. Interview to the Press, 27 January 1931, Collected Works, 45, pp. 127-30. Gandhi to Irwin, 1 February 1931, Collected Works, 45, pp. 136-8

194. Telegram, Irwin to Sykes, 6 February 1931, Halifax Papers, 7

195. Irwin to Viscount Halifax (father), 15 February 1931, Halifax Papers

196. Baldwin to MacDonald, 2 March 1931, Baldwin Papers, 104

197. See, for example, Richard Brooke to Baldwin, 1 March 1931, and George Lloyd to Baldwin, 5 March 1931, Baldwin Papers, 104

198. Telegram, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 6 March 1931, copy in Reading Papers, 118/107

199. New Statesman, 7 March 1931; Daily Herald, 5 March 1931

200. The Times, 5 March 1931

201. Daily Worker, 5 March 1931

202. Daily Mail, 5 March 1931

203. 249 H.C.Deb.5s., 1422-3

204. ibid., 1448 ff.

205. Lionel Curtis to Malcolm MacDonald, 10 March 1931, copy in Lothian Papers, 247

206. Sumit Sarkar, 'The Logic of Gandhian Nationalism: Civil Disobedience and the Gandhi-Irwin Pact (1930-1931)', Indian Historical Review, 3 (1976), pp. 114-46

207. Irwin to Hailey, 12 March 1931, Hailey Papers, 34

208. Irwin to Hailey, 20 March 1931, loc. cit.

209. ibid.

210. Edward Thompson, The Reconstruction of India , London, 1930, p. 260

## 5. The Widening Rift: Towards the White Paper, 1931-3

The Gandhi-Irwin Settlement delivered the coup de grâce, as it were, to an already crumbling British consensus on India. The British political élite, its façade of unanimity shattered, began to draw its battle lines over India, and not even the formation of a 'National' Government could wholly resuscitate the traditional non-partisan Indian policy. In Britain, then, the effects of the Settlement appeared to be deep and virtually permanent.

In India, however, the political results of the Settlement turned out to be ephemeral. If Irwin had remained in India as the Viceroy, he might have helped to prop up the Settlement, and thus reaped from it a full political harvest. At the least, the goodwill generated by the Settlement - it undoubtedly gave a boost to Indian nationalist morale - would have lingered to influence subsequent decisions by the Indian leaders. As it was, Irwin left India to be succeeded by Willingdon.

In the long and meandering story of Indian nationalism, the individual proclivities of a Viceroy, or the personal predilections of an Indian nationalist, might have introduced, on occasion, only minor variations of style or tempo, without significantly altering the main currents of history. Nevertheless, at any specific histori-

rical moment, such factors loomed large and events were affected by them. The way in which a problem was perceived by an individual tended to condition the way in which the problem was solved.

In this sense, the appointment of Irwin's successor was crucial at this juncture. In 1930, when the time came to decide about the new Viceroy, the Labour Party was in power, and could have appointed a 'Labour' Viceroy. Such a Viceroy might have helped to maintain the atmosphere of cordiality that Irwin had left behind and might even have, it may be conjectured, smoothed the path to the negotiating tables of the Round Table Conference in London. Indeed, the Labour Government did attempt to appoint a 'Labour' Viceroy. It has been suggested that this attempt failed because of the unsuitability of the Labour nominee, Lord Gorell, a little known Labour Peer who had taken the Party Whip only in 1924 (1). Apart from the fact that Gorell was undoubtedly an unwise choice, it was unlikely that any truly 'Labour' nominee would have been accepted. Given the fears of many in Britain that the Labour Party would, if allowed, appoint a Viceroy who would act against British interests, it was extremely unlikely that the appointment of a Labour Party member would have been tolerated (2).

In the event, it was Willingdon who succeeded Irwin. How did this affect Indian politics? From the outset, it was apparent that Willingdon was not inclined to maintaining the delicate webs of co-operation that Irwin had spun in the last few months of his Viceroyalty. Willingdon was convinced, for instance, that it had been an error on Irwin's part to have treated Gandhi as a plenipotentiary (3). He rejected the idea that Gandhi could be an intermediary between the people and the Government on matters relating to the Settlement, and even began to contemplate the possibility of taking

action before long against the Congress (4).

There was a reason for Willingdon's conclusion that Irwin had been in error. Some high officials of the Indian Government felt that the Congress was using the Settlement to develop its rural organization, taking advantage of the depressed economic conditions (5). In Britain, there were die-hards who thought that the Settlement had increased the truculence of the Congress (6). The Daily Mail gave expression to such thoughts by publishing, at this juncture, a 'Blue Book' on the Indian situation. Essentially a collection of articles on India which had been published in the Daily Mail, the one penny Blue Book presented a lurid and sensationalist picture of an India on the verge of ruin and anarchy. This was a view shared also by Rothermere, the proprietor of the Daily Mail, who felt that a continuation of what he termed the Irwin policy would mean the end of British India, and who therefore pledged his support to the die-hard campaign against the Gandhi-Irwin Pact (7). Sydenham, another notable die-hard,contended that the proper policy in India was to announce that order would be maintained sternly, that Dominion status was not open for discussion, and to ensure that in any political settlement all essential safeguards would be strictly enforced (8).

There was, therefore, a reaction to the seeming appeasement of the Gandhi-Irwin Settlement. This reaction was not confined to the die-hards alone. Willingdon himself had expressed his opinion against it. His perception of the Indian problem was, as noted, very different from that of Irwin. Where Irwin saw only one possible path to peace, Willingdon saw another - albeit one that would have necessitated the use of force. Whereas Irwin saw in Gandhi a saintly politician, Willingdon thought Gandhi was a 'wily, vain old bird', constantly manoeuvring for an advantage, one in whom the bania

predominated over the saint (9). Willingdon may have also been influenced by the opinion of Reading. Reading was very sceptical of the value of Gandhi's participation in the Round Table Conference, as he thought that Gandhi would be obstructive rather than helpful (10).

Willingdon's policy was no doubt influenced by his perception of Gandhi as a clever politician, by his opinion that the Settlement was an error, by the reaction in Britain to the Settlement and to views such as those of Reading that Gandhi's participation in the Round Table Conference was not entirely desirable. Interestingly, Willingdon did think that Gandhi sincerely desired peace and that he might be reasonable at the Round Table Conference (11).

As the question of Gandhi's participation in the Round Table Conference was resolving itself into a 'will he, won't he' question, one problem that cast its dark shadow on the entire situation was that of the worsening condition of the workers in Lancashire. The boycott of foreign textiles which was being continued in India was, if not the cause of the economic distress in Lancashire, at least seen as being so, for it was a visible factor, unlike the mysterious, unseen forces of international economics. Thus C.F Andrews, divided by his love for India and Gandhi on the one hand and his sympathy for the workers in their misery on the other, could not help thinking that it was necessary for someone to go to India and explain to Gandhi that it would make a big difference if he were to be magnanimous to Lancashire (12).

Andrews tried to convey to Gandhi through a stream of letters the distress he had seen in Lancashire, hoping that Gandhi would be persuaded to find a solution, because, as he thought, the Lancashire problem, along with that of the relations between Hindus and Muslims,

needed to be solved if a constitutional settlement was to be reached (13). Ramsay MacDonald expressed resentment about what he considered cruelty being practised upon the innocent operatives of Lancashire, and thought that it showed a lack of human sense (14).

While Andrews was primarily motivated by Christian concern for the workers in their suffering, there were those who saw in the economic distress of Lancashire the opportunity to make political capital. Sydenham thought that it would be helpful to have meetings in Lancashire, as it seemed 'at last alive to danger' (15). The Indian Empire Society sent C.J. Smith to report on the possibilities of holding a series of meetings to be addressed by Sir Louis Stuart. Smith held discussions with the Secretary of the Cotton Spinners' Association, and concluded that the idea of holding meetings should be abandoned for the time being, as the chairmen of the local committees of the Association appeared to be reluctant (16). Although the chairmen told the Secretary of the Association that their reluctance was due to the fact that most of the towns would be empty because of the 'wakes', Smith thought the real reason was that C.F. Andrews had visited most of the chairmen and urged them not to do anything that would mean attacking Gandhi personally, on the grounds that the result might be an intensification of the boycott (17).

John F. Leach, a cotton magnate of Darwen, also complained to Louis Stuart that traders in Lancashire had been warned (by whom, he did not say) to remain silent, and that the weak and pallid handling of the political problem was ruining local industry (18).

It would appear that many people across the political spectrum saw a direct link between the boycott campaign in India and the distress in Lancashire. The actual source of Lancashire's economic troubles was of course the international economic crisis. But the Indian boycott

certainly decreased the quantity of exports of Lancashire products to India, and thus added to the textile industry's problems. Besides, it was easier to believe that a causal connection existed between the boycott and the decline in the textile trade, whereas the effects and consequences of the international economic crisis could not be discerned so easily, and certainly not by the worker in the Lancashire textile mills. It is for this reason, probably, that Smith, the agent for the Indian Empire Society, suggested that they should get at the working classes instead of the cotton kings, whom he considered timid (19).

C.F. Andrews himself detected some local opposition to Gandhi, and tried to argue that a boycott of Lancashire was tantamount to the use of violence (20). Andrews was concerned not only by the misery of the workers, but also by the possible adverse effects the situation in Lancashire might have on the Round Table Conference. Gandhi had agreed to the suggestion made by Andrews that Gandhi should visit Lancashire when he arrived in Britain for the Round Table Conference.

Gandhi had not, however, definitely announced that he would go to London. When he met Willingdon on 18 July, Gandhi told him that, before he proceeded to London, he should have the assurance that Government would not, during his absence, precipitate a crisis, and that an inquiry would be instituted into the administration of Malcolm Hailey in the United Provinces (21). Willingdon could not, naturally, agree to this, but felt that this was bluffing on the part of Gandhi, and that he would go to London when the Conference began (22).

Interestingly, Malcolm Hailey thought that at the Conference the Congress would attempt to drive the Princes away from the idea of federation and demand responsibility at the centre based on a unitary legislature, and therefore felt that the best solution would be to

press ahead with a scheme for provincial autonomy (23). There was thus a great deal of apprehension about the participation of the Congress in the Round Table Conference. The die-hards too were as prejudiced as the others. Sydenham was happy that the date of the Conference was postponed, as it gave them time to prepare a definite lead, for he felt that it was necessary to lay down clear limitations to the discussions, since Lord Sankey, the chairman of the Federal Structure Committee, was in his opinion as hopeless as Irwin (24). He hoped that the Conference would prove a total fiasco, since that would be best for the Empire (25).

Meanwhile, the Labour Government had been replaced by a 'National' Government, and Samuel Hoare became the new Secretary of State for India.

The India Office thus passed into the hands of one who was inclined to view Indian demands with a less sympathetic eye than Wedgwood Benn's. While not a die-hard Conservative, Samuel Hoare was nevertheless unwilling to force the pace of transition in India. It may be that Hoare and his Conservative colleagues were working within a Stubbsian framework of gradual constitutional evolution through slow, measured steps (26). At the same time, Hoare was in effect responding to the subtle pressures of public opinion. He felt that British public opinion was against anything in the nature of a surrender on the lines of the Irish treaty and that it would be easier to make concessions from a position of strength than from one of weakness (27).

Hoare's definite standpoint contrasted strongly with the much more nebulous viewpoint of the Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald. Ironically, it was the Conservative Hoare who impressed Gandhi and the Labour leader, MacDonald, who rubbed him up the wrong way. Gandhi had at last decided to take part in the Round Table Conference, and his

return to London was a significant signpost in British perceptions of India. Although the King considered him an enemy of the Empire, and therefore initially refused to meet him, Gandhi excited a great deal of popular enthusiasm. It might have been partly a sense of curiosity about the strange little man from India that drew crowds wherever he went, but there was also a genuine element of admiration and sympathy for Gandhi among the people of the East End of London, where Gandhi stayed (28). Even more significantly, Gandhi evoked similar feelings among the workers of Lancashire, who could well have considered him an enemy more diabolical than their own capitalist masters, for, after all, a link had been established in their minds between the Indian boycott and the decline of their industry. But the preparatory work done by C.F. Andrews obviously helped to attenuate their hostility, and Gandhi's personal charm turned any remaining vestiges of hatred into a tacit acceptance of the Indian position, if not an overt expression of sympathy.

Gandhi failed, however, to exercise his charm on the political elite in the same way, or so at any rate thought Hoare, who reported to the Viceroy that Gandhi had made a bad impression on MPs of all Parties whom he had met (29). This apparent failure did not prevent Hoare from trying hard to diminish the publicity that Gandhi might get through the Press (30).

Nevertheless, when Hoare met Gandhi, Gandhi went away quite happily, while MacDonald, in contrast, left a very bad impression on him (31). It appeared to Gandhi's interlocutors that he was adopting an extreme and intransigent position. The Working Committee of the Congress had, in fact, taken a fairly extreme position, reiterating the Lahore and Karachi resolutions indicating, among other things, that the British could have no special commercial privileges, and that

defence forces should be completely under the control of the Swaraj Government, the British troops being withdrawn immediately and so on (32). The letter in which Jawaharlal Nehru had communicated these decisions of the Congress to Gandhi had been seen through secret intelligence by the Government of India, which informed the India Office (33). Thus Gandhi's attitude may not have come entirely as a surprise to the India Office, or to other British officials, who, as noted earlier, were in any case inclined to presuppose that Gandhi would seek to wreck the Conference rather than assist in the discovery of a solution. Even Lord Sankey, who felt that Gandhi was likely to seek a settlement, still saw in him a fanatic, for Gandhi had told him that, if the Conference failed, the struggle would have to be renewed, and, bitter as the cup might be, it would be like nectar to him (34). Malaviya, on the other hand, impressed Sankey by his very taciturnity, and Sankey thought that, if Malaviya could be persuaded to accept the British view, success was almost assured (35).

Not everyone saw a fanatic in Gandhi. Robert Stopford, the Secretary to the Conservative Party delegation, felt that Gandhi was nearer a saint than a statesman (36). This, however, was not the dominant idea. To other observers of the Round Table Conference, Gandhi seemed to be manoeuvring for political advantage, and not sincerely trying for a solution. In fact, even before Gandhi had arrived in London, Reading and others had assumed that Gandhi would only seek to wreck all chances of a settlement. Such assumptions might have reduced the chances of Gandhi being able to forge a compromise in London.

As it was, the increasing strength of the more militant elements in the Congress had already made Gandhi's task very difficult. The assumptions of the British delegates to the Conference that Gandhi would only 'wreck' it placed him in an even more awkward position.

The prospects of a compromise were perhaps rendered bleak also because of the shadow cast on the Round Table Conference proceedings by the British decision of 21 September 1931 to go off the gold standard and to link the Indian rupee to sterling at a ratio of Re 1 = 1s 6d. This decision went against the long-standing Indian demand for devaluation and appeared to demonstrate the dependent status of the Indian economy. The impression that Indian economic interests were being subordinated to those of Britain was probably heightened by the large and rapid flow of gold from India to Britain in the wake of the decision (37).

B.R. Tomlinson has argued that,although the gold flow benefited Britain, it was an unintended consequence of the currency decision and that there was no evidence to suggest that British policy was designed to secure such a result (38). Indeed, the Secretary of State for India, Samuel Hoare, even declared that 'the exports of privately owned gold, and the maintenance of the link between sterling and the rupee, have been of the highest advantage to India' (39).

To Indian nationalists, however, reality appeared differently. The British decision and its economic results seemed to indicate that promises of fiscal and political autonomy were worthless. India's economy was being used, it seemed to them, to prop up a British economy in crisis. In fact, Carl Bridge has suggested that there was evidence to indicate that the link between the rupee and sterling was designed to boost confidence in the pound, and that devaluation was rejected because it would strike at the heart of British interests in India (40).

It can be argued, therefore, that the apparent ease and indifference with which Britain seemed to be controlling India's economy underlined India's subordinate status, and made compromises more difficult to achieve. The currency crisis perhaps indicated also the

British need to retain political control of India.

The darkest shadow was cast, however, by the apparently intractable communal problem. In his final statement, the Prime Minister pointed out that the 'communal deadlock' remained as the major obstacle in the way of constitutional progress, and warned the Indian delegates that, unless they agreed upon an acceptable settlement, the Government would be compelled to devise a scheme for protecting the electoral rights of the minorities in India (41).

The second session of the Round Table Conference ended then with no clear solution of the Indian problem, and Gandhi had to embark for India with no definite proposals that he could put before the Congress. In the view of some British observers, however, it had not been an entirely infructuous session. Francis Younghusband thought that the Conference helped to ease the situation in India and contributed to a change of opinion in Britain (42). Winterton felt that the Conferences dispelled the myth that Indian politicians were merely a handful of 'verbose Bengali Babus' (43). The Parliamentary debates on the Prime Minister's statement indicated the emergence of cleavages in British attitudes to Indian politics, and also enunciated the determination of the Government to ensure that nothing deflected them from their set course (44).

This determination extended to the treatment of Gandhi and the Congress. The Viceroy was already of the opinion that the method of negotiating with Gandhi had been a mistake. He was matched by the new Secretary of State, Samuel Hoare, who also thought that the Gandhi-Irwin negotiations had been objectionable, and that the associated policies had been erroneous, although he conceded the possibility that Gandhi might be prevented from falling into the hands of the extremists by granting him an interview (45). The Willingdon-Hoare

axis, then, appeared to be made of sterner stuff than the Irwin-Benn axis. The hardening of public opinion in Britain probably contributed also to the determination of the Government not to respond favourably to the Congress's overtures.

Willingdon not only refused Gandhi an interview, but launched a carefully orchestrated attack against the Congress within days of Gandhi's arrival in India. To Willingdon, Gandhi appeared to be an 'arrant little humbug', and there was not much to be gained politically by conferring with him (46). Samuel Hoare gave encouragement to Willingdon's policy of the big stick, by pointing out how the British public were strongly behind Willingdon, and indicated the sources of his own views, by referring to the many mistakes that the British had made in the context of Ireland (47). The shattering of the colonial shackles over Ireland apparently remained as a painful memory, and the British élite could not help seeing the Indian situation through the mists of Irish history.

There was, therefore, a visible change in the policy adopted towards the Indian nationalists. There were to be no more protracted negotiations, nor even the hint of an inclination to talk across a table. This new attitude puzzled even the Indian moderates, and it was felt that the attitudes of the Government would hamper the work of the Consultative Committee which was attempting to carry on the work of the Round Table Conference in India (48). It was as if the Government of India had stripped off the veneer of genteel willingness to negotiate and revealed underneath the ruthless determination to reassert the dominance of the Government. Eleanor Rathbone noticed in the attitude of the Home Member of Bombay a harshness and contempt for Indians that she had never heard from anyone but the most die-hard Churchillian, and felt too that Indian stories of repression were true (49).

This new attitude of an iron fist reached down from the very fount of imperial power, the King. He told the Secretary of State for India, Samuel Hoare, that Gandhi should have no interviews in prison, that terrorists should be deported to the Andamans and that Government grants to educational institutions that produced terrorists should be withdrawn (50). There was, it would appear, a disenchantment with the old methods of peace talks, interviews and manoeuvres for saving face. The British Government saw the Round Table Conference and the slow road to devolution that it was building as the only path that could be taken in India: there could be no toleration of agitators and terrorists. Rule by Ordinance was thus seen as a necessity, and the heavy hand of the Government lay upon the Indian body politic, seeking to quell the quickening pulse of nationalism.

The main target of Government repression was terrorism. But inevitably its chief result was to increase nationalist resistance. The New Statesman pointed out that it was futile to hope that a repressive policy would check the nationalist movement for any length of time (51). Interestingly, even Lothian, the Under-Secretary of State for India, recognized this (52). The Prime Minister himself wrote to the Viceroy, asking if it would be possible to withdraw administration by Ordinance, in some provinces at least (53).

Apparently elements of the British public were beginning to be plagued by doubts about the rule by Ordinance in India. One incident which probably catalysed public opinion was the police beating inflicted in Madras on a Scottish missionary, Dr Forrester Paton. Dr Paton became a victim of the excessive zeal of the Madras police - he was even charged with having violated one of the Ordinances - partly because he was dressed in Indian homespun clothes, and was mista-

ken for a Congress agitator. But this incident brought home to the British public the nature of the repressive regime in India more dramatically than any newspapers could (54). Samuel Hoare had to admit that in this case a mistake had been made (55).

The arousal of British public opinion against repression in India was facilitated also by the activities of some newly emerged pressure groups. One such group was the India Conciliation Group, which was formed under the aegis of the Society of Friends to promote a better understanding in Britain of the Indian problem (56). With the enthusiastic and dynamic support of Carl Heath and Agatha Harrison, the India Conciliation Group set to work to present the Indian case in Britain.

But even before the India Conciliation Group was formed the Society of Friends had begun to take special interest in India, a Committee on Indian Affairs having been set up in May-June 1930, following a talk by Rabindranath Tagore, and a deputation sent to the Secretary of State for India, Wedgwood Benn (57). Interestingly, some Friends felt that the Indian Affairs Committee was being too pro-Indian and not sufficiently cognizant of the good done in India by the British (58). It is probably because of such criticism that the India Conciliation Group was set up as a separate and distinct, if informal, body. Although it derived its moral provenance and leading members from the Society of Friends, the Group was not formally linked to it.

It was nevertheless the Society of Friends which financed the visit to India of three Friends in early 1932, and they reported that a state of deep embitterment had been reached, and that there was a growing alienation of moderate men. Pointing this out to the Prime Minister, Carl Heath suggested that he should issue a reassuring

declaration, while selectively modifying the Ordinances and releasing some of the non-violent prisoners (59). MacDonald showed this letter to Hoare, who concluded that there must be propaganda aimed at showing that he and MacDonald had different policies on India, and asked MacDonald to dispel this myth if he were replying to Heath (60). Interestingly, MacDonald, who had earlier, with Willingdon, adopted a critical stance about the Ordinances in India, generally discounted the information secured by the Friends in India, and attempted to justify the need for a repressive administration in India (61). MacDonald, as the head of a National Government, had to accept and even justify the new harsher attitude towards India. At the same time, however, he had in the past advocated a softer approach towards India, and could not entirely slough off the old attitudes, which prompted him to attempt to persuade the Viceroy to wield his sceptre with greater sympathy.

Samuel Hoare thought that MacDonald was unnecessarily succumbing to pressure from the Left, which had been carrying on active propaganda in collusion with the Congress. Hoare himself thought that such propaganda had no impact on the 'big currents of opinion' (62). He advised Willingdon that, despite what MacDonald might state, the great body of public opinion in Britain would support Willingdon to the full in maintaining any Ordinances that might be necessary for the period of the emergency.

Government policy was being justified not only by MacDonald in private letters, but by people like Lord Sankey in public. Sankey wrote a brief article in the National Labour Fortnightly, the Newsletter, in which he criticized Gandhi for his 'uncompromising refusal of give and take in negotiation, the rigidly non possumus attitude he adopted and the extravagant claims he advanced....'(63).

The Newsletter was, naturally enough, an organ of the Labour rump within the Government, and could therefore be expected to publish defences of Government policy, and Sankey's was an extremely influential voice. Even so, his article provoked some critical responses. Horace Alexander questioned Sankey's statement that the Congress was almost exclusively Hindu (64). Arthur St John rejected Sankey's defence of the Ordinances, and enclosed reports which indicated that the Government was not confining its attacks to violent agitators and was not exercising moderation and caution (65).

While the 'Labour' members of the Government necessarily had to defend the new policy of 'resolute government', the Labour opposition was unrestrained in its criticism. George Lansbury compared the Indian situation to that in Poland when a Czarist official stated that order reigned in Warsaw after a terrible suppression of freedom. The Labour movement in Britain would not, Lansbury declared, support the coercive policy of the Government (66).

Others too were attempting at this time to moderate what they considered to be an excessively repressive administration in India. In Birmingham, a Council for Indian Freedom came into being, with the object of supporting the Indian struggle for self-determination. This Council, which affiliated itself to the Friends of India, the India League, and the No More War Movement, was presided over by Horace Alexander and had, among its other office-bearers, the pro-Indian former Labour MP, Wilfred Wellock. The Council adopted a resolution expressing the hope that the Government would remove the Ordinances and release all the political prisoners (67).

Joan Fry, a Quaker, G.P. Gooch, the historian, Carl Heath, the Quaker chairman of the India Conciliation Group, J.A. Hobson, the writer and polemicist, A.D. Lindsay, the radical Master of Balliol,

William Paton, Secretary of the International Missionary Council, H.S. L. Polak, Gandhi's co-worker in South Africa and member of the Labour Party Colonies Committee, and Maude Royden, supporter of women's suffrage and a former missionary in India, penned a letter of protest to the Manchester Guardian, asking that steps should be taken to prevent the further alienation of the Indian people and to restore mutual confidence (68). Another letter, probably inspired by Carl Heath, was addressed to Cosmo Lang, the Archbishop of Canterbury, expressing concern about the situation and pointing out that it was for the stronger party, the Government, to demonstrate a conciliatory attitude by lifting the Ordinances and releasing prisoners (69). Among its signatories were A.D. Lindsay and William Temple, the Archbishop of York, and George Bell, the Bishop of Chichester.

In a pamphlet published by the SCM Press, R.M. Gray also put forward the argument that the British Government as the superior force must make the opening move, and that administration with Ordinances had led to disbelief in the sincerity of the British Government (70).

There was thus a segment of the British public which was attempting to influence the Government. As yet it was a small segment, and its voice was muted. Nevertheless, it was slowly gathering strength, and securing support in Parliament. Samuel Hoare was, however, determined not to let the anti-Ordinance propaganda deflect him or the Viceroy from the policy that they had deliberately chosen, and he assured Willingdon that he would not give way to pressure in the House of Commons (71).

Hoare was not merely determined to avoid any deviation from the path that had been mapped out. He in fact perceived the mood of the Commons to be one of irritation with Indian intransigence, and felt that any Government of India Bill could be got through the Houses of

Parliament if only no further meetings of the Round Table Conference or of the Federal Structure Committee were held (72). There was apparently a feeling among some MPs that the Indian refusal to co-operate had released the British from their commitments. Churchill, at any rate, thought so (73). Hoare was inclined, too, to conclude that events in India were hardening opinion in Britain against the proposed constitutional changes, and in favour of advance by two stages (74). Hoare was perhaps inclined to think that public opinion was shifting in this direction because he himself tended to favour this view. Early in October 1931, he had come to the conclusion that the Indian delegates would be forced to accept provincial autonomy as a first step, although he saw that the suggestion could not come from the British Government in the first place (75). Hoare's perceptions of public and Parliamentary opinion led him also to reject Willingdon's idea of a British-India Federation with responsibility at the centre (i.e., without the Princes) (76).

Not everyone perceived the tenor of public opinion in the same way. Lord Allen of Hurtwood felt that Hoare's opinions were untenable, as the younger Conservative MPs whom he (Allen) had seen wanted the Government to lead and not to be frightened by the 50 to 100 old-fashioned Tories (77). Yet it was evident that the growing fissures within the Conservative Party could not be repaired, and India was acting as an increasingly powerful lever to widen the gulf between those who were keen to make a compromise with the Indian nationalists and re-establish peace in India, and those who harked back to the imperial high noon, and refused to countenance any measure which would diminish the glory of the imperial sun. Hoare had a very difficult task indeed, and at that stage could not have accurately gauged the power of the opposition to the National Government's India policy.

While Gandhi and his colleagues languished in Indian prisons, unable to alter the situation, there were several individuals who hoped to save the situation. One such was G.D. Birla, the Indian industrialist and ally of Gandhi. In a letter to Hoare, he offered his co-operation, pointing out (rather dubiously) that, despite his admiration for Gandhi, he neither took part in nor financed the civil disobedience movement, and suggesting that it would be possible to frame a constitution that would be acceptable to Gandhi and other progressive Indians, if not all Indians, and arguing that, as Gandhi alone could keep the left wing in India under check, to strengthen his hands was to strengthen the bond of friendship between Britain and India (78).

Hoare was not inclined to trust Birla, but sensed that Birla was seeking a rapprochement, and thought that such businessmen might be wooed away from the Congress (79). Birla was certainly anxious, as any Indian businessman must have been at that time, that the Indian crisis should be overcome as quickly as possible. He wrote to Lothian also, arguing that, without the co-operation of Gandhi and his school, no constitution could succeed, and that this co-operation could be secured by the release of Gandhi and other prisoners, and by non-renewal of the Ordinances (80).

There was a unity of purpose in the approaches of Hoare and Birla, a unity woven from reactions to the two basic strands of left-wing political attitudes in India, one against British imperialism and the other against Indian capitalism. If Hoare sought to quell the former, Birla and his kind had a natural interest in suppressing the latter. Although there was a fundamental contradiction of interests between Indian businessmen and those in Britain, there was also a delicate bond of an unstated unity. It was as much in the interests of the

British capitalist to secure peaceful conditions in India for the continuation of profitable trade as it was in the interests of the Indian capitalist. If it was clear that peaceful conditions could be restored in India only through compromise and by political concessions, these steps were, nevertheless, anathema to the high Tories. In their imagination, the slightest yielding of power in India could only lead to the rapid and disastrous dismantling of the British Empire. And these die-hards, refusing to relinquish even an inch of the raj, were seen to be politically potent enough by Hoare and the Cabinet to decide them against reconvening the Round Table Conference or the Federal Structure Committee.

This was a decision that angered the Indian moderates. Lothian had anticipated such a reaction, and argued that any decision to alter the programme of constitutional deliberations was likely to alienate the Indian moderates, and lead to a revival of the civil disobedience movement, thus making it difficult for the new constitution to be accepted (81). The Government either did not anticipate such a reaction or assumed that the moderates did not matter any longer. Indeed, Willingdon explained the decision of moderates like Sastri, Sapru and Jayakar not to co-operate by attributing motives such as vanity and distrust, and thought that their non-co-operation was of no account, as they had no influence (82). Yet, in the end, the Government had to recognize the force of Indian resentment, and agree to the reconvening of the Round Table Conference.

The crucial question of balancing the apparently conflicting claims of the various Indian communities had not yet been resolved, however, and the Government took the decision to attempt a solution by diktat rather than the hitherto infructuous negotiations. There were several other reasons for this decision besides the failure of the method of negotiation. Primarily, there was the old and enduring

notion that Muslims were a different political species and that they ought to be treated with circumspection. In the attempt to weaken political extremism in India, the Government had not been occupied merely in retaining the support of the moderates, but also that of the Muslim community. Thus Willingdon summed up the British view of Indian politics when he wrote to the Prime Minister that the Hindus, as a community, had been leaders of every subversive movement, were very unreliable, and always acted for themselves, while the Muslims had on the whole been law-abiding. If the Muslims did not get what they wanted, they would not co-operate, and the result would then be either autocratic rule or capitulation to the Congress (83).

This tendency to see India as an arena of conflicting political entities was another curious paradox of the Raj. While British ideologues were constantly reiterating the role of the Raj in welding a multitude of nations into a unity, they were also prone to see clear divisions and dissensions between different groups if not between different nationalities. There were differences, no doubt, and the makers of constitutions for India had to take note of them. Hindus and Muslims, upper castes and depressed communities, landlords and peasants, the antinomies were certainly there. But they were recognized primarily in terms of religion and caste. The term 'class' rarely made an appearance and there were few who differentiated the Indian countryside into landlords and peasants in other than caste or religious terms. The tendency to identify the Congress, and therefore Indian nationalism, with Hinduism was all-pervasive and persistent. Thus, when the New Statesman reported in February 1932 that 30,000 'Hindus' were then in gaol, Humayun Kabir, an Indian student at Oxford, (he was later to become the Education Minister), had to point out the error (84). The editorial staff of the New Statesman were probably

using, as many people did, the word 'Hindus' as a synonym for 'Indians'. But this carried with it an implied assumption, which was all too common, that Indian nationalists were Hindus, and Hindus alone.

The cleavages that existed in Indian society were reinforced by the way in which they were perceived, and even more by the political decisions rooted in those perceptions. Undoubtedly, in 1932, any British programme of constitutional change in India had to take into account the inter-group tensions and rivalries there. As it appeared that the Indian leaders were unable to reach an agreement on this issue, the Prime Minister decided, as foreshadowed in his speech to the Round Table Conference, to formulate a plan revolving around the concept of separate electorates. It would seem that MacDonald was reluctant to do this, for he confessed to Samuel Hoare that communal representation was a 'terrible system' and that he was frightened at the prospect of self-government in India resting on that principle; moreover, he was afraid too that no community would be pleased and it would seem that the British Government had no friends left in India (85). In the end, MacDonald had no choice perhaps, and had to make what came to be known as the 'Communal Award'.

The Prime Minister's decision, announced on 17 August 1932, reaffirmed the principle of separate electorates for Muslims, Sikhs, Indian Christians in some areas, Anglo-Indians and Europeans. The depressed classes were given special constituencies for 71 reserved seats. All the others were to vote in general constituencies. The arrangement could be revised after ten years by mutual agreement (86).

As might be expected, The Times thought that it was a 'definite and necessary step in the progress of self-government' (87). Even the New Statesman welcomed the Award as an 'honest attempt' to solve the 'insoluble', for, although the system of separate electo-

rates offended orthodox democratic doctrine, it could not be helped in India (88). The Daily Worker, on the other hand, clung tenaciously to the divide et impera argument, declaring that, if British imperialism did not deliberately act as a divisive force, the communal problem could soon be solved (89)

Whether or not it was a deliberate policy is not clear. What is apparent, however, is that the decision was rooted in a belief system which saw the divisions in India to be ineradicable. Modern political institutions and processes introduced into India by the British recognized and incorporated these differences, and in doing so tended to reinforce them. Thus, paradoxically, beneath a veneer of unity, the British Raj created a virtually self-perpetuating system of tensions and conflicts.

If the Communal Award was intended to be the final word on the problem, the intentions were belied almost immediately. Gandhi, who regarded the provision of separate electorates for the depressed castes as a negation of his work for the eradication of untouchability, embarked on a fast to death, to be given up only if the proposals were modified.

Was Gandhi attempting, as some suggested, to retrieve through the fast his political influence? J.R. Glorney Bolton rejected the notion that it was a political 'stunt', and argued that it was natural that Gandhi should fast on this issue, since he detested both untouchability and separate electorates (90). Whatever Gandhi's motives, the fast caused concern to his friends. C.F. Andrews felt that Gandhi was wrong to undertake the fast, but he considered it more important to secure the ending of the fast and the saving of Gandhi's life, for the sake of both Britain and India (91). Andrews, desperate to save Gandhi's life, cast about for an alternate settlement acceptable to

the depressed classes as well as to Gandhi, and suggested that constituencies could be restructured to secure the representation of the depressed classes, or even that there could be judicial selection to secure such representation (92). Andrews had indeed asked Gandhi to delay the fast till he arrived in India, possibly with an alternative plan, but Gandhi replied that he could give up the idea of the fast only if the scheme of separate electorates was given up (93).

The more practical suggestion, that Gandhi should be released from prison so that he could confer with the representatives of the depressed classes, came from G.D. Birla, and under his inspiration, from Walter Layton, now at The Economist (94). Emmeline Pethick Lawrence also urged the release of Gandhi, so that he could have discussions with his friends, as a prison environment made it difficult to respond to objective realities (95). For different reasons, Professor John Coatman too argued that Gandhi should be allowed to confer with the depressed classes. He anticipated Gandhi's failure to reach agreement, and, as he would then be covered in ridicule, thought that he would break off the fast (96). The New Statesman strongly argued in an editorial article that, since the consequences of the fast would be terrible, MacDonald should personally intervene, promising a general amnesty and further negotiations, without actually repudiating the Communal Award (97).

Samuel Hoare felt that Gandhi was attempting to shift the odium of his own actions onto the Government, and that the Government should not put itself in the position of releasing him and then having to rearrest him, and also that the Government should not get involved in the controversy between Gandhi and the depressed classes (98).

The Poona Pact of 25 September 1932, which rejected the idea of separate constituencies for the depressed classes, but increased the

numbers of seats reserved for them to 148, relieved the pressure on the Government and Gandhi's friends alike. The New Statesman felt that Gandhi had scored a victory over 'his own people', and that the Pact was important as 'a sign of change in India and a prelude, as we hope it is, to a steady, or perhaps a rapid reform of a social system which, if it ever was defensible, is surely indefensible in a civilised community today' (99). Bernard Houghton, formerly of the ICS (he had served in Madras and Burma) and a radical critic of imperialism, also agreed that Gandhi had initiated a great social reform through the Pact. But, since Gandhi achieved this on religious rather than on public grounds, the result was to accentuate the religious factor in India and was thus, according to Houghton, a retrograde step, and, even more, implied an acceptance of 'the imperialist plan' (100).

Reverend William Paton of the International Missionary Council, who had been in India during the Twenties, felt that the Pact presented an opportunity to make a fresh start with the Congress, and urged the Prime Minister to at least attempt some kind of private consultation with Gandhi and his colleagues (101).

Apparently the Government too had come to such a conclusion. At any rate, Samuel Hoare began to contemplate methods of facilitating the cessation of the civil disobedience movement by Gandhi. To this end, he was anxious that no statement should be made that would force Gandhi into an anti-Government stance, and he did not think that the Government should push itself into the position of having to keep Gandhi in prison for ever (102). Hoare thought that Gandhi should be allowed to see selected persons who might persuade him to call off the civil disobedience movement (103).

Willingdon himself, puzzled by the Poona Pact, was reluctant to consider either releasing Gandhi or even allowing him interviews, as

he saw him as the chief instigator of all the Government's troubles in India (104). Willingdon, unlike Irwin before him, had convinced himself that Gandhi was an arrant politician whose agitational antics could not be tolerated by an imperial Government, and his attitude to Gandhi and the Congress was coloured by this conviction. Willingdon was not entirely alone in adopting a stance that was inherently hostile to Gandhi and the Indian nationalist strategy in general.

Even a Liberal intellectual like Sir Michael Sadler was inclined to consider Gandhi's methods as not being completely acceptable. Not only was Sadler convinced that certain forms of non-violent non-co-operation were in effect acts of physical resistance to the Government and were therefore only nominally non-violent, and thus deserved condemnation, but he felt that India could not yet become a self-governing Dominion as there would be civil war caused by communal dissensions (105). Sadler was probably rationalizing his decision not to support actively the newly set up Provisional International Committee on India which was to work for securing international sympathy and co-operation for the struggle for Indian independence. Nevertheless, his attitude did reflect the new ambivalence in Britain towards India, a sense of exasperation with the tactics of Indian nationalism, combined with a desire to deal fairly with Indian aspirations.

This ambivalence meant that various groups could attempt to sway public opinion. A muted but real propaganda war over India began, and the Government necessarily got involved to protect its own position. Samuel Hoare, realizing the persuasive power of the cinematic image, not only did a five minute 'talkie' on the Government's programme for India, but suggested to the Viceroy the use of film as a means of propagating the Government viewpoint (106). He even toyed with the idea of a private company being formed for making

and screening propaganda films, with a third of the capital coming from Britain, a third from the Indian Princes and another third from British India (107). Indeed, as early as 1926, the United Empire reported that some Indian Princes, including Alwar, Patiala, Bikaner, Jaipur, Kashmir and the Aga Khan, were offering to finance the production and screening of 'Empire' films (108).

While these ideas of reinforcing the imperial lattice with the cinematic image did not materialize, the India Office carried on a propaganda war against opponents of Government policy from both ends of the political spectrum. One group that emerged in the conflicts and confabulations of the period was the India League (109). The League had sent a delegation to India to examine and report upon the conditions in India. Even before the delegation had published anything that might influence the British public, the Government of India sought to counteract the India League's activities. The Government of India suggested to the India Office, therefore, that they should attempt to do this by showing how from the very beginning the delegation had been 'run' and influenced by the Congress (110). Hugh MacGregor, the Information Officer at the India Office, thought that an edited version of the Government of India's report on the India League delegation (prepared on the basis of Intelligence Bureau reports and intercepted letters) should be sent to the Conservative Central Office and the Anti-Socialist Union, so that they could use it for propaganda, and H.A.F. Rumbold suggested that if possible a wedge should be driven between Ellen Wilkinson (one of the delegates) and the official Labour Party on the one hand and the rest of the delegation on the other (111). What the Government of India report showed was that the delegation received Congress funds through Malaviya, that Congress arranged the delegation's itinerary, and, rather farcically, even that the delegation stayed in hotels, and therefore could

not claim acquaintance with the people. The Government of India obviously rated the possible influence of the India League as very high, to take such measures of counter-propaganda. The India League did have the possibly influential support of Bertrand Russell, who was its chairman, and several Labour MPs, including Eleanor Rathbone and Morgan Jones. Russell wrote a brief note introducing the League, in which he declared that, if the British public knew the facts about India, and of the Government's shameful and incredibly foolish behaviour, the public would shrink from the cruelties being perpetrated there (112). Intellectuals like Harold Laski and journalists like Simon Ratcliff of the New Statesman gave their tacit support for the League. Hence, although the League did not have an extensive membership, it was seen as being sufficiently threatening for the India Office not only to keep track of its activities, but to attempt to persuade the Press to ignore it. An India Office note indicated, for example, that the Manchester Guardian Correspondent had been approached about a prospective India League meeting, but he felt that all references to the meeting could not be suppressed (113).

There may not have been a real need to manipulate the Press, for, in general, the line taken by the India League was too radical even for the Manchester Guardian, which was sympathetic to the idea of Indian independence. The fact that the India Office still felt the need to detract from the importance of the League was an index of official nervousness and of the precarious character of the Government's India policy. As one of the 'agents' of the India Office reported, the meetings of the League attracted working class and lower middle class audiences, and these were 'important as a voting power' (114).

If the India League was stirring up the officers of the India Office, the activities of the India Conciliation Group, although in

a lower key, were no less significant. Originating as it did in the Christian ambience of the Society of Friends, the India Conciliation Group reached out to a slightly different public. While maintaining links with the India League, the Friends of India and other such organizations sympathetic to the Indian cause, the India Conciliation Group kept a distinct identity, and attempted to promote a sympathetic attitude to Indian nationalism, especially among those who were not usually reached by such organizations. For instance, it formed a very useful link with the disarmament movement, which was attracting a great deal of attention at that time. Thus, Gerald Bailey, the Secretary of the National Peace Council, was asked to join the India Conciliation Group. He not only joined the Group, but arranged for the publication of three or four special Bulletins on India which argued that the situation in India was a challenge to those working for peace. Similarly, the India Conciliation Group and the East End branch of the Peace Army organized a procession one day, in which people carried posters asking questions like, 'What would Christ do in India today?' and 'Gandhi was a Guest here. Now he is in prison. Why?', and stating, 'While we are talking of Disarmament, a state of war exists in India' (115).

One of the major campaigns launched by the India Conciliation Group in the winter of 1932-33 revealed the wide divergence of opinion about India among church leaders. The India Conciliation Group proposed that some action should be taken to secure the release of Gandhi and other Indian leaders to create the right atmosphere in which the future constitution could be inaugurated (116). It was suggested that either a deputation could meet the Secretary of State for India, or a private letter could be sent to him. A letter to the Press was the other alternative considered. The responses to these suggestions were

extremely varied, and with a few notable exceptions indicated that the different church leaders in Britain were very cautious about adopting radical stances on India, that they were, on the contrary, inclined to pursue a line that was not too different from that adopted by the Government, and that there was among them a scarcely concealed hostility to the Indian nationalist and his ideas. Thus, while Hewlett Johnson, the 'Red' Dean of Canterbury, and F.L. Donaldson, Christian Socialist and Canon of Westminster, were agreeable to any of the methods suggested, most of the others approached expressed their inability to adopt any of them for various reasons.

Oliver Quick, Canon of St. Paul's, argued, for example, that the release of Congress leaders would inevitably mean the resumption of propaganda against the proposed constitution, and this would destroy all chances of it working. M.E. Aubrey, General Secretary of the Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland, felt that the Congress agitation was in the interests of a small section of the Indian society, and that the Government should continue its policy. He did not approve of Gandhi's methods of moral coercion by threats of suicide, and felt that the release of Gandhi and the others would result in harm.

Refusal to support the India Conciliation Group proposal came also from William Temple, the Archbishop of York, George Bell, the Bishop of Chichester, Frank Williams, the Dean of Manchester, Henry Wilson, the Bishop of Chelmsford, Henry Vodden of the Church Missionary Society, Paul Kirk, Director of the Industrial Christian Fellowship, and Charles Curzon, Bishop of Stepney.

Percival Stacy Waddy, Secretary of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, regretted that he could not append his signature without approval from his Committee, and thought it unlikely that they would agree. J. Scott Lidgett of the London

Bermondsey Settlement also expressed his regrets as he had been convinced in a private conversation with Samuel Hoare of his goodwill and felt that the Secretary of State must be the final judge.

W.J. Noble, Secretary of the Methodist Society, asked, rather strangely, if the appeal should not be made to Gandhi, since he put himself in prison, prompting Carl Heath to reply that Gandhi was in prison and therefore could not act.

Why was there such apparently universal reluctance to sign a simple letter urging the release of prisoners? That even radical clergymen like William Temple and George Bell, who had earlier shown support for a conciliatory policy, should have demonstrated a new reluctance might seem inexplicable. Perhaps they were being cautious. Some others, like G.E. Phillips of the London Missionary Society, felt that any public expression of support for release of the Indian prisoners might unleash an avalanche of 'die-hard' protests.

The Anglican Church might have been expected to support the Empire, but the Non-Conformist Churches were usually more radical (117). But on India they were subject perhaps to contradictory pressures which resulted in an ambivalent attitude. Their anti-imperialism was balanced by a dislike of the Indian nationalist. This dislike stemmed partly from an aversion to the ideology of Indian nationalism which was seen as being Hindu and even as being anti-Christian. It was also due to the tendency to equate the nationalist leadership with an oppressive minority which would exploit the Indian masses. Thus, with a few exceptions, the majority of Christian missionaries in India were not sympathetic to the nationalist movement (118). Besides, there might have been the influence of a notion such as that expounded in 1919 by Arthur Hirtzel of the India Office, that the Empire was a means of enabling Christian redemption of mankind (119).

The various churches in Britain seemed therefore reluctant to overtly support Indian nationalists. This reluctance extended even to the discouragement of attempts to set aside a day of prayer for India (120). Yet there were a few individuals like Hewlett Johnson who were willing to adopt a more explicitly sympathetic stance on Indian questions. Clergymen like C.F. Andrews and Verrier Elwin reacted to their Indian experience very differently, and more and more of their fellow clergy were beginning to realize that the promotion of Christianity in India did not have to take place only under the aegis of a rebarbative Raj.

As the time for convening the third Round Table Conference drew near, a wide variety of ideas were floated about the steps to be taken. The die-hards, sensing a growing inclination among the political élite to make definite concessions, gathered their forces for reshaping attitudes to India, and Winston Churchill articulated their hope and conviction that the devolution of power in India would be a protracted process (121). Their views could not be entirely ignored, and it was probably to take some wind out of their sails that a group began to seriously consider the idea of prolonging the transition in India by a two-stage devolution. Initiated by Charles Mallet, who had been Secretary for Indian Students at the India Office from 1912 to 1916 (and before that a Liberal MP for Plymouth from 1906 to 1910) and Theodore Morison, former Principal of the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College, Aligarh, and a member of the Council of India from 1906 to 1916, and agreed to by Harcourt Butler, Meston, and William Marris, who had all been Governors of Indian provinces, the idea was to seek a reconsideration by Government of the proposed constitutional programme (122).

Lord Crewe arranged a meeting at his house to discuss the idea and Salisbury, among others,was invited to attend. Interestingly

enough, Salisbury wished to take Winterton and George Lloyd along with him, but Crewe thought that it would be odd to include anybody who definitely belonged to the Winston group, as their standpoint was very different (123). Zetland, who could not attend the meeting, thought that he would be in sympathy with the views of those who would be present (124). Hardinge, who was happy to note such strong moderate opinion outside the die-hards, expressed his apprehension about the proposal to simultaneously give autonomy at the centre and in the provinces, while Reading felt that the Bill should be framed in such a way that central autonomy would be considerably postponed, but with an assurance that it would be a definite sequel (125).

At the meeting, held on 29 November 1932, the predominant opinion, however, was against asking Government to defer responsibility at the centre for a subsequent Bill or to include it in the present Bill merely in a skeleton form to be clothed and developed as experience grew. The various administrators present thought that it would be best to concentrate on the safeguards issue, and they agreed to prepare a note on that subject (126).

The memorandum prepared by Harcourt Butler, Meston, William Marris and S.P. O'Donnell (who had been a Commissioner in Bengal until 1900, and later, from 1906-10, a Liberal MP), suggested the need for extreme caution, and that safeguards should be precisely defined and included in the Act itself, the Governor being given not merely negative powers of veto, but positive power of intervention in the legislative and executive spheres (127). Crewe discussed the memorandum with Salisbury, who thereupon arranged with the Secretary of State to receive a deputation on 12 December (128).

This memorandum became the opening salvo in a wide ranging battle for strict safeguards in any new Indian constitution, an

issue that was to be the central element in the protracted negotiations over the proposed constitution. The concept of safeguards contradicted the idea of responsible government, and was thus unacceptable to the Indians, while many British politicians were reluctant to place power in the hands of Indians without the fullest kind of protection for British interests. There was a feeling that in any new election the Congress would come to power, and that, unless reined in by restrictive legislation, Congress Governments would act inevitably against British interests in India.

Although there was a feeling that only the constitution being considered by the Round Table Conference offered a way out of the Indian impasse, and that if the Indians voted against it chaos would come again, there was also the recognition that Indian nationalism was a force that had to be reckoned with and not ignored. Lothian, for example, thought that it was the refusal to recognize the strength of nationalism in Ireland that had led to problems there, and felt that the Congress leaders should be released to facilitate discussion of the White Paper scheme (129). But Willingdon in India still preferred his mailed fist, arguing that any amnesty at that juncture would be construed as weakness, which would be fatal for the future (130). If it seemed to some that the participation of the Congress was necessary for the successful working of the new constitution, others then saw the Congress as insufferable excrescence which, if possible, should be excluded altogether from the new Governments.

As already noted, one recurrent fear was that a Congress Government would destroy British interests in a trice. This was the keynote of a letter that Lord Greenway, who had been in India as a businessman and still had business interests there, wrote to Samuel Hoare, indicating his apprehension about the appointment of a Governor-General

by India as a Dominion. What was to prevent the appointment of Gandhi or any other anti-British Indian as the next Governor-General, he asked, and his main fear was that such an Indian would use his powers against British commercial interests(131). It was the fear of a Congress Government indeed that made the devolution of power at the centre such an apparently dangerous step, and particularly to one like Greenway, who was a senior partner of Shaw, Wallace and Company, one of the leading Managing Agencies in India with varied and valuable commercial interests.

The Duchess of Atholl articulated this fear, expressing her anxiety about the safeguards that would form part of the constitution, an anxiety that was strengthened by the realization of the extent of opposition to transfer of responsibility at the centre (132). The Duchess may have been influenced in part by letters such as those she received from 'The Royalists', a right-wing European group, mainly composed of businessmen, in India. Eliott Lockhart of Gladstone Lyall & Co., and the young chairman of the Royalists, indicated in one letter that the non-official British organizations in India had opposed the idea of central responsibility for British India alone, and that responsibility at the centre should be given only in a Federation (133). He too was apprehensive about Congress coming to power, especially in Bengal, which should, he argued, be treated as a special case, because of terrorism and the sympathetic attitude of the local 'Hindus' towards terrorists, and where there should be no transfer of power until conditions were suitable (134)

The Duchess of Atholl in fact began to orchestrate the opposition to the idea of simultaneous transfer of responsibility at the centre and in the provinces, along with Edward Cadogan, who had been a member of the Simon Commission, Reginald Mitchell Banks, Conservative MP for

Swindon, and a few others (135). Meetings and luncheons were organized to co-ordinate the activities of those who hoped to modify the ideas that the Government might incorporate into the White Paper that would form the basis of the new constitution, and soon these preliminary meetings were turned into regular affairs (136). The thinking of this group, politically indistinct from the die-hards, could be determined from a memorandum drafted by the Duchess. In this, the Duchess of Atholl argued, among other things, that an All-India Federation should not be set up unless a substantial majority of Indian Princes signified their adherence: she also criticized the transfer of financial responsibility, and the idea of the Army Budget being discussed in the legislature, and deprecated the wide extension of the franchise recommended by the Lothian Committee (137).

Edward Cadogan, who had 'grave misgivings' about the Government's scheme, was hopeful that their activities would show the Government that there was a body of moderate opinion which was not inclined to let the Government have it all its own way (138). There were, indeed, signs that even at the constituency level within the Conservative Party, a muted opposition to the Government's India policy was taking root. The constituents of J.C.C. Davidson, MP for the Hemel Hempstead Division of Hertfordshire, for example sent him a resolution which declared that the demand for central self-government came only from a minority of townfolk, and that what the great majority of the Indians desired was not self-government but firm and stable rule (139).

This was an enduring tenet of Conservative ideology, that what India needed was rule with a firm hand, and nationalism was equated not only with Hinduism, but with urban élites. It was inconceivable that Indians could without British assistance administer India, and

India could not be compared with any other Dominion (140). Did the die-hards sincerely sympathize with the oppressed masses of India and therefore seek to oppose the rise to power of the urban élites? There might have been an element of a feudal noblesse oblige in shaping their policy. But their alliance with the Princes to stave off the dominance of the nationalists in any new legislatures indicated a desire not so much to relieve oppression as to maintain feudal structures in India. Die-hard notions tied in also with the idea advanced by some that Indians were used to, and therefore thrived under, autocratic rather than democratic rule (141).

Did the machinations of the Atholl group or the die-hards have much effect on the India Office? At this stage, not much apparently. Hoare wrote to Baldwin that his course for the future was set and neither Winston Churchill nor George Lloyd would deflect it, and, as he had the full support of Baldwin, he was not even apprehensive about the die-hards sinking the ship altogether (142).

Baldwin's fight against the die-hards convinced the more moderate leaders of the Congress, so the Correspondent of The Sunday Times reported, that the policy of breaking the law had failed, and they were now looking for an excuse to change their hitherto hostile attitude (143). On the other hand, Tej Bahadur Sapru indicated that there was uneasiness in the public mind caused by the delay in publication of the White Paper, and irritation about the continued detention of Gandhi and other political prisoners (144). Willingdon was, of course, unwilling to release Gandhi, because he felt that Gandhi would resume civil disobedience, although Sapru was convinced that Gandhi was more likely to be involved in the anti-untouchability campaign (145).

Sapru's plea for the creation of a better atmosphere in India

was supported also by Lady Frances Stewart, member of the India Conciliation Group who had lived in India for twelve years with her husband, Major-General Sir Keith Stewart. She suggested to the Prime Minister that the Home Government ought to take the initiative rather than leave it to the Government of India (146). Similar suggestions for the release of political prisoners not accused of violence came from the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, a non-partisan women's group which had among its members Agatha Harrison, which kept up a stream of resolutions on the subject which were forwarded to the Secretary of State (147).

Several British women's organizations became very interested in the question of extending women's franchise in India. Although Indian women's groups were demanding full franchise for women, neither the Simon Commission nor the more liberal Lothian Committee recommended full franchise. The Franchise Committee under Lothian had suggested a ratio of about one female elector to every five male electors. But even this was sought to be whittled down further, the proposal being to change the ratio to 1:7 at least. This provoked various women's groups to express their collective consternation, and to ask for the extension rather than decrease of the voting rights for women, and they also set up a British Committee for Indian Women's Franchise (148). Lothian himself was unhappy about the reduction in the proposed franchise, but the India Office was unable, at that juncture, to modify the position (149).

One of the things the India Office and the Government had to contend with soon after the publication of the White Paper in March 1933 was the growing opposition to it, especially from the right wing of the Conservative Party, the enemy within the gates as it were, which made the task even more difficult. A pamphlet published by the

Indian Empire Society at this time termed the Government's plan 'the maddest example of doctrinaire constitution-mongering that the world has yet seen', and attributed it to the moral cowardice of British politicians 'bowing to the false gods of democracy', and to the sedition and terrorism of the nationalists in India (150). The pamphlet suggested that in India votes would be bought and envisaged a bleak future when the Indianization of the Civil Services would spell the end of Empire, and reforms would result in the cessation of Lancashire trade with India.

The die-hards were extremely unhappy about the size and composition of the Joint Select Committee and rejected Baldwin's invitation to participate in the Committee, on these grounds (151). They felt that Baldwin had deliberately stacked the cards against the die-hards by carefully selecting the members of the Committee, but by refusing to accept membership they lost a chance to be more closely involved in the framing of the reforms. Nevertheless, Churchill was hopeful of saving much from the wreck, even if it was not possible to save the ship (152). The die-hards were of course opposed to the participation of Indians in the Joint Select Committee, a view which led Lothian to expostulate that it was 'a disgusting manifestation of what is one of the main roots of Indian opposition to British rule - the assumption that 600 ignorant Englishmen are better judges of Indian conditions than any Indian' (153). To Lothian, schooled in the liberal traditions of the Round Table, this was anathema indeed, but to the die-hards, who were convinced that Indians were incapable of self-government and that they had no right to participate in the framing of constitutions, which was the business of Parliament alone, this was the only possible creed.

But if the die-hards were hostile to the Joint Select Committee and regarded it as a tool of the National Government, the India

Office was no less apprehensive about the Committee and its attitudes. Firstly, the Committee did not confine itself to the White Paper, but was determined to examine the whole question de novo, albeit in the light of all that went before. Secondly, there were in the Committee those who, like Salisbury, were suspicious of any great changes in the centre and even looked upon the transfer of law and order in the provinces with disfavour. Hoare's main fear was that the Committee might recommend that Federation was not practicable and advocate only a restricted provincial autonomy (154).

Although the Joint Select Committee was thus reconsidering the Indian question afresh, the die-hard campaign against the White Paper did not slacken. In a letter to the Daily Telegraph, Sir Michael O'Dwyer argued that the White Paper proposals required the existence of an intelligent electorate, which could not come into existence in India for some generations, and that the essentials of good government, namely security, efficient and progressive administration, and light taxation, would all be imperilled if the changes contemplated were introduced (155). This was merely a restatement of the die-hard creed that India was not yet fit for self-government, a creed based on the assumption that Indians were corrupt, inefficient and incapable. But it was a creed that struck a responsive chord in many a British mind. The die-hards capitalized on the widely prevalent notion that India was a very backward place (reinforced by lingering memories of Victorian images of India recently refurbished by writers like Katherine Mayo, Al. Carthill, and R.J. Minney), and by widening their campaign from the Press to grassroots work in the constituencies were able to stir up a very real and substantial opposition to the White Paper. This naturally caused a great deal of unease in the Government, especially since on occasion even constituents of leading Con-

servatives like Earl Winterton expressed their opposition to the Government line, and it seemed as though the ideas contained in the White Paper received support from only a small minority (156).

The attempts of the die-hards to secure rejection of the White Paper were viewed with consternation by officials of the Indian branch of Imperial Chemical Industries Limited. They feared that rejection of the White Paper would drive the Indian moderates into the Congress camp, resulting in a renewal of political agitation and violence, and thought that the die-hards should concentrate on securing safeguards for finance, trade, and law and order (157). Imperial Chemical Industries was one of the 'new' industrial giants in Britain: its close monitoring of Indian politics and its recognition of the need for supporting the general principles of the White Paper signified its desire to adjust to changing conditions while protecting its commercial interests. Indeed,the founders of the company had declared that it had deliberately been given the name Imperial Chemical Industries because the British Empire was 'the greatest single economic unit in the world', and since the promotion of imperial trading interests would be given special consideration by the Company (158).

This example of the Imperial Chemical Industries taking a pragmatic view of political change in India suggests that probably the new industries, which feared little Indian competition and were also able to cope with protective tariffs by establishing local manufacture, were able to accept the notion of greater devolution of power. Perhaps, as D.K. Fieldhouse has recorded in the case of Unilever (which also set up Indian subsidiaries), the equanimity of the multinationals viewing the prospect of transfer of power might have been due in part to misreading of the political scene: Unilever, for example, assumed that it would be a long time before India became completely independent (159).

Political strategies of giant companies were not determined, particularly in the short term, by such considerations alone. Other factors, especially metropolitan factors, also operated on them. This perhaps explains why Alfred Mond, one of the founders of ICI, might have, as J.C.C. Davidson believed, intrigued with the Tories, who hoped to use the Irwin Declaration affair to attack Baldwin (160).

But it was not only the die-hards who nurtured the idea that Indians were unfit for self-government. Willingdon felt that, even if responsibility were given to Indians, they would still want the British to run the country for them almost in the same manner in which they had been doing before (161). This was an idea shared by Sir John Anderson, the Governor of Bengal, who also thought that a large British element would have to be retained in India for many years to come, as even the most capable Indian officers were often corrupt, and legislators sold their votes for a few rupees (162). If the British officials in India held such views, it was even more natural that those who observed the Indian scene from the distant shores of Britain should adopt an even more hostile attitude. It was to counter this hostility and to win public support for the White Paper that the Government began to seriously consider the formation of an organization to undertake propaganda work on its behalf.

The idea of such an organization had been considered as early as July 1932, and Irwin was expected to head it. That expectation could not be realized, however, as Irwin joined the Cabinet, but the idea was not altogether given up, Lord Derby being considered a possible replacement for Irwin (163). At a meeting held at the Oxford and Cambridge Club (Pall Mall, London) on 28 October 1932, Irwin, Lothian, Stanley Reed (Editor of The Times of India, 1906-23), Lionel Curtis and Hubert Carr, who had been President of the European Association from 1922-5, drew up a plan of action for formally setting

up an organization for carrying on propaganda on behalf of the Government (164). But the concept did not take concrete shape because the City did not come up with the expected support, and several of those consulted, like Hardinge, Walter Lawrence, and Laurie Hammond, were not inclined to be encouraging in their response (165).

As the opposition campaign increased in its intensity, however, the Government had to revive the idea of a body that would promote views that were more in line with those espoused by the Government. The Government needed all the support it could get, and it was essential at that juncture to secure support from those who would be recognized as those who had close associations with India.

The need of the Government for a supportive organization grew all the more when the campaign against the Government's policies being waged by different groups within the Conservative Party intensified. For instance, the Bath Conservative Association, admittedly the retreat of retired Colonels from India, refused offers of speakers from the Central Office of the Party, as they had had Lord Lloyd down and were presumably unwilling to listen to any contrary opinions which the speakers sponsored by the Central Office might advance. The Women's Executive Committee of the Conservative Association voted against changes in the central government of India and against the transfer of law and order in the provinces. The 'Camberley Committee on India' published a pamphlet in which it was argued that liberalization of rule in India would be antagonistic to the interests of the Indian people, and that the 'failure' of the Chinese Republic had shown the inappropriateness of democracy in the East (166).

The hostility of the local Conservative Associations to the Government policy on India stemmed partly from misconceptions about it, one widely held notion being that the White Paper required all

provincial Governors to be Indians (167). Partly, it was also due to the successful propaganda being carried out by Churchill, Lloyd, the Duchess of Atholl and others, to the effect that the Government was surrendering India out of cowardice and the lack of a will to hold India for the Empire. There was also the possibility that India was being used as a lever by an anti-Baldwin faction in the Conservative Party, to displace him from the leadership. Interestingly enough, this faction represented an older generation of Tories, those who had aristocratic origins with close ties to land, and this was reflected not only in their dislike of the new Tories, who were predominantly linked to the industrial bourgeoisie, but also in their espousals of the Indian aristocracy and their opposition to the Indian capitalists.

The combined attack of Winston Churchill, the Daily Mail, and the Morning Post on the Government's India policy made, in the opinion of Samuel Hoare also, a very significant impression on the people in the constituencies (168). The Daily Express also threw its weight behind the campaign against the White Paper. Only The Times, under the editorship of Geoffrey Dawson, remained a staunch, if sometimes critical, supporter of the Government, a support that some die-hards attributed to Dawson's friendship with Irwin, and to his connections with the Round Table movement.

If the Government wished to promote its own scheme against the hostility of such formidable opponents who could, moreover, take advantage of the fairly widespread ignorance of true conditions in India, it needed, it became clear, a separate organization which would support the White Paper without actually being a department of the Government. The first formal step towards setting up this body was taken when R.A. Butler, the Under-Secretary of State for India, circulated a draft letter which would form the basis for getting together

like-minded people for working in favour of the Government's India policy (169). The draft letter indicated that a meeting would be held on 9 May at the house of J.J. Astor, the proprietor of the Observer, to discuss how best to combat the activities of those critical of the Government's proposals, and the best way to present the Indian situation in the proper perspective. It was expected that the letter would be signed by Lord Goschen, former Governor of Madras (1924-9) and with close connections with the City, Basil Blackett, who had been the Finance Member of the Government of India (1922-8) and was a director of the Bank of England and several other companies, Leopold Amery, Conservative MP for Birmingham and former Dominions Secretary, Alfred Watson, former Editor of the Calcutta Statesman, Charles Innes, former Governor of Burma, and J.P. Thompson, who had retired as Chief Commissioner of Delhi. After a brief hiatus, caused partly by the reluctance of Lord Goschen to head the new organization, it came into being as the Union of Britain and India. If the India Office was not the 'onlie begetter' of this Union, it was at least the prime mover, and acted as the catalyst to create the new organization, and, as Butler saw it, it was created at the right psychological moment (170). It was also the right political moment, for the die-hards appeared to be wielding a magic wand that was transforming the Government's policies into shreds of abject surrender to the Indian nationalist, and thus winning wide support for their battle against the White Paper (171).

The Union of Britain and India began with J.P. Thompson as Chairman, Alfred Watson and Edward Villiers, who had been the President of the European Association in India in 1931-2, as Vice-Chairmen, Brabourne as the Treasurer, and Owen Tweedy as the Secretary. It did not formally constitute itself into an association, but remained loosely structured, and asked its supporters to send donations of

5 shillings or more. Obviously the donations of sympathizers could not and did not constitute the only source of financial support for the UBI. Although these other sources of financial support for the UBI have been very carefully obscured, it is evident that Lord Goschen, who had close links with the banking circles of the City, either acted as a conduit for City funds, or was himself a munificent supporter of the Union (172).

Why did these people support the idea of the UBI and, by implication, the White Paper? J.P. Thompson had been the Chief Secretary of the Punjab during the O'Dwyer administration, and was probably attempting to rid himself of the lingering taint of Amritsar. Even as early as 1930, Thompson had come to the conclusion that further constitutional progress was necessary, and this conviction may have led him to support the Government's policy (173). Villiers, the fortunate victim of an unsuccessful assassination attempt, had been the President of the European Association, which, although divided in its attitudes, some of its members opting to oppose the White Paper, was committed to the support of the policies of compromise rather than those of the heavy hand.

Quite rapidly, the Union of Britain and India attracted several individuals who responded to the Press notices which appeared on 20 May 1933, and to a general circular distributed to those who might be inclined to join the Union. The circular suggested that sympathizers could help by agreeing to speak in different constituencies, by assisting in the preparation of leaflets, by contradicting mis-statements, or, at the least, by merely expressing sympathy for the objectives of the UBI (174). Among the early respondents was G.R. Lane-Fox MP, who had been a member of the Statutory Commission (175). He was naturally co-opted into the Council of the Union. The Council,

the main co-ordinating body for the activities of the Union, consisted of personswho had served in India in various capacities, and thus could speak authoritatively on Indian affairs without being dismissed as mere theoreticians. The members of the Council had returned from India recently, and could therefore claim to much more contemporary knowledge about Indian affairs, a fact that was made much use of in the propaganda of the UBI.

The motives of those who joined the UBI and of those who declined to do so reveal the range of attitudes towards the White Paper and what it signified to different individuals. M.J. Ottley, a retired Colonel of the Indian Army, offered his support because he was an absolute believer in the White Paper, and significantly indicated that he was a shareholder in several Indian companies and was acquiring more shares, and also operated coalmines in the Central Provinces with 5000 employees (176). Another retired Indian Army officer, Brigadier P. Sturrock, felt that political development was essential and thought that the White Paper was a sound basis to work upon (177). Reverend E.N. Spear of the St. Agnes Vicarage, Leeds, wanted to join the UBI because he had spent three years in Travancore and had learnt how strong and legitimate was the desire for self-government by Indians who still valued the British connection (178). Lord Meston, while expressing his sympathy for the Union, declared his inability to become a regular member of it because he was among the first members of the Indian Empire Society, and, although he disliked the drift of the IES towards the die-hard camp, he had not cut himself off totally, and besides, he could not hurt his old friends like Reginald Craddock (179).

The Indian Empire Society, dominated as it was by die-hards, had to respond to the newly created Union of Britain and India, and this it did by creating an alter-ego; the India Defence League. The

India Defence League, in contrast to the Union of Britain and India, had a Council consisting of those who had served in India very much earlier, mostly before the War and the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. They were apt, therefore, to view Indian affairs from a perspective that was still Victorian and more overtly imperialist. Collectively, they were more likely to reject ideas of reform in India, as such ideas directly conflicted with their view of India as a trust for the British, one that had to be zealously guarded. The formation of the India Defence League marked the beginning of a prolonged battle between it and the Union of Britain and India, a battle that, while appearing to be a conflict merely between two factions in the Conservative Party, reflected also the deep divisions in the way the British public reacted to the developing events in India (180).

Not only was the India Office compelled to secure support for its policies from within the Conservative Party, it had to counter criticism from outside as well. The India League continued to be a target of the Information Officer's propaganda. When a book by Ellen Wilkinson was about to be published, H. MacGregor, the Information Officer, proposed to secure adverse reviews for it, and contacted Captain McClay of the Central Office of the Conservative Party, who promised to do all he could to ensure that the book got the kind of review it deserved (181). But more insidious tactics were reserved for the Report of the India League delegation which had visited India. Jonathan Cape had accepted the manuscript for publication, and their imprint would no doubt have given the Report a cachet of respectability and a wide readership. But the printer took a proof copy to the Information Officer for advice, who thought that the book would do much harm abroad if not at home (182). It was conjectured that, if the printer could be persuaded to refuse to print the book, Cape

would also decline to proceed further, or at any rate refer the book to an expert, who was likely to be John Coatman, who was expected definitely to give an unfavourable report. A letter was accordingly sent to the General Secretary of the Newspaper Society, Edward Davies, who was representing the printer, S.J. King, suggesting that the Report was a publication with which no responsible Englishman should be associated, and this was followed up by a telephone conversation with Davies (183). The ruse succeeded, for the printer did refuse to print the book, and Jonathan Cape refused to publish it. It was ultimately published by Essential News, a small publisher who obviously could not furnish the book with the kind of distribution that Cape would have given it.

The India Office managed, thus, to obscure a view of India that was presented by those who had seen Indian affairs from close quarters, but a view that necessarily conflicted with that the India Office sought to present. Since the India Office did not go to the same lengths with other books and pamphlets that were appearing at this time, it can only be surmised that they perceived the India League report as potentially a very influential book, one that could further increase opposition to the policies of the Government.

If the India Office was able to blunt the barbs of one set of critics, it was virtually helpless in the face of criticism from the right wing, who had the undiluted support of mass circulation newspapers such as the Daily Mail and the Daily Express, and others such as the Daily Telegraph and the Morning Post, which were unanimous in their rejection of the White Paper. There were also pamphlets and articles in journals through which the opponents sought to present a bleak picture of an India that could only decline without the presence of the British. For example, in a pamphlet entitled 'The Main Facts

of the Indian Problem', the Duchess of Atholl tried to argue that Indian illiteracy, the caste system, barbarous customs, corruption, the close connection between the Congress and the terrorists, and the deterioration in the efficiency of the transferred departments all required the continued British control of several spheres, and added that transfer of power would affect British trade (184). In a foreword to this pamphlet, Lord Islington declared that it was a mistaken sense of political expediency that was driving India and the British Empire into great peril.

An anonymous article in Blackwood's Magazine made a similar point, remarking that the Government proposals were to abolish British rule, and hand over power to the Congress 'De Valeras' and to 'put the dumb and helpless millions of India under the heel of their hereditary oppressors', and went on to declare that autonomy for India would also be ruinous to Britain, as Congress would confiscate the thousands of millions of British capital invested in India (185). Such a view was not confined to die-hards alone. J.C.C. Davidson thought that 'the British Government, the Viceroy and to a certain extent the States have been bounced by Gandhi into believing that a few half-baked semi-educated urban agitators represent the views of 365 millions hard working and comparatively contented cultivators' (186).

How closely did such views represent the reality of the Indian political scene? Did the Congress still remain an élite minority waiting to capture power so that it could exploit the Indian masses? In the late 19th century, the Congress might have been, in Dufferin's dismissive phrase, a 'microscopic minority'. But the complexities of 20th century politics and the national campaigns it had organized had transformed the Congress into a new creature. Its membership, its

ideology and its policies reflected the emergence of complex linkages between the Congress on the one hand, and the urban bourgeoisie as well as the rural rich peasantry on the other (187). At the same time, the Congress had to recognize and act upon rural and urban discontent and the resultant popular unrest. As Gyanendra Pandey pointed out, it was perhaps the 'popular masses who brought an increased militancy and "radicalism" to the Congress, rather than a militant and radical Congress which took politics to the people' (188). Nevertheless, the Congress also acted as 'a major source of inspiration for popular revolt' (189).

But the significant question perhaps is not why Congress became militant, but the fact that it did acquire a sharper, more radical stance. The Congress had become in fact a protean creature, attempting to satisfy in a multitude of ideological guises a wide range of political and economic wants. But it was certainly no longer confined merely to an urban élite.

However, the charge that giving power to the Congress was to place power in the hands of the 'hereditary oppressors' of the Indian masses had an apparent ring of truth. Despite its rhetoric, the Congress was little inclined to support those at the bottom of the social pyramid, the share-croppers and agricultural labourers, for instance (190). Nor was it sympathetic to the urban proletariat. Gandhian notions of 'trusteeship' visualized a well-tempered society, but not an egalitarian one.

Nevertheless, the charge rested on the false premiss that under British rule things were different. British imperialism also supported an exploitative, hierarchical structure, especially in the countryside. Indeed, given its dependence upon the support of Zamindars, big landlords and Princes, the Raj had a vested interest in perpetuating

the existing social structure. Although enlightened attempts were occasionally made to regulate, through tenancy legislation, the way in which the structure operated, the paternalistic concern for the peasant did not extend to any ideas of radically restructuring rural India.

Admittedly, the Congress also derived, in certain regions, support from the rich rural peasant, and was therefore unlikely to desire any radical change. But it also had links to the urban bourgeoisie and contained within itself small but increasingly significant groups of enlightened radicals. The Congress was thus subjected to several forces which perhaps gave it a changing ideology, but one which increasingly acquired a radical tinge.

The die-hard campaign in Britain thus rested on an inability to shed old and outworn images of India and of the British role there. Although the campaign got entangled in the internecine conflicts within the Conservative Party, thus suggesting that the Indian question was merely being used as a convenient excuse for attacking a section of the Party élite, in reality the campaign was serious. The die-hards considered the Empire inviolate, even sacred , hence the stridency of their campaign for its defence. This made it seem as though the British public were polarized into those for Indian self-government and those against. The reality was much more complex. Left-wing critics of Empire, for example, were also hostile to the nationalists, as were some of those clergymen who were sympathetic in principle to the cause of Indian political advance. Business interests were subjected to contradictory pressures as well: their desire to preserve the Indian Empire with their vast investments in it was balanced by the need to come to terms with nationalist agitation. Their sense of urgency was perhaps increased by the growth of terrorism and the

apparently increasing militancy of the Congress itself, and thus prompted attempts - such as that of the Indian branch of the Imperial Chemical Industries - to intervene in the political debate. Then again, not all the businessmen were inclined to see the need for compromise. The younger ones, who formed themselves into a right-wing 'ginger group' in Calcutta, not having experienced, perhaps, the full force of militant nationalism, were apt to believe in the possibility of completely extinguishing the fires of Indian nationalism.

The White Paper debate did not precipitate a radical shift in British perceptions, but it set in motion an intellectual flux. Debates, discussions, questions raised and answered, all compelled a renewed examination of Britain's role in India, and while the constitutional juggernaut moved slowly on the British public found itself in the middle of a propaganda war.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1. Philip Williamson, '"Party first and India second": the Appointment of the Viceroy of India in 1930', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research (London), 56 (1983), pp. 86-101

2. Such fears persisted. See for example Greenway to Samuel Hoare, 14 January 1933, copy in Baldwin Papers, 106

3. Willingdon to Reading, 29 April 1931, Reading Papers, 118/106

4. ibid.

5. Malcolm Hailey to S.F. Stewart, 25 April 1931, Stewart Papers, 9

6. Sydenham to Mark Hunter, 4 May 1931, Stuart Papers, c.620. See also the enclosure with Sydenham to Mark Hunter, 5 May 1931, loc. cit. (This was a letter from Col. Logan Horne to his uncle.)

7. Rothermere to Sydenham, 13 May 1931, enclosed with Sydenham to Mark Hunter, 14 May 1931, Stuart Papers, c.620

8. Sydenham to Mark Hunter, 12 May 1931, Stuart Papers, c.620. According to Sydenham, Rothermere also subscribed to this opinion.

9. Willingdon to MacDonald, 29 May 1931, MacDonald Papers, 698

10. Reading to Willingdon, 29 May 1931, and 12 June 1931, Reading Papers, 118/106

11. Willingdon to Reading, 21 June 1931, Reading Papers, 118/106

12. C.F. Andrews to Sankey, 11 June 1931, Sankey Papers, c.538

13. C.F. Andrews to J.R. MacDonald, 24 June 1931, MacDonald Papers, 698

14. MacDonald to Andrews, 29 June 1931, MacDonald Papers, 677

15. Sydenham to Mark Hunter, 4 May 1931, Stuart Papers, c. 620

16. Copy of the Report by C.J. Smith, 4 May 1931, in Stuart Papers, c. 620

17. ibid.

18. John Leach to Louis Stuart, 23 April 1931, Stuart Papers, c. 620

19. Report by C.J. Smith, 4 May 1931, Stuart Papers, c.620

20. C.F. Andrews to Irwin, 8 June 1931, copy in Sankey Papers, c.538

21. Willingdon to Reading, 19 July 1931, Reading Papers, 118/106

22. ibid. Willingdon laid the blame for all this on what he called the 'wretched old settlement' which prevented effective administration of the country.

23. Malcolm Hailey to Sankey, 25 May 1931, Sankey Papers, c.538. Hailey's argument was that if this were left for later, Congress would come to power whereas if it were done immediately 'responsible men' could be got into the Ministries.

24. Sydenham to Mark Hunter, 1 June 1931, Stuart Papers, c.620

25. Sydenham to Mark Hunter, 5 June 1931, Stuart Papers, c.620

26. For this view, see Carl Bridge, 'Conservatism and Indian Reform (1929-1939): Towards a Prerequisite Model in Imperial Constitution Making', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 4 (1976), pp. 176-93

27. Hoare to Willingdon, 2 September 1931, Templewood Papers, 1

28. See James Hunt, Gandhi in London, New Delhi, 1978

29. Hoare to Willingdon, 25 September 1931, Templewood Papers, 1. See also the note by Irwin, 25 September 1931, recording his conversation with Gandhi and Malaviya, Sankey Papers, c.539. Irwin told Gandhi that MPs whom Gandhi had addressed had been disappointed by his demand for full and immediate control of the Army, Finance, and Foreign Policy, and that they felt that he was looking for an opportunity to wreck the Conference.

30. Hoare to Willingdon, 2 October 1931, Templewood Papers, 1

31. Horace Alexander to Robert Stopford, 1 October 1931, Stopford Papers,8 . Alexander thought that, unless MacDonald changed his attitude, it would be better if he and Gandhi did not meet again.

32. Jawaharlal Nehru to Gandhi, 11 September 1931 and enclosures, extracts in B.N. Pandey (ed.), The Indian Nationalist Movement, 1885-1947: Select Documents, London and Basingstoke, 1979, pp. 68-70

33. Telegram, Government of India to Secretary of State, 18 September 1931, copy in Sankey Papers, c. 539

34. Record of conversation between Sankey and Gandhi, 13 September 1931, Sankey Papers, c.539

35. ibid.

36. Robert Stopford to J.T.A. Stopford, 13 November 1931, Stopford Papers, 2

37. From 21 September 1931 to 9 December 1932, £67,501,216 worth of gold from India reached Britain: see 273 H.C.Deb.5s., 31

38. B.R. Tomlinson, 'The Indian Currency Crisis, 1930-2', Economic History Review, 32 (1979), pp. 88-99

39. 278 H.C.Deb.5s., 742-3

40. Carl Bridge,'"Britain and the Indian Currency Crisis, 1930-2": a Comment', Economic History Review, 34 (1981), pp. 301-4. See also Tomlinson's response, ibid., pp. 305-7

41. Cmd 3972 of 1931

42. Francis Younghusband, 'The Indian Round Table Conference', Contemporary Review, 14 (January 1932), pp. 1-8

43. Earl Winterton, 'The Indian Impasse', Fortnightly Review, 13 (January 1932), pp. 1-7

44. See 260 H.C.Deb.5s., 1101-1218, 1287-1412 (2,3 December 1931); 83 H.L.Deb.5s., 299-368, 371-434 and 437-83 (8, 9, 10 December 1931). In the Commons, Churchill's amendment was defeated, 369 to 43, while in the Lords, Middleton's adjournment motion was defeated 106 to 58

45. Samuel Hoare to Willingdon, 31 December 1931, Templewood Papers 1,

46. Willingdon to Baldwin, 17 January 1932, Baldwin Papers, 105

47. Hoare to Willingdon, 8 January 1932, Templewood Papers, 1

48. M.R. Jayakar to Sankey, 31 January 1932, Sankey Papers, c.539

49. Eleanor Rathbone to MacDonald, 9 February 1932, MacDonald Papers, 703. She also claimed that the Home Member had told a friend of hers that the Indian agitators should be shot.

50. Hoare to Willingdon, 12 February 1932, Templewood Papers, 1

51. New Statesman,3 (9 January 1932), p. 29

52. Lothian to Lloyd George, 12 March 1932, Lloyd George Papers. G/12/5/30

53. MacDonald to Willingdon, 31 March 1932, MacDonald Papers, 678

54. 262 H.C.Deb.5s., 752, 819-21, 845-8

55. Hoare to Willingdon, 11 March 1932, Templewood Papers, 1

56. For details about the formation and activities of the India Conciliation Group, see Hugh Tinker, 'The India Conciliation Group, 1931-1950: Dilemmas of the Mediator', Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 14 (1976), pp. 224-41

57. See various papers dealing with this in Box 41, Harrison Papers

58. This can be inferred from Carl Heath's circular letter to Friends, 16 August 1932, Box 41, Harrison Papers. Heath expressed surprise that Friends should evince such feelings, as the basic thought of the Society of Friends was in favour of human liberation, irrespective of colour, race, creed or nationality.

59. Carl Heath to MacDonald, 8 April 1932, MacDonald Papers, 678

60. Hoare to MacDonald, 13 April 1932, MacDonald Papers, 678

61. MacDonald to Carl Heath, 13 April 1932, loc. cit.

62. Hoare to Willingdon, 22 April 1932, Templewood Papers, 2

63. The Newsletter, 16 April 1932

64. H.G. Alexander to Sankey, 23 April 1932, Sankey Papers, c.539

65. Arthur St John to Sankey, 25 April 1932, Sankey Papers, c.539

66. Statement published in the Indian Review, 30 April 1932, copy in the Lansbury Papers, Vol. 23

67. Copy of Resolution of 11 May 1932, in Sankey Papers, c.540

68. Manchester Guardian, 4 April 1932

69. Copy in Sankey Papers, c.540. Signatories of this letter were: William Temple, Archbishop of York; George St. Clair, Bishop of Salisbury; George Bell, Bishop of Chichester; W. Wilson Cash; A.W. Davies; H.W Fox; R.M. Gray; Carl Heath; G. Hickman Johnson, P.T.R. Kirk; A.D. Lindsay; Kenneth Maclennan; F.W. Norwood; William Paton; G.E. Philips.

70. R.M. Gray, The Present Deadlock in India, London [1933]

71. Hoare to Willingdon, 19 May 1932, Templewood Papers, 2

72. Hoare to Willingdon, 5 May 1932, Templewood Papers, 2

73. Note, 3 June 1932, by Sankey, who had met Churchill at the Gray's Inn Dinner, Sankey Papers, c. 540

74. Hoare to Willingdon, 27 May 1932, Templewood Papers, 2

75. Hoare to Willingdon, 2 October 1931, Templewood Papers, 1

76. Hoare to Willingdon, 3 March 1932, Templewood Papers, 1

77. Lord Allen to MacDonald, 27 May 1932, MacDonald Papers, 703

78. G.D. Birla to Hoare, 14 March 1932, Templewood Papers, 1

79. Hoare to Willingdon, 1 April 1932, 8 April 1932, Templewood Papers, 1

80. Birla to Lothian, 4 May 1932, Lothian Papers, 151

81. Note,23 June 1932, by Lothian, Lothian Papers, 154

82. Willingdon to MacDonald, 12 July 1932, MacDonald Papers, 703

83. ibid.

84. New Statesman, 13 February 1932 and 20 February 1932

85. MacDonald to Hoare, 21 July 1932, MacDonald Papers, 698

86. Cmd 4147, 1931-2, xviii, 965 ff.

87. The Times 17 August 1932

88. New Statesman, 20 August 1932

89. Daily Worker, 17 August 1932

90. New Statesman, 17 September 1932

91. C.F. Andrews to MacDonald, 25 September 1932, MacDonald Papers, 698

92. See note, 14 September 1932 by H.A.F. Rumbold of the India Office, and Andrews to Lothian, 15 September 1932, Lothian Papers, 154. Lothian considered the suggestions of Andrews to be impractical. Note, 19 September 1932, by Lothian, loc. cit.

93. Note, 14 September 1932, by R.H. Carter of the India Office, Lothian Papers, 155

94. Telegram, Birla to Lothian, 13 September 1932, Lothian Papers, 151. Walter Layton to MacDonald, 14 September 1932, MacDonald Papers, 678

95. Emmeline Pethick Lawrence to MacDonald, 15 September 1932, MacDonald Papers, 1442

96. Note, 14 September 1932, by H.A.F. Rumbold, recording conversation with Coatman, Lothian Papers, 154

97. New Statesman, 17 September 1932

98. Hoare to Willingdon, 22 September 1932, Templewood Papers, 2

99. New Statesman, 1 October 1932

100. Bernard Houghton, 'The Communal Award and Gandhi', Labour Monthly , 14 (December, 1932), pp. 765-8

101. William Paton to MacDonald, 28 September 1932 , MacDonald Papers, 698

102. Hoare to Willingdon, 5 October 1932, Templewood Papers,2

103. Hoare to Willingdon, 27 October 1932, Templewood Papers, 2

104. Willingdon to Lothian, 21 October 1932, Lothian Papers, 163

105. Michael Sadler to Margaret Cousins, 15 September 1932, copy in MacDonald Papers, 1442

106. Hoare to Willingdon, 1 July 1932, Templewood Papers, 2

107. Hoare to Willingdon, 14 October 1932, loc. cit.

108. United Empire, 17 (November 1926), p. 630

109. For a discussion of the origins and activities of the India League, see K.I. Vijay, 'British Opinion and Indian Independence: A Study of Some British Pressure Groups which Advanced the Cause of Indian Independence', M.Phil. Thesis, University of London, 1971

110. I.M. Stephens, Director of Public Information, Government of India, to H. MacGregor, Information Officer, India Office, 24 October 1932, L/I/1/50-16/6

111. Please see below (*)

112. Bertrand Russell, India: Know the Facts, London, 1932

113. Note, 8 December 1932, India Office, L/I/1/50-16/6

114. Private Report on the India League Conference, 26 November 1932, India Office, L/I/1/50-16/6

115. See Agatha Harrison to Pyarelal, 24 August 1932, Harrison Papers, Box 41

116. Carl Heath to various people, 5 January 1933, Harrison Papers, Box 41. The replies referred to are also in this Box.

117. See Stephen Koss, Nonconformity in Modern British Politics, London, 1975; W.L. Guttsman, The British Political Elite , London, 1963, pp. 169-70

118. George Thomas, Christian Indians and Indian Nationalism, 1885-1950: An Interpretation in Historical and Theological Perspectives, Frankfurt am Main, 1979, pp. 190-200

119. Arthur Hirtzel, The Church, the Empire and the World: Addresses on the Work of the Church Abroad, London, 1919

120. Maude Royden to MacDonald, 1 November 1932, and MacDonald to Royden, 2 November 1932, MacDonald Papers, 678; see also Agatha Harrison to Sankey, 5 November 1932, Harrison Papers, Box 47, and Hugh Tinker, 'India Conciliation Group'

121. Winston Churchill, 'India May Still be Saved from Disaster', Daily Mail, 14 October 1932

*111. Note, 23 November 1932 by H. MacGregor, and Note, 26 November 1932, by H.A.F. Rumbold, India Office, L/I/1/50-16/6

122. Charles Mallet to Lord Crewe, 6 November 1932, Crewe Papers, Box M/9(12)

123. Crewe to Morison, 23 November 1932, Crewe Papers, M/9(12). Crewe and his associates were very reluctant to be linked to the die-hards. Ultimately, Salisbury's'team'consisted of Linlithgow, Burnham, Edward Cadogan and Wardlaw-Milne: Salisbury to Crewe, 28 November 1932, loc. cit.

124. Zetland to Crewe, 21 November 1932, loc. cit.

125. Crewe to Morison, 23 November 1932, loc. cit.

126. Charles Mallet to Crewe, 30 November 1932, loc. cit.

127. For text of Memorandum and discussions among its authors, see Meston Papers, 37

128. Crewe to Meston, 8 December 1932, Meston Papers, 37

129. Lothian to Willingdon, 28 December 1932, Lothian Papers, 165. See also Editorial in Time and Tide, January 1933

130. Willingdon to Lothian, 13 January 1933, Lothian Papers, 165

131. Greenway to Hoare, 6 January 1933, 14 January 1933, copies in Baldwin Papers, 106. Greenway also drew parallels with Ireland.

132. Duchess of Atholl to Baldwin, 20 February 1933, Baldwin Papers, 106

133. Elliott Lockhart to Duchess of Atholl, 26 January 1933, Atholl Papers, 5

134. ibid.

135. Duchess of Atholl to Meston, 21 January 1933, Meston Papers, 37

136. Duchess of Atholl to Meston, 10 February 1933, 1 March 1933, Meston Papers, 37

137. Memorandum, 'Suggestions as to points to be put before Government before issue of White Paper', by Duchess of Atholl, enclosed with Atholl to Meston, 3 February 1933, Meston Papers, 37

138. Cadogan to Louis Stuart, 27 February 1933, Stuart Papers, c.609

139. R.R. James, Memoirs of a Conservative: J.C.C. Davidson's Memoirs and Papers, 1910-1937, London, 1969, p. 395

140. See for example J.P. Hewett to Clifton-Brown, 30 January 1933, copy in Stuart Papers, c.609

141. A notable example is V.A. Smith, Indian Constitutional Reform viewed in the Light of History, London, 1919; Smith tried to argue that, because India was used to autocratic rule, democratic constitutions were unsuitable. [Referred to in A.L. Basham, 'Modern Historians of Ancient India', in C.H. Philips (ed.), Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, London, 1961]

142. Hoare to Baldwin, 9 January 1933, Baldwin Papers, 106

143. Sunday Times, 6 January 1933

144. Sapru to MacDonald, 5 February 1933, MacDonald Papers, 679

145. Sapru to Hoare, 5 February 1933, copy in loc. cit.

146. Frances Stewart to MacDonald, 16 February 1933, MacDonald Papers, 1443

147. Annual Council Resolution, 7 March 1933, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), WILPF Papers, 4/2. The League was founded in 1915 to bring together women for the cause of peace.

148. Eleanor Rathbone to Lothian, 7 March 1933, 28 April 1933, Lothian Papers, 166. The British Committee for Indian Women's Franchise consisted of the Association of Assistant Mistresses, Association of Women Clerks and Secretaries, British Federation of University Women, Headmistresses' Association, London and National Society for Women's Service, National Council of Women, the National Council for Equal Citizenship, Standing Joint Committee of Industrial Women's Organizations, Women's National Liberal Federation, Women's Co-operative Guild, and the YWCA. See also Rathbone to Baldwin, 6 March 1933, Baldwin Papers, 106, and correspondence in Lothian Papers, 164, from the Women's Freedom League, and St. Joan's Social and Political Alliance.

149. Note, 20 March 1933, by Lothian; R.A. Butler to Lothian, 8 March 1933, Lothian Papers, 166

150. F. Victor Fisher, The Threatened Indian Chaos, Indian Empire Society, London, May 1933

151. See Page Croft to Hoare, 4 April 1933, Croft Papers, 1/14. See also Churchill to Salisbury, 1 April 1933, copy in Croft Papers, 1/8

152. Churchill to Page Croft, 31 March 1933, Croft Papers, 1/8

153. Lothian to Herbert Samuel, 24 March 1933, Samuel Papers, A94

154. Reported in Hailey to Willingdon, 26 April 1933, Hailey Papers, 34

155. Daily Telegraph, 15 May 1933

156. Hailey to Willingdon, 6 May 1933, Hailey Papers, 34

157. Telegram from ICI India (Calcutta) to H. McGowan, Chairman ICI, 21 June 1933, copy enclosed with McGowan to Baldwin, 22 June [1933], Baldwin Papers, 106.

158. Quoted in W.J. Reader, 'Imperial Chemical Industries and the State, 1926-1945', in Barry Supple (ed.), Essays in British Business History, Oxford, 1977, pp. 227-43

159. See D.K. Fieldhouse, 'Decolonisation and the Multinational Company: Unilever in India, 1917-65', in Paul Bairoch and Maurice Lévy-Leboyer (eds.), Disparities in Economic Development since the Industrial Revolution, London and Basingstoke, 1981, pp. 58-64

160. J.C.C. Davidson to Irwin, 9 November 1929, in R.R. James, Memoirs of a Conservative, pp. 308-10

161. Willingdon to Baldwin, 5 May 1933, Baldwin Papers, 106

162. Anderson to Samuel, 18 May 1933, Samuel Papers, A94

163. Thomas Jones, entry for 28 July 1932, A Diary with Letters, pp. 48-9, London

164. Lionel Curtis to Lothian, 28 October 1932, Lothian Papers, 163

165. Stanley Reed to Lothian, 27 November 1932, Lothian Papers, 163

166. Camberley Committee on India, Pamphlet No. 2, 'India and some little known Indian opinion', (April) 1933, copy in Thompson Papers, 53

167. See Hailey to Willingdon, 12 May 1933, Hailey Papers, 34

168. Hoare to Willingdon, 3 March 1933, 23 March 1933, Templewood Papers, 3

169. R.A. Butler to J.P. Thompson, 1 May 1933 and enclosures, Thompson Papers, 49

170. R.A. Butler to Thompson, 11 May 1933, Thompson Papers, 49. See also Hoare to Willingdon, 5 May 1933, Templewood Papers,3

171. Hoare to Willingdon, 12 May 1933, Templewood Papers, 3

172. See Goschen to Thompson, 29 March 1934, Thompson Papers, 49

173. See Thompson to Reading, 23 October 1930, Reading Papers, 118/108

174. Circular, 23 May 1933, Thompson Papers, 49

175. See Lane-Fox to Edward Villiers, 20 May 1933, Thompson Papers, 49

176. M.J. Ottley to the Secretary, UBI, 26 June 1933, Thompson Papers, 49

177. P. Sturrock to Secretary, UBI, 26 June 1933, Thompson Papers, 49

178. E.N. Spear to Secretary, UBI, 19 June 1933, loc. cit

179. Meston to Thompson, 31 May 1933, Thompson Papers, 49. See also Meston to Louis Stuart, 6 July 1933, Stuart Papers, c.609, and other letters in this collection which reveal Meston's growing disenchantment with the Indian Empire Society

180. For a discussion of this conflict, see Gillian Peele, 'Revolt Over India', in Gillian Peele and Chris Cook (eds.), The Politics of Reappraisal, 1918-1939, London and Basingstoke, 1975

181. Note, 22 March 1933, by H. MacGregor, India Office Records, L/I/1/50-16/6

182. Note, 14 October 1933, by H. MacGregor, loc. cit.

183. MacGregor to Davies, 18 October 1933, loc. cit.

184. Duchess of Atholl, Main Facts of the Indian Problem, London, 1933

185. Blackwood's Magazine, July 1933. Reprinted also as an India Defence League pamphlet

186. J.C.C. Davidson to Baldwin, 29 February 1932, R.R. James, Memoirs of a Conservative, p. 390

187. See Bipan Chandra, 'The Indian Capitalist Class and Imperialism before 1947', Journal of Contemporary Asia (Sweden), 5 (1975), pp. 309-26; David Hardiman, Peasant Nationalists of Gujerat: Kheda District, 1917-1934 , Delhi, 1981; Rajat and Ratna Ray, 'Zamindars and Jotedars : A Study of Rural Politics in Bengal', Modern Asian Studies, 9 (1975), pp. 81-102.

188. Gyanendra Pandey, The Ascendancy of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh, 1926-34: A Study in Imperfect Mobilization, Delhi, 1978, p. 217

189. ibid., p. 211

190. Rajat and Ratna Ray, 'Zamindars and Jotedars' ,

## 6. The Final Compromise: the Making of the Government of India Act, 1935

The breakdown of the long-standing British consensus over India and the consequent emergence of deep and real divisions tended to accelerate the programme of reform. The imperial façade had till then concealed such divisions, and the mystique of a non-partisan policy on India had helped to obscure dissentient opinions. But, it appeared, the façade had been shattered, and, if a new India policy was to be forged, it had to be done quickly, before opposition grew too strong.

British policy-makers were perhaps spurred also by the signs of growing militancy in India, reflected in the creation of the Congress Socialist Party or in the rejection by the Indian nationalists of the White Paper proposals. One of the unstated aims of the new constitutional proposals was the strengthening of structures of collaboration in India which had been weakened by repeated waves of mass agitation. If potential collaborators were to be rescued before they too were engulfed by the menacing tide of militancy, the new constitution had to be hammered out quickly.

There was another, probably more important reason for speed: the world economic crisis showed no signs of disappearing, and it

perhaps became more necessary than ever before to solve the Indian problem rapidly and with the greatest advantage to British interests. India had not yet ceased to be an economic asset. Even if trade with India constituted only a tiny segment of the British economy, in a period of economic stress it became a vital segment. Any market assumes importance in a crisis, and, despite the apparently increasing fiscal autonomy of India, there were benefits that could be reaped by the retention of India in the Empire. Dietmar Rothermund has shown for instance how the Indian foreign trade became an important source of revenue for the Government of India, and a means for the transfer of funds to Britain (1).

But it was no longer possible to control India's economy through imperial fiat. Indeed, it was a recognition of this which increased the reluctance of some British groups to yield more political power to India. At the same time, it was becoming increasingly evident that only through mediation and compromise could a solution be formulated that would be acceptable to British and Indian economic interests alike. The informal arrangement between Indian and British cotton textile interests was an example of such mediation and compromise (2).

Some British businessmen recognized that Indian industry was entitled to a reasonable level of protection against import of goods from the UK, especially cotton goods, but at the same time they wanted an acknowledgement from the Indians that there was no damaging competition from Lancashire, and also a higher level of protection against other foreign producers, like the Japanese. British industrialists, in effect, were seeking to form an alliance with the Indians against the Japanese, the main contenders for the lucrative Indian market (3). The Indian market was no longer a captive market, and agreements such

as these had to be negotiated to protect an industry already damaged by the world depression. Yet there was no doubt that the longer India remained within the Empire, the longer it would be possible to exert influences in favour of British trade at the negotiating tables. Ostensibly, for instance, the agreement reached between Indian and Japanese textile manufacturers restricting imports from Japan was one designed to benefit the Indian cotton grower and manufacturer. But it also served to help Lancashire, by diminishing the fiercely competitive imports from Japan, although the Cotton Trade League of Manchester, for one, was inclined to doubt the benefits accruing to them as a result of the Indo-Japanese agreement (4).

The urgency of, and the need for, Indian reform was, as pointed out, especially evident to some industrialists in Britain, and they were the keenest supporters of the Government's White Paper scheme, which was essentially a design to provide India with a measure of self-government while hedging it around with safeguards that would protect British commercial interests among others. Lord Derby, closely connected with the Lancashire textile industry, was one such, committed to the White Paper proposals, and he was even able to persuade the King to see the need for considerable advances in Indian constitutional reform, to the extent that Samuel Hoare noted a change in the monarch's attitudes (5). If the King represented a conservative focal point, one which acted as the focus for tendencies to preserve the Empire as it was, a change in his attitudes, however small and however private, implied nevertheless that there was a growing inclination among British élites to concede the necessity for change.

Yet, even among those who might have been expected to support the White Paper as a scheme that promised much, there was a strange reluctance to support it, partly caused by the consideration that it

could be used as a political pawn, and partly by a conviction that the White Paper went too far. Lloyd George, for example, was against the White Paper, and thought that Britain ought to keep a strong hand in India, and even advised Reading and Churchill not to serve on the Joint Select Committee, so that they could have a free hand after the Committee's Report was published (6).

It would appear that there was a great deal of concern in the Conservative Party group led by Baldwin that the Indian White Paper might turn out to be its Waterloo, as the opposition to it and the ideas it contained came not only from the die-hards who felt it went too far, but from some, like Josiah Wedgwood, who felt it did not go far enough, and from Indians who rejected the contradiction inherent in it, namely self-government with safeguards. At the same time, Baldwin and his followers saw the White Paper scheme as the golden mean, as it were, between the two extremes of self-government on the one hand and the continuation of coercive British rule with an increasing use of force on the other. The deliberations of the Joint Select Committee attenuated the intensity of the opposition, but could not totally extinguish it, and the die-hards strove to undermine support for the White Paper. Very significantly, the die-hards, while whipping up anti-White-Paper feelings in Britain, attempted to secure the support of the Indian Princes for their campaign.

Since the notion of a federal structure for British India alone was rejected as being impractical and undesirable, the Princes became a crucial factor in determining the course of events. If they rejected the proposals in the White Paper, it would have to be replaced, and thus a struggle for their enthusiastic allegiance was launched. The Morning Post, the most ardent exponent of the die-hard creed, acted as the chief instrument for securing the support of the

Princes for the die-hard cause. H.A. Gwynne, its editor, and Madhava Rao, the Indian Correspondent of the newspaper, made strenuous efforts to secure and retain the support of the Princes. Their efforts were complemented by a series of delegations the Morning Post sent to India. The first of these consisted of Major John Courtald, MP for Chichester, and Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Morning Post, and Viscount Lymington, MP for Basingstoke, and it was intended that they would explain to the Indian Princes why they should oppose the White Paper (7). The second mission to the Princes, which followed hard upon the first, consisted of Captain Spencer-Churchill, and E.W. Russell, the deputy editor of the Morning Post (8). These missions were not only to gather support for the die-hard cause, but were also to counter the pressure that the die-hards believed was being exerted on the Princes by Willingdon, to bend them in favour of the Government policy on India.

The die-hards sought the support of the Princes because they were seen as a conservative force which would act as a counterweight to the process of democratization (9). But this was also one of the unstated reasons for the idea of an All India Federation that embraced the Princes, and this convergence of opinion on an important aspect of the Indian policy could have been used to minimize the conflict and polarization in Britain, but was not utilized to that effect.

What is interesting about the active involvement of the Morning Post in the Indian question is that, unlike the various other British newspapers which were confining themselves to attempted moulding of public opinion, it tried to strike a blow at the White Paper at a more basic level, by securing the opposition of the Princes. There was also the possibility that the Princes could be induced to part with some of their enormous wealth to support the die-hard campaign

in Britain (10).

The Morning Post delegations did not, according to the Government of India, confine themselves to intriguing with the Princes, but sought to conspire with the Hindu Mahasabha as well to stir up the anti-White-Paper agitation (11). The main object of the Morning Post and the India Defence League was to undermine the support for the White Paper proposals, and they were determined to use any possible ally to achieve this object. Their most powerful allies were in the Joint Select Committee, where not only Salisbury, Rankeillour and Reginald Craddock were putting the die-hard case effectively, but others, like Austen Chamberlain, were beginning to argue for fairly radical recasting of the White Paper scheme, especially with regard to the question of indirect elections to the federal legislature. Outside, Hoare got the impression that the agitation against the White Paper was diminishing, except for London, the Home Counties and Lancashire (12).

Inside the Joint Select Committee, however, the die-hards seemed to be winning their battle. In fact, as early as January, R.A. Butler wrote to Brabourne that the main problem was whether to yield on certain points in the White Paper so that the support of the independent Conservatives led by Austen Chamberlain could be secured. It was a case of throwing over parts of one's equipment to save the ship, he added, and, while he appreciated the value of standing pat on the White Paper, and the importance of Indian opinion, politically they could not do without the support of the majority in the Select Committee (13). Butler felt that the Chamberlain group wanted to justify their presence in the Committee by making some alterations in the White Paper scheme, which would also enable them to persuade the progressive sections of the Conservative Party that the scheme was essentially

sound, requiring only such minor changes (14). Chamberlain did think that the basic idea of the White Paper was correct, but felt that the Report of the Committee would not have much authority if it merely approved the White Paper in toto, and was inclined, therefore, to making some changes at the centre (15). It became clear to Hoare, Baldwin, Halifax and other members of the Cabinet, with some of whom Austen Chamberlain conferred, that, unless concessions were made on the issue of indirect elections, there was little hope of securing Parliamentary support for the subsequent Bill on Indian reform (16).

The Government clearly were compelled to surrender to pressure from the die-hards, and were willing to weather the storm of protest that they anticipated from India. Indeed, even before the Committee reported, Indian moderates like Sapru were getting alarmed by newspaper rumours about the possible contents of the Report. Sapru thought that it would be disastrous if the White Paper scheme was further whittled down, as it had few supporters in any case (17). Hoare hoped that criticism of the final Report could be defused by extensive propaganda, especially by the use of news films, in India as well as in England (18). From the correspondence of this period, it is evident that the Government were prepared to resile from their White Paper position, and ultimately did so, for tactical reasons.

Carl Bridge has argued that it was inaccurate to suggest that the die-hards acted as a restraining influence, and that in fact Hoare himself was inclined to favour indirect elections, and was therefore moving in a direction in which he and Baldwin would have liked to move in any case (19). This is true to a certain extent, but, just as no concessions of any kind would have been made without

the pressure exerted by the Indian nationalist movement, the regression from the White Paper position was necessitated by the much more immediate pressure from the die-hard campaign.

Constitution-making in London was always an intricate and delicate task, with pressures and influences from several different positions acting and reacting to produce an end product. This was more so when there was a strange coalition in power in Britain, faced by an acute domestic economic crisis and divisions within the Parties constituting the coalition. While it was true that the Conservative Party was committed to the maintenance of the Raj, there were real differences among Conservatives in their responses to the winds of change summoned up by Indian nationalism.

At one extreme there was the notion that nationalism must be suppressed by full use of the imperial might, and by seeking allies among the conservative elements in India, the Princes. At the other was the idea that the Raj could be made more enduring by striking a bargain with Indian nationalism, the Princes being brought in as a countervailing force. These notions reflected differing perceptions about the strength of the nationalist movement. If it was evident to some that it could no longer be totally extinguished and that excessive force could only further stoke the fire, to others it was still the insignificant activity of a few urban élites, and hence one which could be ground down with no fearsome consequences. It was this difference in perceptions that was at the root of the conflict in Britain between the different shades of Conservative opinion. If indeed the Baldwin group intended to move in the same direction as the die-hards, they would not have needed to create an organization such as the Union of Britain and India to fight the India Defence League in the public arena. There was a struggle for the mind of the British

public, and the struggle was real.

At the same time, this struggle tended to obscure, by its own intensity, the fact that there were others in Britain who fell into neither the group that supported the White Paper nor into the one that opposed it altogether (20). Indian voices and those of their allies in Britain were drowned by the clamour in Britain caused by the conflict between the Government and its die-hard opponents. It was in the nature of the circumstances of the time that this should be so, and, although there was a wide range of opinions, these tended to be subsumed by the fiercely polarized struggle between the Government and the die-hards.

It was a struggle, at once for the preservation of the British Raj and for dominance in the Conservative Party, and India became an important element, unusually so, even in British electoral politics. At various by-elections held at this time, India and the Government's policies towards India were examined and pronounced upon (21).

One European political phenomenon which struck a responsive chord in Britain, albeit a minor one, was the rise of Fascism. The reincarnation of the erstwhile socialist, Oswald Mosley, as a leader of the British fascists, and the rise of the Blackshirts, necessarily impinged on imperial and Indian politics, and added a new dimension to an already complex problem. To the fascists, Empire was all, and, as they considered it absurd to contemplate self-government for India, they opposed the White Paper policy totally (22). This ranged the fascists on the same side as the die-hards, who could not have been too pleased by this unsolicited alliance. More significantly, however, this development probably gave an added impetus to the Government to push on with Indian reform. Similarly, the emergence in India of the Congress Socialist Party with a programme of radical economic

change, must have quickened the desire to reach a settlement with more moderate elements. The decision of the Congress leaders to formally cease civil disobedience (which had, in fact, been all but suppressed long before) created the political atmosphere in which such a settlement could be reached more easily.

Yet the continuing conflict between the die-hards and the Baldwin wing prevented an easy transition in India. An examination of this conflict is useful, for it reveals the breakdown of the consensus politics which had hitherto been the norm for determining India policy, and at the same time indicates the manner in which the two groups sought to manipulate public opinion. India intruded upon the British public as it never had since the Mutiny. Even the BBC, which had, as a rule, abjured discussion of Indian politics, decided to allow a series of broadcasts on India, and the presses of Britain poured forth a large number of tracts, pamphlets, books and leaflets on India, as the major contenders in the arena sought to project an image of India that would support their ideas on Indian reform. The most assiduous of these were the members of the India Defence League, and they were also visibly the most ostentatious. In the first place, the League had the advantage of total access to the journal of the Indian Empire Society, the Indian Empire Review. This monthly journal, edited by Sir Louis Stuart, had been started in 1931 (with Sir Mark Hunter as the editor), and carried articles and reviews expounding the die-hard view of India and Indian politics, besides carrying regular reports about the activities of the India Defence League, and of the Indian Empire Society, which, strangely, retained its separate identity, at least nominally, despite the greater fame of its doppelgänger sibling. Unlike other groups (the India League, for example) of the period, the Indian Empire Society was financially well

supported, evidently so, for the journal appeared regularly, and was very well designed, running to about 80-100 quarto pages. The Indian Empire Society was ostensibly supported by subscriptions, but the India Defence League had an apparently wider range of sources of support. It was not merely the 'bottomless purse' of Lady Houston which sustained the activities of the India Defence League, as R.A. Butler imagined (23). The League presumably secured funds from the Princes in India, and quite appropriately the suggestion that the 'die-hard' fund, collected by the Morning Post to save Ireland, should now be converted into one that would be used to save India was seriously considered (24). Baldwin thought that Rothermere also provided large sums for the 'anti-Government' campaign on India (25).

The result of this affluence was a journal that looked very impressive, and an organization that could maintain an intensive campaign. The die-hards were also aided by the fact that they were propagating an idea that merely reinforced existing conceptions about India. The notion that Indians were a benighted people incapable of ruling themselves without the help of the British died hard, and, in terms of opinion-moulding, the India Defence League had a relatively easy task. All it had to do was to persuade people that nothing had changed in India, and the paradigm of the 'unchanging East' was one that could be taken advantage of. The Government, on the other hand, had the much more difficult task of convincing people that Indians had advanced sufficiently to be given a measure of self-government, but not enough to be allowed a totally free rein.

The Press also seemed to be enthusiastically supporting the die-hard cause. While the Morning Post was at the forefront, waging its great battle for India, the more widely circulated Daily Mail and the Daily Express joined the well orchestrated chorus of opposition to the Government's India policy. The Daily Mail even published a

'Blue Book' on India, priced only one penny, with a slogan that encapsulated its philosophy: 'Save India for the Empire' (26). In a foreword to this pamphlet, Lord Carson of Duncairn declared:

> The proposal to abdicate British rule in India -
> for disguise it as you will, that is the reality -
> is the most vital for us and for India that has arisen
> within the lifetime of the present generation.

Sir Michael O'Dwyer delineated the results of such an abdication in his essay for the 'Blue Book' entitled 'The Betrayal of our Trust'. The loss of India, O'Dwyer argued, would mean the loss of the hundreds of millions of British capital, bring misery to hundreds of millions of Indian 'fellow subjects', and poverty to millions of British workers who depended for their livelihood on the annual trade of 200 million pounds between India and Britain. It was immaterial if the figures that O'Dwyer was using were accurate or not. It was the implicit argument that was significant. In striking and stark phrases, it reached out to British capitalist and worker alike, and also managed to reiterate concern for the Indian 'masses'.

The Daily Mail 'Blue Book' also reprinted a series of articles by Rothermere which had earlier been published in the newspaper, and in these the well worn arguments about the artificial character of Indian nationalism, the corruption and inefficiency of Indians, the problem of communalism, and the inability of India to defend herself were brought out again. The purpose of the 'Blue Book' was of course to present a negative image of India, and this was done not only through these articles, but also through selected statistics and the choice of pictures which showed riot scenes, victims of terrorist attacks, animal sacrifices and such other images of India as would serve to reinforce traditional notions of India.

With a circulation of nearly 2 million, and a readership drawn from the lower middle-class, the Daily Mail was a potent propagandist

for the die-hard cause, for what it was saying about India struck a responsive echo in its readers, for many of whom India was a distant, exotic land peopled by unlettered and superstitious peasants and held together only by the British Raj.

What is of interest in such image-reinforcing propaganda is the fact that it blurred the ability to perceive the reality of the Indian situation. Whatever was happening in India was seen through a distorting prism, as it were, and this meant, in turn, that people could not slough off the traditional ideas about India which clung to them with greater intensity. The gulf between the objective reality and the subjective perception of it was significant because it was the nature of the perception that determined the attitudes of the public. For instance, it was a basic tenet of the die-hards that they could not allow Indian nationalists to acquire any real power because they would only use it to further oppress the masses. Their propaganda reinforced this idea and a self-sustaining circle of ideas was thus set up.

There were many others too who held such ideas about the Indian nationalists. What distinguished the die-hards was their unwillingness to change their attitudes. Baldwin had recognized that it was necessary to adapt to the changed circumstances. He had told Thomas Jones in February 1932 that: 'Rightly or wrongly we have done with the old India; there's a new one afoot and we must make the best of it' (27). The divergence of die-hard attitudes towards Indian reform had several reasons. As predominantly deriving from the British landowning classes, they probably felt a greater kinship with the Indian landlords and entertained a natural antipathy towards the Indian capitalists and their partners, the nationalists. True, the Congress received support from rural rich peasants in many areas,

and their alliance with the Indian capitalists was tenuous and shifting (28). But the traditional image of the Indian nationalist as an urban Hindu persisted, and the die-hards refused to explore beneath the surface to discover the roots of Congress. Perhaps this image was reinforced also by the loyalty to the Empire displayed by the big landlords of Punjab and their peasant allies (29). The loyalty of these 'feudal' elements contrasted strongly with the hostility of the apparently urban nationalists, and thus strengthened die-hard sympathy for the Indian landlords.

There were some die-hards who were involved in commercial activity, of course. But this involvement was limited to certain specific areas. An analysis of the commercial connections of the India Defence League, for example, shows that, of the 47 MPs who were members of the League Council, 27 held no directorships, and those who held directorships were connected primarily with foreign investment funds, railway companies, and tea plantations in India (30). These were areas in which there was little or no Indian competition and the investors had few grounds for apprehension. But the countervailing factor was the fear that Congress would repudiate India's debts, and confiscate British assets in India, and this fear produced a reluctance to countenance any plan that gave Indians a greater control of their economy.

These fears were sharpened perhaps by economic changes in India. Shares of many companies were passing into Indian hands, and blurring the distinctions between British and Indian capital (31). Even more significantly, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry launched an attack on the managing agency system, suggesting that contracts should be limited to 25 years at the end of which the 'managed' company would have the option of revision. As most of

the managing agencies were British and as the system was a highly profitable one, the move of the Indian Federation caused alarm, prompting Eric Hayward, the chairman of one major managing agency, Waldie and Co. of Calcutta, to write to the Duchess of Atholl, seeking her support (32).

It has been argued that the difference in age between the die-hards and the supporters of the White Paper was one factor which would explain the reluctance of the die-hards to accept the necessity of Indian reform (33). The Union of Britain and India had also argued that most of the important members of the India Defence League had served in India before the Montagu Chelmsford reforms, and hence were unable to accurately judge the potential for change. These factors no doubt serve to partly explain the attitudes of the die-hards, but the economic aspect would seem to be equally important as an explanatory factor. The difference in age was not truly significant, and, as the India Defence League continually pointed out, a large number of the members had returned from India quite recently, having experienced the newly reformed administration. Besides, Members of Parliament attracted to the India Defence League had little actual experience in India, and their stance can be better understood in economic terms.

Carl Bridge has suggested that die-hards and the supporters of the Government's policy shared common perceptions of Indian politics, differing only in the attitudes towards method and procedure (34). But this argument ignores certain fundamental differences. Although both groups wished to perpetuate British rule in India, the die-hards refused to recognize the existence of a strong nationalist movement which transcended provincial and communal boundaries, and they sought to preclude the rise of democratic movements by strengthening the

hands of the Princes and other feudal foci of power and influence. They vociferously opposed the extension of the franchise, rejecting even the limited extension proposed by the Lothian Committee, and made every effort to create an image in Britain of an India that would sink into anarchy if the Government proposals were implemented without alteration.

Thus, in a leaflet entitled 'Facts', the Indian Empire Society declared that (35):

> India has had some twelve years' experience of the Montagu 'Reforms' with grave results. It is now proposed to transfer power into the hands of thirty-five million voters, the majority of whom have not only no conception as to what a vote means, but are in addition illiterate...

In effect the die-hard concept of the Indian polity was one which envisaged no extension of democratic structures.

In a book published in 1934, Hamish Blair, who had written a series of articles on India for the Saturday Review, suggested that the primary task of the British Government was to rescue the peasant, and not to enfranchise him,while in his prefatory remarks Ian Colvin, who had been with the Allahabad Pioneer between 1903 and 1907, and was in 1934 a Morning Post leader writer, observed that the Congress was the Party of Indian 'capitalism', which was trying to drive out British goods from India, expressed the hope that all Conservatives who opposed the Government's policies would form the nucleus of a new Conservative Party (36). In one of his despatches, Blair also sought to raise the bogey of Russian intrigues, especially with the newly emergent Congress Socialist Party, and concluded that what was needed was a little 'timely firmness' which would crush the 'Congress and the nests of vipers, Communistic, Terroristic and the rest, to which it has given rise' (37).

Another fearsome image conjured up by the die-hards to

buttress their theories was the fate of Christian missionaries and Christians in India under a nationalist Government. In a letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury, Sir Henry Page Croft expressed the 'very grave anxieties which are felt by large numbers of Churchmen with reference to the proposed reforms in India', as the fanatical religious feelings of the days of the Indian Mutiny were still latent among Hindus and Muslims. And, he added, 'There are in India 6,000,000 Christians surrounded by overwhelming masses of fanatical members of other religions, and to some of us it appears that their whole chance of employment or advancement and even their lives may be imperilled by the sudden ending of the partnership of Britain and India...' (38). The Archbishop replied that, from the evidence that he had, there was no basis for the apprehensions of Page Croft (39). The General Secretary of the Methodist Missionary Society, the Reverend Edgar Thompson, repudiated the suggestions of Page Croft much more emphatically. Speaking at the annual meeting of the Society, Thompson declared that, 'No body of Indian Christians, and no representative Christian or missionary leader, so far as I am aware, has ever given Sir Henry Page Croft any support in this view'. He added, 'We do not deplore the reform scheme as an abdication by England of her responsibility for India's welfare and progress; rather we welcome it as a vindication and fulfilment of England's mission to India' (40). A number of Indian missionaries and missionary leaders also rejected Page Croft's ideas as baseless (41).

Sir Henry himself was unwilling, despite this chorus of disapproval, to jettison his ideas of the endangered Cross. The confidence of the missionaries was over-optimistic, he stated, and cited the Moplah rebellion and other communal conflicts as evidence of the inflammable nature of religious feeling in India. 'Can anyone

contemplate without the gravest concern the position of any religious minority when the police and the judiciary have passed from British to Indian hands, and how can we be sure that Christians would be immune from such animosities?' Croft asked, and went on to criticize the Indian missionaries for seeking to dissociate themselves from the British Raj and European civilization. The day Christianity and the British flag were divorced, he added, the former would have lost the main medium through which it was established around the world, and the main inspiration of British civilization would have been destroyed (42). Croft's efforts to stir up fears of a Hindu Raj in India decimating Christians there bore no fruit because very few influential Christians supported him. Besides, it was evident to any perceptive observer of the Indian scene that the Christian in India had nothing to fear from the nationalist, even if the missionaries from Europe anticipated some curbs on their freedom to propagate the Gospel.

The die-hards were successful, however, in creating in many constituencies a feeling that the proposals of the Government on India were fraught with danger not only for Britain but for the Indian masses as well. It was acknowledged by the supporters of the Government that they could not, in many areas, counter the effective propaganda of the India Defence League, especially since members of the League appeared to be capable of exerting much greater influence locally (43). The India Defence League had, from the beginning, rapidly developed a network of local branches, each with its own organizational structure, and this provided it with a fairly effective platform for putting across its views. The Union of Britain and India, on the contrary, began to consider the setting up of local committees only about August 1934 (44). The battle between the India Defence League

and the Union of Britain and India intensified from this time, and, although the Joint Select Committee was the chief instrument of determining policy, the struggle for public support went on undiminished. It was, on one level, an intra-party struggle. But, by waging it in public, the two bodies kept the debate on India at a high pitch and contributed in a substantial measure to increasing public awareness of the Indian problem. But, since the die-hards as well as the supporters of the Union of Britain and India belonged to the Conservative tradition, the debate was conducted within a very limited framework, and it did not do much to totally demolish existing stereotypes of Indian politics.

Public opinion is shaped primarily by two factors: preconceptions, formed by conscious absorption and subconscious assimilation of information, which constitute the internal mental framework, and, secondly, the new information that seeks to alter or reinforce those notions already held. Altering an existing set of ideas is evidently a much more difficult task, since there is inevitably an intellectual resistance to change, especially if the internal framework is strong and well defined. This was another reason why the die-hards were successful in terms of support in the localities. Their propaganda was acting to shore up public opinions that had been formed over decades of British rule over India. The British public had inherited an intellectual image about India and Britain's role there which was lit more by the histories of James Mill and the fiction of Kipling than by the writings of Edward Thompson or E.M. Forster. It was this image which acted as the internal paradigm even in the Thirties, and the implication of die-hard propaganda that nothing had changed fitted in very well. If change in public opinion was desired, it could be secured only by modifying the

internal framework of perception. Although this process had begun, with a significant number of literary and scholarly works questioning assumptions about the British Empire and India, there had been little change in the preconceptions of the vast majority of people, and what change there was was slow.

The slowness of the change was due also to the fact that those who sought to counter the die-hards did not attempt to alter basic assumptions about India. Hugh Tinker, analysing the activities of the India Conciliation Group, has suggested that mediatory groups are constrained to function within parameters set down by those who wield power (45). That is to say, they have to function within the dominant paradigm. The dominant paradigm is not therefore susceptible to change. If groups like the India Conciliation Group were constrained to function within closely defined boundaries, it was even less likely that groups like the Union of Britain and India would attempt to alter the paradigm.

The Union of Britain and India, for example, merely hinted that the consequence of reforms in India would not be anarchy and that what was being attempted was reform in a minor key, as a result of pledges made in the past. In the various pamphlets published by the Union of Britain and India, there was no explicit indication that India had become fit for receiving any measure of self-government. They were primarily defensive statements, seeking to reassure those who were suspicious about the White Paper proposals, and contained few positive statements about Indian development. The first leaflet issued by the Union of Britain and India, entitled Facts about India: Plain Answers to Plain Questions, argued that the White Paper contained adequate safeguards, and that British trade would not suffer. Another leaflet suggested that, if the pledges made to India were not

honoured, ill-will would increase and consequently trade would be affected. Others in the series argued that it was not possible to resile to the Simon Commission recommendations, that the reforms of 1921 had worked, and that terrorism in India need not lead to a rejection of the White Paper, as, on the contrary, such a rejection would further stimulate the terrorist movement (46).

It was in the nature of the political struggle between the two factions of the Conservative Party that there should be little said on the manner in which India was more ready for self-government than before. The consensus on India was breaking down, but it had not yet broken down so irrevocably that the very way in which Indian events were viewed was altered. At other points in the political spectrum, however, there were visible signs that attempts were being made to significantly change the ways in which people saw and thought about the Empire. An example of this was the decision of the London County Council to change 'Empire Day' celebrated in its schools to 'Commonwealth Day'. The Education Committee of the London County Council approved the issue of a circular to schools indicating the change, and suggesting that the celebrations should not be used to encourage among children and students any unworthy feelings of racial superiority or antagonism for the rest of the world (47).

The Chairman of the Royal Empire Society, Sir Archibald Weigall, inveighed against this 'grave mistake', as he termed it, arguing that it would mislead the child, and eliminate from the child's mind the idea that he shared in a great heritage of crown colonies, protectorates and mandated territories. The Royal Empire Society would never change its name to the Royal Commonwealth Society, declared Sir Archibald to cheers from his audience (48). One correspondent to The Times, the Reverend G.S. Hewins, thought that the title, Empire

Day, was full of significance for children, suggesting the greatness of the British Empire, while Commonwealth Day was a weak and meaningless title (49).

This minor tussle about a very obscure aspect of the great Empire has, nevertheless, a significance of its own, since it indicates the subtle shifts that were taking place in attitudes to the Empire. These shifts were necessary if larger changes in the political structure of the Empire were desired. But as yet such shifts, even if evident, did not affect the decision-makers or even those whose opinions influenced the decision-makers. The dominant paradigm was still that which saw India as being in virtually permanent tutelage to Britain. Thus Sir Walter Lawrence recorded in 1934 that, in his opinion, human nature had not changed in 2000 years, and that Oriental character was not suited to democracy and Parliamentary institutions, and therefore the changes that might have occurred in India were meaningless. He regretted the fact that Morley, Montagu and Hoare had made it impossible to return to the Victorian era which culminated with Curzon (50).

Those who saw the viceroyalty of Curzon as the high noon of Empire could not accept the gradual eclipsing of the imperial sun by the despised nationalists, and to such people the very idea of giving away more power and responsibility was anathema. The most extreme of the die-hards wished a return to that glorious past. An example was Sir Lionel Haworth, formerly of the Indian Army and the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India. For him, the Empire was a means by which British traditions, the salvation of the world, could be spread to undeveloped and 'savage' areas (51). Most of the die-hards were not so reactionary in their views and did not cling to such outworn concepts of the role of the Empire. On the other hand,

they did not believe that the time had come for any substantial measure of reform in India. The furthest they were willing to go was to concede responsibility at the provincial level, and even that was to be hedged in by special safeguards to protect law and order. The die-hards were determined that, unless the experiment in reforms was shown to be successful in the provinces, there should be no talk of transfer of any power at the centre. Interestingly, however, despite receiving a significant amount of support, the die-hards did not expect the Government to modify the White Paper proposals to any large extent (52). Yet they carried on their fight relentlessly. Why did they do so? Primarily it was a harking back to the Curzonian dictum that the loss of India would mean the end of the British Empire, and any reforms in India were, in the eyes of the die-hards, certain pathways to that bleak and dismal end. Secondly, the die-hards were seeking to dislodge Baldwin and the new Conservatism that he represented, using India as the crucial lever at that juncture.

But it was this second aspect that perhaps gave the Baldwin group an additional rallying point, for they could ask for, and get, support for Party unity against divisive forces, especially in the face of a serious potential threat from the left wing in British politics. True, a rump of the Labour Party was in the National Government, and thus was the political ally of the Conservatives. But the Thirties were the time for militancy, both on the right and the left, and the fear of the 'socialists' acted as a useful cementing force for the Conservatives.

It was this which led Rothermere to remark that the Conservative leaders seemed to think that it was less important to lose India than to lose an election (53). It must be noted, however, that Rothermere himself was willing to flirt with fascist forces as a

means of staving off the rising tide of communism, in Germany, and presumably in Britain as well (54). Rothermere's attitudes on India may have been tied up with his grander vision of a rearmed Britain ready to resist any invader, but there was at this time a complex meshing between sympathy for fascism and hostility to Indian reforms. Not all die-hards were inclined to support fascism, but there were a significant number of them who saw in the rise of fascism the mechanism by which the Empire might be preserved against erosion by socialist tendencies. Whereas socialism was anti-imperialist, fascism appeared to be promising a return to the old Empire, ruled by imperial fiat, with no quarter for nationalist flimflammery, and it was not surprising that die-hards on India should also have shown a predilection for the British Union of Fascists, which was advocating an Empire reincarnated.

It has been argued that there was no correlation between the die-hards and those favouring 'appeasement' (55). But appeasement related to making a deal with a potential enemy, while on India and the Empire the aims of the fascists in Britain and those of the die-hards coincided too well for there to be any divergence of opinion. India became, therefore, another ingredient in a strange mixture of complex and conflicting ideas on national, imperial and international issues.

The vociferous opposition of the die-hards was not entirely without effect, for, when the Joint Select Committee published its Report, it was evident that the Government had, in order to secure the greatest possible measure of support, yielded on certain contentious issues. Most notably, the Report recommended indirect elections, increased safeguards for protection of British trade, and more power of intervention to Governors. Although the die-hard members of the

Committee, Salisbury, Middleton, Rankeillour, Craddock and Nall, signed a separate Report advocating only provincial autonomy with safeguards, it was clear that the Majority Report itself was the product of pressures exerted by the die-hards during its long gestation. The Labour members of the Committee submitted their own minority Report, recommending that the new constitution should provide for the attainment of Dominion status by India without further recourse to the British Parliament, and with no special powers for the Governors and the Governor-General. Although this reflected the Indian nationalist view, the Government had reached a position from which they would not retreat to satisfy nationalist aspirations.

In fact, at this juncture, although the Government was keen not to do anything that might damage the chances of Indian acceptance of the Bill to be placed before Parliament, they appear to have decided that the Congress, at any rate, was not to be given too much importance. Thus, through the summer of 1934, mediators like C.F. Andrews and Agatha Harrison attempted to persuade the leaders that Gandhi was desirous of peace, and that the Government should make a conciliatory gesture, such as release of Congress prisoners, return of confiscated buildings and funds, and, if possible, meeting with Congress leaders (56). The Secretary of State for India, into whose India Office these doves of peace came proferring olive branches, remained unconvinced, while Baldwin politely declined to see Mirabehn altogether (57). Indeed, Baldwin appears to have decided that there was no use in talking to Gandhi (a move which had been advocated by Lloyd George also) as, in his opinion, Gandhi was an 'impossible person' to deal with and difficult to pin down (58).

If in one sense the Congress was the progenitor of the Indian reform proposals, it was obvious to the Government that in the

final version they fell so far short of Congress expectations that they would be rejected, leading to further difficulties in getting the Bill through an already reluctant Parliament. Indeed, so apprehensive was the Government that they had earlier decided to postpone elections in India lest Congress should come to power and wreck the reforms scheme by rejecting the Report.

The Congress did indeed reject the Report of the Joint Select Committee, and the consequent Bill that was introduced, and Gandhi declared that withdrawal of the Bill would be a blessing both for India and England (59). But the constitution-making process had acquired a momentum of its own, and the Government were determined not to let the opposition of either the Indians or of the die-hards halt the stately progress of this great constitutional beast which, its time come, was slowly moving towards the end. If in fact any opposition was noticed, it was that of the die-hards at home, and the distant muted voices of the Indians were lost in the plangent clamour in Britain. The adoption of the Majority Report did not deter the die-hards, and they decided to fight every line and every comma of the Bill at every stage of the Parliamentary process (60).

Looking for sources of strength, the die-hards turned once again to the Indian Princes whom they had so assiduously cultivated in the past. On 14 December 1934, the Morning Post published an article which suggested that the Government would be relieved if the Princes decided against joining the Federation. In a letter to Patiala, Gwynne, the editor of the Morning Post, declared that, if the Princes refused to join the Federation, the Government proposal to give responsibility at the centre could be defeated, and that the Princes must see 'that the introduction of a drab, uniform, vakil raj is going, in the long run, to destroy all that is fine and

beautiful in India' (62).

The Indian Princes were, naturally, very apprehensive about their fate under the proposed Federation, and probably their fears were increased by the gloomy forecasts of the die-hards. The result was that the Princes passed a resolution at a meeting in Bombay, stating that the Bill in the existing form was unacceptable to them. That there was collusion between the Princes and the die-hards is indicated by the fact that Churchill was able to quote from the speeches made at the Bombay meeting when he was addressing the House of Commons a few days later. The Bombay resolution caused consternation in London, but the Government decided to go ahead with the Bill, on the assumption that the Princes would 'tumble in due course' (63).

As the Bill progressed through Parliament, the debate did not lose its intensity, and in fact the India question came, briefly, to the forefront of British politics. The BBC arranged a series of broadcasts by persons representing various shades of opinion (64). In the Lords, peers who had never voted before, and even those who had not even been sworn in, came to vote, and to take the oath and participate (65).

Because of the tenacity with which the die-hards continued their fight, the Union of Britain and India, which had contemplated winding up its affairs soon after the publication of the Select Committee Report, had perforce to maintain its activities at a high pitch (66). It continued to publish its Bulletin, to hold meetings, and to keep its local Committees going (67). Functioning within the Conservative Party ideology, the Union of Britain and India performed the useful task of blunting the edge of die-hard criticism and in the process securing greater support for the Government's policies, not only among the Conservatives, but among people with no specific

Party allegiance.

Since the National Government was predominantly a Conservative one, the debate on India could only be conducted within the broad ideology of the Conservatives. What the debate revealed, however, was the existence of a sharp division between two groups in the Conservative Party, one which had a belief in, and was committed to, an evolutionist view of Indian constitutional reform, while the other saw every step towards Indian self-government as a step towards the ruin of the Empire. But it was this internecine conflict that shaped the India Bill, not the voices of Indian nationalists. Indian leaders might not have seen it as the most reactionary constitution that had yet been devised for perpetuating imperialist rule in India, as Rajani Palme Dutt described it (68). They might not have, as Birla suggested to Lothian, preferred the Act of 1919 to the new Bill, but clearly there was resentment that Indians were excluded from the shaping of the Act (69). The Government of India Act of 1935 was a compromise between opposing factions of British politicians, and not a compromise with Indians. Even as late as June 1935, a few weeks before the Act received the Royal Assent, Willingdon was refusing to consider a meeting with Gandhi, even though Zetland, the new Secretary of State, thought that such a meeting might improve the atmosphere (70).

Why did the focus of Indian politics shift from India to London? Although the announcement of the Statutory Commission which excluded Indians and the assertion that the British Parliament alone would formulate the necessary constitutional changes appeared to transfer the Indian problem to London, the consequent agitation, and the civil disobedience movement of 1930-31, did indicate a return of the initiative to India. Yet, when the final act emerged, in 1935, it came, not primarily as a response to Indian nationalist

demands, which it signally failed to meet, but as a product of conflicting forces in Britain. The initial impetus, it is true, came from the pressure exerted by the Indian nationalist movement. The need for reforms was conceded because of the increasing strength of the nationalist movement in India, which indicated that without further reforms India could not be retained within the Empire. There were contemporary observers (as there are modern historians) who argued that the reforms were a result of the evolutionary tendencies in British politics (71). Yet it can easily be argued that, had it not been for the nationalist movement, there was no need for any reforms. Imperial politics required collaborators, and collaborators can be secured only at a price. Although in the beginning a minimal share of the spoils of the Raj might have been sufficient to ensure the support of the new élites in India, the changes in Indian politics necessarily changed the price of collaboration. This was further complicated by the rising competition between British and Indian capital, a competition which made collaboration more necessary and more expensive.

By this argument, then, the political initiative should have remained with the Indian nationalists. It passed, nevertheless, into the hands of British rulers. The explanation for this lay in the fact that in the Nineteen Thirties Britain could not shake off the mantle of the imperial ruler to the extent that Indians were demanding. The independence of India was an image that contrasted harshly with the palimpsests of the past which created a picture of a permanent Raj slowly toiling to raise India from the abyss of barbarity, in which nationalists were obstacles to progress. The political stance of the Congress - complete independence - was the result of a rising tide of militancy, and it could retreat but little from that position. But this was an untenable proposition for the British.

In the end, therefore, the British had to ignore the Indians, moderates and extremists alike, and forge a new constitution that would go as far as possible to meet some Indian aspirations, without alienating the British public, or sections of it, and without sacrificing British economic interests.

But no constitution or commercial arrangement, however cleverly wrought, could benefit all British economic interests. While some sectors of the economy derived advantage from retaining India in the Empire, the price paid for securing that retention - fiscal autonomy for instance - adversely affected other sectors. The cotton textile industry was one of the 'victims' of new political and economic arrangements, and tried to secure special safeguards. It failed to do so because the Government was determined to carry through the reforms programme without let or hindrance, and to this end even managed to persuade the Manchester Chamber of Commerce to alter the evidence it had submitted to the Joint Select Committee (72). Indeed, some of the cotton traders believed that the Government was suppressing all dissent on the White Paper (73).

As already suggested, the difference in attitudes to Indian constitutional changes could partly be traced to the different economic interests of the various élite groups. The dominant groups, particularly the 'new' Tories, were able to overcome die-hard resistance albeit by making concessions. In this sense, it was die-hard pressure which gave the final shape to the India Bill of 1935 rather than Indian expectations. The Act was not a compromise between Indian nationalists and imperial rulers. It was rather a compromise between different sections of the British élite.

One reason for this was the necessity of presenting a united front to newly emerging social and political forces in British society. Already, as the India Act was being inscribed in the Statute

Book, the die-hards who had fought so passionately against it were informing their erstwhile opponents that the time had come to heal old wounds and be friends again, though they continued the India Defence League into the 1940s. Similarly, it may be argued, there was a feeling that the Indian nationalists also faced the threat of militancy from the masses, and would need to compromise with the imperial rulers.

The making of the 1935 Act showed, then, that, while the strength of Indian nationalism was implicitly acknowledged, the weaknesses were also recognized and taken advantage of. It also showed the divisions that were beginning to appear in Britain. The crumbling of the consensus on Empire which led to the bitter struggles between the die-hards and the Government and also to the exposition of a wider range of views on India, led also to compromise designed to resurrect the consensus. But later events were to show that the decay was irreversible, for the fundamental paradigm had begun to change.

There were several reasons for the change in the paradigm. The very intensity of the debate, and the activities of the various pressure groups, focused attention on India and subjected Indian affairs to close scrutiny, compelling a re-examination of the Indian question. Old notions and ideas did not completely disappear. But they were confronted by a new set of ideas,based on new perceptions of Indian nationalism. These ideas were espoused by eminent persons in Britain and thus proved to be influential. They did so partly because of an intellectual revulsion against the use of coercion. As Reginald Coupland put it (74):

> The idea of forcing our will, even with the best of intentions, on subjects who resist and resent it has somehow become distasteful to us.

The distaste arose perhaps not only from moral considerations but also from a realization that the use of coercive power abroad would ultimately lead to its use at home, as Harold Laski argued in India Today, the journal of the India League (75).

The result of such intellectual reorientation was a new structure of beliefs which made it possible to reduce the resistance to the idea of Indian constitutional reform. In the beginning, as the British Empire was being established in India, there was a great debate and much pamphleteering (76). In the process, the dominant imperial paradigm was created. In the end, as the imperial structures were shored up by constitutional compromises, the imperial paradigm gave way, if only partially, to a new paradigm.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1. Dietmar Rothermund, 'British Foreign Trade Policy in India during the Great Depression, 1929-1939', Indian Economic and Social History Review, 18 (1981), pp. 349-76

2. For details of this agreement, see B. Chatterji, 'Business and Politics in the 1930s: Lancashire and the Making of the Indo-British Trade Agreement, 1939', Modern Asian Studies, 15 (1981), pp. 527-73

3. Report of the British Cotton and Artificial Silk Industries Delegation to India (September/October 1933), copy in Atholl Papers, 4

4. The Times, 5 January 1934

5. Hoare to Willingdon, 23 February 1934, Templewood Papers, 4

6. Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George: A Diary, (ed. by A.J.P. Taylor), London, 1971, pp. 256-7 (entry for 21 February 1934)

7. H.A. Gwynne to Maharajah of Patiala, 15 February 1934, Gwynne Papers, 11. Gwynne added, 'I can guarantee the failure of the White Paper policy if your Highness and the Standing Committee [of the Chamber of Princes] pass a resolution rejecting Federation'

8. Gwynne to Patiala, 25 May 1934, Gwynne Papers, 11. Gwynne explained that Spencer Churchill was one of the 70 or 80 men in the world who could understand the Einstein theory, and,perhaps more significantly, that he was a cousin of the Duke of Westminster and the Duke of Marlborough.

9. Gwynne to Madhava Rao, 16 August 1934, Gwynne Papers, 10

10. Gwynne to Madhava Rao, 22 November 1934, Gwynne Papers, 10

11. Telegram, Secretary of State to Governor of Bombay, 8 March 1934, Brabourne Papers, 2. It was suggested to Lord Brabourne that he should discreetly get the Aga Khan to expose this intrigue.

12. Hoare to Willingdon, 16 February 1934, Templewood Papers, 4

13. R.A. Butler to Brabourne, 25 January 1934, Brabourne Papers, 20c

14. Note, 14 February 1934, on the political situation, enclosed with R.A. Butler to Brabourne, 15 February 1934, Brabourne Papers 20c

15. Sankey to MacDonald, 16 March 1934, MacDonald Papers, 680. Among the changes contemplated by Austen Chamberlain were a smaller chamber at the centre, and indirect elections.

16. Note recording Hoare's conversations with Austen Chamberlain on 11 April 1934, enclosed with Hoare to Baldwin, 12 April 1934, Baldwin Papers, 106, Cambridge University Library. See also Hoare to Willingdon, 13 April 1934, Templewood Papers, 4

17. Sapru to Lothian, 3 April 1934, Lothian Papers, 174, Scottish Record Office.

18. Hoare to Willingdon, 1 February 1934, Templewood Papers, 4. Telegram, Secretary of State to Governor of Bombay, 15 May 1934, Brabourne Papers, 2

19. Carl Bridge, 'Conservatism and Indian Reform (1929-1939): Towards a Prerequisite Model in Imperial Constitution Making', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 4 (1976), pp. 176-93

20. See letter to the Editor of The Times, 14 March 1934, from F.W.Pethick Lawrence, Francis Younghusband, Allen of Hurtwood, Dorothea Layton, A. Maude Royden, Frances Stewart, Tissington Tatlow, Hewlett Johnson, Carl Heath, Dickinson, Alfred E. Garvie, G.P. Gooch, W.E.S. Holland, A.W. Davies.

21. Churchill to Page Croft, 19 January 1934, Croft Papers, 1/8, about candidature of Roger Keyes at Portsmouth. The Times, 19 April 1934, regarding the Liberal candidate at Basingstoke by-election. The Times, 22 June 1934, about the Twickenham by-election.

22. Speech by Oswald Mosley, reported in The Times, 9 April 1934

23. R.A. Butler to Brabourne, 25 January 1934, Brabourne Papers, 20c

24. For correspondence on this subject, during April 1933, see Gwynne Papers, 8 (c). Gwynne thought that the fund might amount to £14,000, but discovered that it totalled only £4,000.

25. W.P. Crozier, Off the Record: Political Interviews, 1933-1943, (ed. A.J.P. Taylor), London, 1973, p. 25. (interview, 12 June 1934, with Baldwin.)

26. Daily Mail, India Blue Book, London, 1934

27. Thomas Jones, A Diary with Letters, London, 1954, p. 29, (entry of 27 February 1932)

28. See Rajat and Ratna Ray, 'Zamindars and Jotedars: A Study of Rural Politics in Bengal', Modern Asian Studies, 9 (1975), pp. 81-102; D. Hardiman, Peasant Nationalists of Gujerat, Kheda District, 1917-1934, Delhi, 1981; Bipan Chandra, 'The Indian Capitalist Class and Imperialism before 1947', Journal of Contemporary Asia (Sweden), 5 (1975), pp. 309-26; B. Chatterji, 'Business and Politics in the 1930s'; A.D. Gordon, 'Businessmen and Politics in a Developing Colonial Economy: Bombay City, 1918-1933' in Clive Dewey and A.G. Hopkins (eds.),

The Imperial Impact: Studies in the Economic History of Africa and India, London, 1978, pp. 194-215

29. See I.A. Talbot, 'Deserted Collaborators: The Political Background to the Rise and Fall of the Punjab Unionist Party, 1923-1947', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 11 (1982), pp. 73-93

30. List of members of the India Defence League taken from the Indian Empire Review, April 1934, Vol. 3, No. 4. Directorships from Directory of Directors, 1934. The special relationship between the tea planters and the die-hards was also reflected in the special low rate (rupees five) of subscription offered to tea planters, the only category so favoured. The Indian tea industry was affected by a crisis in the Thirties and the sterling interests tried to meet it by regulation of production and export. See Percival Griffiths, The History of the Indian Tea Industry, London, 1967, Chapter 15. Interestingly the tea plantations were run by a 'covenanted service', which was almost totally European, and it is likely that the die-hards thought that a nationalist Government would end European dominance of the plantations. Ironically, as Griffiths points out, as late as December 1960, there were only 38.85% Indians in the covenanted posts.

31. See B.R. Tomlinson, 'Foreign Private Investment in India, 1920-1950', Modern Asian Studies, 1 (1978), pp. 655-77

32. Eric Hayward to Duchess of Atholl, 3 January 1935, Atholl Papers, 4

33. Gillian Peele, 'Revolt over India', in Gillian Peele and Chris Cook (eds.), The Politics of Reappraisal, 1918-1939, London, 1975, pp. 114-145

34. Carl Bridge, 'Conservatism and Indian Reform'

35. Indian Empire Society, 'Facts' (1932), copy in Thompson Papers, 53

36. Hamish Blair, India: the Eleventh Hour, (Preface by Ian Colvin), London, 1934, pp. i-iv, 135. The book was a collection of articles by Blair which had appeared in the Saturday Review, a right-wing periodical owned by Lady Houston, one of the chief supporters of the India Defence League

37. Saturday Review, 16 June 1934, p. 693

38. Page Croft to the Archbishop of Canterbury (Cosmo Lang), 27 April 1934, Croft Papers, 1/15. See also, The Times, 30 April 1934

39. Archbishop of Canterbury to Page Croft, 28 April 1934, Croft Papers, 1/15

40. Reported in The Times, 3 May 1934. This statement was, according to the report, greeted with cheers.

41. The Times, 11 May 1934

42. The Times, 14 May 1934

43. J.P. Thompson to Lord Brabourne, 1 May 1934, Thompson to E.I.D Gordon, 2 February 1934, Thompson Papers, 49

44. Thompson to Brabourne, 8 August 1934, Thompson Papers, 49

45. Hugh Tinker, 'The India Conciliation Group, 1931-1950: Dilemmas of the Mediator', Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 14 (1976), pp. 224-41

46. See the various leaflets in Thompson Papers, 53

47. The Times, 9 May 1934

48. Speech to the Royal Empire Society annual meeting, reported in The Times , 24 May 1934. The Royal Empire Society did change its name to the 'Royal Commonwealth Society' in May 1958.

49. The Times, 3 May 1934

50. Note by Walter Lawrence, Lawrence Papers, 111

51. Memorandum by Owen Tweedy, recording conversation with Sir Lionel Haworth, 28 February 1935, India Office Records, L/I/1/53-16/10. Interestingly, not only did Sir Lionel display sympathy for the fascist movement in Britain, but showed strains of anti-semitism by blaming the ruin of India on the two 'jews', Montagu and Reading.

52. Alfred Knox to Page Croft, 6 October 1934, Croft Papers, 1/15

53. Rothermere to Page Croft, 28 October 1934, Croft Papers, 1/17

54. Paul Addison, 'Patriotism under Pressure: Lord Rothermere and British Foreign Policy', in Gillian Peele and Chris Cook (eds.), The Politics of Reappraisal, 1918-1939, London, 1975, pp. 189-207

55. Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill, London, 1972 (Fontana edn.), pp. 242-3

56. Agatha Harrison to Lord Brabourne, 2 June 1934, C.F. Andrews to Brabourne, 9 October 1934, Brabourne Papers, 17 (B). Ramsay MacDonald to Hoare, 5 November 1934, MacDonald Papers, 680

57. Hoare to MacDonald, 7 November 1934, MacDonald Papers, 680. See also correspondence between Mirabehn (Madeline Slade) and Baldwin, September-October 1934, in Baldwin Papers, 106.

58. See W.P. Crozier, Off the Record, p. 25 (interview with Baldwin, 12 June 1934). See also Thomas Jones, Diary with Letters, p. 139 (entry for 17 November 1934, recording conversation with Baldwin).

59. M.K. Gandhi to Carl Heath, 3 January 1935, copy in Lansbury Papers, 24.

60. J.P. Thompson to Selwyn Fremantle, 7 January 1935, Thompson Papers, 49. Martin Gilbert, Winston Churchill, Vol. V., London, 1976

61. Morning Post, 14 December 1934. Hoare thought that this article, which appeared just before a scheduled meeting of the ministers of Indian Princely States, was an attempt by the die-hards to wreck the reforms. See Hoare to Brabourne, 14 December 1934, Brabourne Papers, 2

62. Gwynne to Patiala, 26 December 1934, Gwynne Papers, 11

63. R.A. Butler to Brabourne, 8 March 1935, Brabourne Papers, 20a. Butler to Brabourne, 15 March 1935, loc. cit., indicated that the King was so annoyed by the action of the Princes that he proposed to stop his princely ADCs from coming to London for the Jubilee celebrations. See also, telegram, Secretary of State to Governor of Bombay, 25 February 1935, Templewood Papers, 7

64. Those who spoke on the radio included Attlee, George Schuster, Lord Lloyd, Lady Layton, J.P. Thompson, C.F. Andrews, Winston Churchill, Simon and Hoare. Agatha Harrison and Frances Stewart regretted the fact that no Indians were included among the speakers,and the latter suggested that at least recordings should be made in India and then broadcast. See Agatha Harrison to George Lansbury, 7 December 1934, Lansbury Papers, 24, and Frances Stewart to MacDonald, 2 January 1935, MacDonald Papers, 682.

65. Hoare to Willingdon, 18 December 1934, Templewood Papers, 4

66. R.A. Butler to Brabourne, 20 December 1934, Brabourne Papers, 20b. Lord Bingley to J.P. Thompson, 19 December 1934, Thompson Papers, 49

67. A note in Thompson Papers, 51, indicates that,up to 23 May 1935, speakers from the Union of Britain and India addressed 326 meetings, and that till July 1935 45 issues of the Bulletin were published.

68. R. Palme Dutt, 'The Meaning of the Indian Constitutional Proposals', Typescript Article, Dutt Papers, Cup. 1262.k.4., British Library.

69. See Lothian to MacDonald, 27 June 1935, MacDonald Papers, 681

70. Zetland to Willingdon, 28 June 1935, Willingdon to Zetland, 13 July 1935, Zetland Papers, 6

71. See R. Coupland, The Empire in These Days: An Interpretation, London, 1935. R.J. Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity, 1917-1940, Oxford, 1974

72. This led to a privilege motion by Winston Churchill which he lost. But see Carl Bridge 'Churchill, Hoare, Derby, and the Committee of Privileges, April to June 1934', Historical Journal, 22 (1979), pp. 215-27

73. See for example Sydney Wilks (Secretary of the Cotton Trade League) to Duchess of Atholl, 22 November 1934, Atholl Papers, 4

74. R. Coupland, The Empire in These Days: An Interpretation, London, 1935, p. 112

75. India Today, 2 (February 1936), pp. 12-13

76. See F.D. Van Aalst, 'The British View of India, 1750 to 1785' Ph.D. Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1970

## 7: Conclusion

This study of British attitudes to Indian nationalism between 1922 and 1935 was an attempt to answer three basic questions. What were the attitudes of the British public to expressions of Indian nationalism during this period? What was the economic, social, political and intellectual context of these attitudes? Finally, what was the relationship between these attitudes and imperial policy?

The British public was not a homogeneous entity which reacted monolithically to Indian events. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that different groups in British society held different attitudes towards India and Indian nationalism. Admittedly, no attempt was made in this study to correlate statistically the attitudes with the various social groups. Nevertheless, it is clear that there were marked variations in the way in which different sections of British society perceived, and reacted to, Indian nationalism.

Who were the people in Britain who took, individually or collectively, an interest in India and expressed opinions on Indian events? And what prompted their interest? Some were ardent supporters of the British Empire, and they inevitably saw India as a natural focus of their imperialism. Former Indian civilians and retired military officers with cherished memories of the Raj were, as might be

expected, prominent among those who became actively involved with Indian affairs. Businessmen with economic interests in India constituted another such group. Others, like missionaries and intellectuals, were driven by more complex reasons to take a close look at the British connection with India. Significantly, however, the great majority of those who displayed an overt interest in India appear to have belonged to the middle and upper classes of Britain.

Possibly, this conclusion, that India was essentially a middle and upper class preoccupation, might be a result of the narrow focus of this study. The sources used, and the questions raised initially, might have set artificial limits, and thus led to an arguably false conclusion. If working class activities had been probed more deeply, it might be argued, a greater awareness about Indian politics among British workers might have been revealed. But there is little manifest evidence of the existence of such awareness, except for an occasional and transient interest in India sparked off by incidents like Gandhi's visit to Lancashire. Undoubtedly, the Labour Party and the Trades Union Congress closely monitored Indian politics, and often expressed carefully formulated opinions upon Indian affairs. There is no indication, however, that the interest shown by the higher echelons of these organizations percolated down to the grassroots.

What were the reasons for the British worker's apparent indifference to the Raj? There were pamphlets,and articles in newspapers like the Daily Herald and the Daily Worker, which attempted to present the British worker with alternative views of the Empire. But they do not appear to have stirred British workers to rage against imperialism. This did not mean, however, that the British working class had been successfully and totally incorporated into the imperialist system through a social imperialist mechanism (1). If they had been, they

might have more explicitly supported the Empire. Indeed, traditionally, British workers were ambivalent towards the Empire (2). Such ambivalence might have stemmed partly from the differing perceptions of the Empire as seen by different fractions of the working class. This ambivalence could perhaps have been erased by imperialist propaganda. There is little evidence to suggest that in the Twenties and Thirties any such attempt was made overtly and explicitly to enlist the active support of British workers to defend the Empire.

There were, no doubt, newspapers like the Daily Mail and the Daily Express which were suffused by an imperialist ideology, and constantly tried to whip up a perfervid imperialism. But these were aimed more at the petit-bourgeoisie than at the workers, although they might have also attracted some of the more affluent workers.

The medium which perhaps helped most to inculcate an imperialist ethos among workers was cinema. It was in fact because of this that political censorship of films was resorted to so that anti-imperialist sentiments could not be disseminated through them. But even films could only secure a passive acceptance of the Empire.

British workers and their organizations were probably too involved with domestic economic affairs to be concerned by the problems of distant colonies (3). And, it might be that the dialectical tensions generated by different perceptions of imperialism also contributed to the apparent apathy to questions of imperialism and nationalism.

But then, indifference to imperial affairs and to India was not characteristic only of the working class. Between the wars, British society as a whole evinced little interest in imperial questions, being more preoccupied with domestic issues. Although India had been usually considered the most vital element in the British Empire, it seldom caught the attention of the British public. Even Parliament,

charged with the ultimate responsibility for India's administration, rarely displayed more than perfunctory interest. As India began to shuffle off the coils of Empire, however, British interest in Indian affairs quickened.

The period between the cessation of the non-co-operation movement and the Government of India Act of 1935 was a period of rapid political change in India. The metamorphosis of the Indian nationalist movement, triggered by the First World War and its effects, gathered momentum and a new more aggressive nationalism was born. This new militancy captured sections of Indian society which had hitherto remained outside the political arena and British imperialism found itself challenged by a fiercer and more widespread nationalism. These developments did not mean that the older, more moderate forms of Indian nationalism were completely extinguished. They lingered on, albeit in an attenuated state. The predominant form of Indian nationalism was, however, radical and extremist. British responses - constitutional reforms and commercial concessions - were designed to ensnare and tame this new and seemingly protean beast. But these very measures appeared, on the contrary, to be destroying the web of Empire in India.

At a time when Britain faced crises at home and abroad, the apparent crumbling of the Raj seemed to be even more threatening. Very naturally, Indian politics stimulated British interest in India to a degree not reached perhaps since the 'mutiny' of 1857.

Books, pamphlets, and articles on Indian subjects appeared in prolix profusion. Intense and passionate debates were conducted on Indian questions. Pressure groups emerged and attempted to mould official policy. Thus, despite the general preoccupation with domestic issues, the spectre of a vanishing Empire spurred, it would seem, a

new interest in India.

This study of expressions of British opinion on India shows that, though there was a wide range of attitudes towards Indian nationalism and India (the two were necessarily related), essentially three main ideas dominated the currents of thought in Britain.

At one extreme was the idea, held by a tiny minority, that imperialism was inherently exploitative, and hence that British domination of India should be terminated immediately. The Marxist overtones of this idea meant that its proponents viewed Indian nationalists also with hostility, since, in their eyes, the nationalists were partners in the imperialist exploitation of India, and therefore as guilty as the imperial rulers.

At the other extreme there was the notion that the British Empire in India was immutable, and that the British presence in India was necessarily permanent, since Indians were deemed incapable of ever being able to govern themselves efficiently. This too was a minority view, also complemented by an intense hostility towards Indian nationalists.

The radical Left, with its intense anti-imperialism, and the extreme Right, with its veneration of the Empire, thus shared an apparently common dislike of the Indian nationalist. Both considered the nationalists to be a minority which, if given power, would exploit the Indian masses. But the similarity of attitudes was superficial. Beneath the surface, there was a fundamental divergence.

The radical Left looked forward to a revolutionary transformation of Indian society in which the imperialist rulers and their bourgeois collaborators would both be overthrown. The extreme Right, on the other hand, envisaged a permanent Raj in which the British would hold the balance between Princes and peasants, having extinguished the

nationalist.

But the image of the nationalist as a member of an exploitative urban élite was one of the most potent weapons in the armoury of the imperialist ideologue. The fact that some elements of the radical Left agreed with such a formulation tended to reinforce the image. The anti-imperialism of the Left lost some of its force because of this. It introduced an inevitable ambivalence into the struggle of the Left against British imperialism. They could not, for ideological reasons, espouse the cause of the Indian nationalists, although by doing so they would have hastened the dismantling of the British Empire. But not all the anti-imperialists were hostile to the nationalist leaders. In fact, the majority of them were inclined to see the nationalists as a progressive group which ought to be supported, and thus came close to what might be called the median view.

The predominant idea, which with minor variations coloured most British thought on India, conceded the necessity of political reforms and economic concessions, and envisaged the evolution of India into a self-governing Dominion. In any society, extreme viewpoints are usually held by small minorities, while the majority tend to congregate towards the middle of the spectrum of attitudes and beliefs. This was true also of British attitudes towards Indian nationalism. Nevertheless, the predominance of one set of ideas did not mean that the views of the majority were harmonized. Despite general agreement on tendencies and principles, there was fierce controversy over the mechanics and the degree of devolution in India. In part, this controversy was stimulated by pressure from the peripheries of the ideological spectrum, and also by the very range of ideas on India that were thrown up during this period.

This controversy revolved around two crucial questions. Firstly, was India ready for self-government? And, secondly, to which

elements of Indian society should power be given? The answers to these questions were determined by British perceptions about the nature of Indian society and the character of the Indian nationalist movement. These perceptions were influenced by attitudes which constituted an internal paradigm or model. Images of India that reinforced this internal model were easily accepted, while those that tended to weaken the paradigm were rejected. The parallels with the African experience of European observers are striking and significant. Philip Curtin has pointed out how the British image of Africa differed from the African reality (4).

> ...reporters went to Africa knowing the reports of their predecessors and the theoretical conclusions already drawn from them. They were therefore sensitive to data that seemed to confirm their European preconceptions, and they were insensitive to contradictory data. Their reports were thus passed through a double set of positive and negative filters, and filtered once more as they were assimilated in Britain. Data that did not fit the existing image were most often simply ignored. As a result, British thought about Africa responded very weakly to new data of any kind.

Curtin did not link the European'Africaanschaung', as he called it, to imperialism. But, given the resonances between the Indian and African cases, it can be argued that the preconceptions and the distortions that flowed from them were consequences of the imperialist need to 'incorporate' subject people and also to create an imperialist mystique for home.

As in Africa, so in India too, images were formed within a closed, self-sustaining intellectual system which repelled new images. Moreover, attitudes which are shaped by received images and in turn act as filters, are resistant to change. There could be slow shifts in the paradigm, but the accumulation of powerful alternative images that could secure a really significant shift was inhibited by control of the transmission of images and ideas inimical to Empire. The possi-

bilities of changing the paradigm were therefore very slight.

The predominant paradigm about India was one which had been inherited from the past, from a time when imperialism sought to justify itself and therefore created an image of a backward India that needed the civilizing influence of the British. The implicit assumption of the racial and cultural superiority of the European, the notion that Indians were effete, corrupt and inefficient, the concept of martial races, and the idea that Indian society was degenerate because of an excessive sexuality, were all part of this structure of beliefs that became the paradigm which conditioned perceptions of India.

This paradigm was generated by the mythology of an expansionist imperialism. As imperialist structures began to be buffeted by the rising tide of nationalism, the paradigm was reinforced by reiteration of the old myths. The Twenties and Thirties saw the resurrection of old images of India. If their function in the past had been the justification of imperialism, they were now defensive statements, justifying the permanence of Empire and legitimizing the continuation of British rule over India. But these were not 'new' ideas or images: they were merely old images refurbished and reproduced. This constant reiteration prevented change.

Besides, for those whose experience of the Empire and India was in an imperialist high noon, any change was anathema. Ruth Lee, who travelled through India with her husband, Lord Lee of Fareham who was the chairman of the Royal Commission on the Indian Civil Services, described one encounter with Rudyard Kipling, who gave her the impression of being as prejudiced against any new developments in India as 'any old "Qui Hai"' (5). That was in 1931. There was a permanence of illusion, as it were, which inhibited change. It was within such a reinforced paradigm, for instance, that the Simon Commission operated.

Its members carried with them a set of notions about India which had been inherited from the past, and it was inevitable that they should have found little to alter their preconceptions to any significant extent.

The reinforcement of the predominant paradigm became all the more necessary as Indian nationalism became more militant and thus more threatening. Although it was often dismissed as an irrelevant irritant, Indian nationalism and its concrete manifestations in the form of agitation and political unrest could not but be perceived as a threat to the permanence of the Raj. It became necessary, therefore, to attack Indian nationalism, and this attack came from two directions.

Since India remained a sphere of darkness which even the effulgent imperial sun could not penetrate to any significant degree, the argument ran, the demands of the nationalists for self-government were untenable. India had to remain under British tutelage. Secondly, the nationalists were, it was argued, a small urban minority hungry for political power which they would only abuse to exploit the rural masses. The minority and potentially oppressive character of the nationalists was further emphasized by stressing that they were 'Hindu' and not Indian. The idea that India was not a nation and that it never could be proved enduring, but it was now given a religious colour as well. Not only was a distinction drawn between the 'Hindu' nationalist and the loyal Muslim, but the 'Hindu' nationalist was cast also as the oppressor of the low caste rural masses.

The attack on the nationalists meshed closely with the recurrent notion that India was and would remain primarily an agricultural country (6). The question of whether imperialism inhibits or advances colonial industrial development has in recent times generated an

intense historiographic controversy (7). It is particularly interesting therefore that the idea of India remaining an agricultural country producing raw materials for the metropolis and consuming its manufactured goods should have been enunciated so often. This is not being offered as proof of any theory of imperialism as the progenitor of underdevelopment; it is, nonetheless, suggestive, since it reflects an underlying attitude that India must serve the economic interests of Britain. There was also a resonance between this attitude and the notion entertained by some elements in Britain who visualized a permanent Empire in India consisting of Princes and peasants living amicably under the imperial sun.

That such scenarios were sketched out by right-wing Conservative groups, and in particular by the Morning Post, is significant in this context. On the one hand, Indian Princes and landlords were seen as conservative elements who would neutralize the radicalism of the nationalists. On the other hand, there was also a natural affinity at work here. Suggestively, the keenest British supporters of the Indian feudal elements were those who could be termed the 'old' Conservatives. They were mostly members of the rural squirearchy, and the India Defence League, which was dominated by them, was one of the chief defenders of the interests of the Indian Princes. In addition, they also cast themselves as protectors of the Indian peasantry against the urban nationalist. They represented therefore one strand in British thought on India which visualized an India preserved as a feudal society.

Bill Warren has argued that the apparent 'preservation' of pre-capitalist modes of production was due to uneven development of capitalism, and that, in the long run, imperialism was a liberating force, as Marx had prognosticated (8). The focus of this study has

been, however, on intentions and preconceptions rather than final decisions and end results. It is therefore interesting that an influential group in Britain should have desired the preservation of a feudal order in India, and that this group reflected the assumptions and ethos of an older Conservatism. This also indicates that,just as the British 'public' was not monolithic in its attitudes towards India, so too were British economic interests differentiated into several distinct strands.

This was because of the complex contradictions of imperialism. Although Britain would have benefited in one sense from 'preserving' the Indian economy in a feudal or semi-feudal state, it was necessary also to raise the productive capacities of India, even if it were only to raise consumption of the industrial produce of the metropolis. This would have, in turn, created the conditions for further economic development. The growing strength of the Indian capitalists meant that in some sectors at least they began to compete with foreign entrepreneurs. This contradiction was partly resolved through a wary alliance with Indian nationalists (9). The protectionist policies engendered by this union did not always defend the Indian entrepreneur. Various multinationals merely set up local subsidiary operations and remained blithely oblivious of the hard edge of nationalist economic policies (10). Essentially, although the 'old' industries like textiles suffered because of tariff policies, the 'new' industries like chemicals could overcome the barriers by the fairly simple expedient of local manufacture. It must be noted, however, that they too required the pax britannica to prosper, for only a colonial Government would have given them sufficient guarantees against nationalist expropriation or allowed them to repatriate profits without hindrance. Nevertheless, they were perhaps more willing to make

compromises with the Indian nationalist movement than other sections of the British economy. It can be argued that decolonization might have been resisted with greater vigour if there had been the need to exercise a rigid control over India's economy. If business could be carried on as usual, what need colonies in the traditional sense? The suggestion here is that the willingness of some British economic interests to accept the devolution of some power to Indians facilitated political change, and allowed also the growth of alternative structures of beliefs about India.

Such structures were gradually created by individuals and groups which tended to question received notions about imperialism and Britain's role in India. A new paradigm of perceptions slowly came into existence, one in which Indian nationalism was perceived as a progressive force, and the leadership was seen as being capable of ameliorating the condition of the masses. The creation of this alternative paradigm made change more likely and less painful.

What were the roots of such anti-imperialist ideas? Britain had a tradition of anti-imperialism and in the Twenties this tradition appears to have surfaced again. The period after the First World War was in any case a time of intellectual flux. New ideas and new ways of looking at the world had begun to exert their influence on people everywhere, and not least in Britain. From Relativity to Marxism, from psychoanalysis to philosophy, a new intellectual ferment led to reformulation of old ideas and to questioning of traditional assumptions. New attitudes towards India and Indian nationalism can be placed in this intellectual context.

It can also be argued that the rising militancy of Indians and the consequent use of increasing repressive force by the British forced a re-examination of old attitudes. Particularly for Christian groups,

the use of the coercive power of the State must have seemed abhorrent, and a contradiction of the original concept of the Empire as a vehicle for the dissemination of Christianity. To some Christians the Indian nationalists might have seemed to be too 'Hindu' to be given power which they might use to oppress the various minorities and the 'scheduled castes'. But imperialism rampant could have appeared even less attractive.

The events in India also obviously had their repercussions on British attitudes. The civil disobedience movement, for example, demonstrated the falsity of the traditional notion of the nationalist spirit being confined to the towns and the cities. Similarly, the radicalization of the Congress, manifested in the formation of the Congress Socialist Party, might have introduced a sense of urgency into British political circles. The earlier a compromise could be forged in India, the more moderate the leadership that would have and hold power, according to one calculation.

The struggle in Britain over the Indian question, then, had several components, one of which was the conflict between alternative structures of belief. The distinction between the two sets of ideas was not clear and precise, and even within each paradigm there were constantly shifting perceptions. It can be said, however, that, just as imperialism in its expansionist phase produced an imperialist mythology, it was accompanied in a period of decline by the emergence of a new and antithetical set of beliefs.

It would be difficult to establish a causal relationship between ideas and the expansion of empires. But ideas favouring and encouraging such expansion did arise and created attitudes supportive of imperialism which made the riveting of imperial rule more acceptable to the subject people as well as to the people of the dominant country.

Similarly, while it cannot be argued that critics of the Empire brought about decolonization, it would appear that they and their ideas facilitated the process of imperial retreat.

Some social psychologists have argued that there is no relationship between attitudes and behaviour (11). But the problem is perhaps one of measurement, for the relationship cannot be determined with any degree of precision. It is possible to argue that, as attitudes condition the way in which an object or a situation is perceived, they influence the responses of an individual or of a State. The relationship is perhaps too complex to be analysed accurately but that it exists can be inferred, if not measured. In fact it was, in the case of India, a self-sustaining relationship. British attitudes which constituted the traditional paradigm influenced the way in which the Indian problem was perceived, and these perceptions in turn conditioned imperial responses to Indian affairs.

Attitudes, then, set the mental boundaries within which imperial decision-makers functioned. The parameters of their policies were determined, in the sense of exerting pressure and influence, by the predominant structure of beliefs. This would seem to suggest that public opinion as expressed through pressure groups would have exerted no significant influence. Indeed, some scholars have argued that there was little concrete empirical evidence to correlate public opinion and public policy (12).

But it was partly the expectation of influencing and altering official policy that led to the emergence of pressure groups which proliferated during the great debate on Indian policy. Pressure groups often serve to reinforce the beliefs and attitudes of their members by providing a more intense focus and by creating an intellectual milieu in which such attitudes are inevitably sharpened. They could

also facilitate attitude change by providing alternative foci, and by advancing new paradigms of perception. Fundamentally, however, pressure groups are formed in order to exert influence on the decision-makers in power. The groups that emerged in the Thirties, during the discussions on India, were the products of such expectations. Some of these, like the India Defence League, were defenders of the Empire and hoped to stop the retreat of the Raj. Others, like the Union of Britain and India, represented within the predominant paradigm the elements who hoped quickly to forge a compromise in India and thus secure the continuance of British economic interests. Others, like the India Conciliation Group and the India League, tried to create alternative structures of belief. But, as Hugh Tinker has pointed out, apropos of the India Conciliation Group, the groups sympathetic to Indian nationalism were faced with a dilemma: on the one hand they were trying to espouse the cause of a subject people and had to adopt their values and modes of thought, while on the other hand, in order that their efforts might succeed, they had to 'accept the rules of the game as laid down by the powerholders, and by pressing for small concessions, here and there,...achieve small ameliorations' (13).

In other words, pressure groups necessarily had to function within the predominant paradigm. But they could act as sources of new ideas about the colonial people, and thus help to alter the paradigm. It was perhaps this aspect of the activities of pressure groups that caused concern to the Government, compelling them to monitor pressure group activities, and even attempt to undermine their influence. The Government also attempted to mould public opinion. It supported, for instance, organizations like the Union of Britain and India, which would reinforce the propaganda of the State. Or, as in the case of the India League, the Government tried to prevent the dissemination of

alternative images inimical to Empire.

There is also some evidence to suggest that on a few occasions the State reacted explicitly to public opinion, as for example over the Irwin Declaration of October 1929 which was in effect recanted, or as in the incorporation of 'safeguards' into the Government of India Act of 1935. Reflecting as it did the dominant ideology, the State had to mould policy and opinion to obtain the closest possible correspondence between them. The rise of contrapuntal themes and ideas made the task of the State more difficult perhaps, and thus made it necessary for the State to take them also into consideration.

Imperialism is a complex matrix of interacting elements such as domestic and international economies, political structures, and ideologies. Attitudes and opinions, which are a part of the ideological element, might not have determined the precise nature of imperial policy, but they did set the limits of action and drew the boundaries of thought within which the chief actors could formulate their policies.

In this sense, British attitudes to Indian nationalism made certain policies more likely than others. Other, more material, factors were no doubt responsible for determining the fundamental character of imperial policy, but the structure of beliefs that existed at the time shaped the contours of that policy in significant ways. Similarly, the alternative images of India that were projected by many sympathetic individuals and groups helped to create a new climate of opinion which, it may be said, prepared the path for a peaceful transition. Alternative ideas did not entirely extinguish the dominant ideology. In the nature of things, they could not have, since the predominant paradigm had an intrinsic inertia which resisted change. Nevertheless, they contributed to the process of dismantling, however slowly, the

imperialist structure of beliefs which was nurtured by, and in turn reinforced for so long, the British Empire.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

1. For a discussion of 'social imperialism', see Geoff Eley, 'Defining social imperialism: use and abuse of an idea', Social History, 1, (1976), pp. 265-90. See also Bernard Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial Thought, 1895-1914, London, 1960, and Avner Offer, 'Empire and Social Reform: British Overseas Investment and Domestic Politics, 1908-1914', Historical Journal, 26 (1983), pp. 119-38

2. Several illustrations of such ambivalence can be found in Richard Price, An Imperial War and the British Working Class: Working Class Attitudes and Reaction to the Boer War 1899-1902, London, 1972

3. See Alan J. Mackenzie, 'British Marxists and the Empire - Anti-Imperialist Theory and Practice, 1920-45', Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1979; and Stuart Mcintyre, 'British Labour, Marxism and Working Class Apathy in the Nineteen Twenties', Historical Journal, 20 (1977), pp. 479-96.

4. Philip Curtin, The Image of Africa: British Ideas and Action, 1780-1850, London, 1965, p. 479

5. Ruth Lee's diary entry for 10 September 1931, in Alan Clark (ed.), 'A Good Innings': The Private Papers of Viscount Lee of Fareham, London, 1974, p. 308

6. For example, see the Report on the Conditions and Prospects of British Trade in India at the Close of the War, Cmd.442 of 1919.

7. The most recent discussion of this question with particular reference to India is in Dharma Kumar and Meghnad Desai (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of India, Volume 2, c.1757-c.1970, Cambridge, 1983, especially pp. 3-35, 553-676 and 947. See also D.K. Fieldhouse, 'The Imperial Impact' (review of the above volume), Times Literary Supplement, 10 June 1983, pp. 597-8

8. Bill Warren, Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism (ed. John Sender), London, 1980, pp. 152-6

9. See Claude Markovits, 'Indian Business and the Congress Provincial Governments, 1937-39', Modern Asian Studies, 15 (1981), pp. 487-526. See also Bipan Chandra, 'The Indian Capitalist Class and Imperialism before 1947', Journal of Contemporary Asia, 5 (1975), pp. 309-26

10. D.K. Fieldhouse, 'Decolonization and the Multinational Company: Unilever in India, 1917-65', in Paul Bairoch and Maurice Lévy-Leboyer (eds.), Disparities in Economic Development since the Industrial Revolution, London and Basingstoke, 1981, pp. 58-64. B.R. Tomlinson, 'Foreign Private Investment in India, 1920-1950', Modern Asian Studies, 12 (1978). pp. 655-78

11. See J.M.F. Jaspars, 'The Nature and Measurement of Attitudes', in Henri Tajfel and Colin Fraser (eds.), Introducing Social Psychology, Harmondsworth, 1978, pp. 256-76

12. See Lee Benson, 'An Approach to the Scientific Study of Past Public Opinion', in Robert O. Carlson (ed.), Communications and Public Opinion: A 'Public Opinion Quarterly' Reader, New York, 1975, pp. 541-86

13. Hugh Tinker, 'The India Conciliation Group, 1931-50: Dilemmas of the Mediator', Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 14 (1976), pp. 224-41

# B I B L I O G R A P H Y

## I. PRIVATE PAPERS


| | |
|---|---|
| Atholl Papers | Papers of Katherine Marjory, Duchess of Atholl, India Office Library, Mss Eur. D.903 |
| Baldwin Papers | Papers of Sir Stanley Baldwin, 1st Earl of Bewdley, Cambridge University Library |
| Beaverbrook Papers | Papers of Max Aitken, 1st Baron Beaverbrook, House of Lords Record Office |
| Birkennead Papers | Papers of Frederick Edwin Smith, 1st Earl of Birkenhead, India Office Library, Mss Eur. D.703 |
| Brabourne Papers | Papers of Michael Herbert Rudolph Knatchbull, 5th Baron Brabourne, India Office Library, Mss. Eur. F.97 |
| Butler Papers | Papers of Sir Spencer Harcourt Butler, India Office Library, Mss Eur. F.116 |
| Crewe Papers | Papers of Robert Offley Ashburton Crewe-Milnes, 1st Marquess of Crewe, Cambridge University Library |
| Croft Papers | Papers of Sir Henry Page Croft, 1st Baron Croft, Churchill College Archives, Cambridge |
| Dawson Papers | Papers of Geoffrey Dawson, Bodleian Library |
| Palme Dutt Papers | Papers of Rajani Palme Dutt, British Library, Cup. 1262 K.1/6 |
| Foster Papers | Papers of Sir William Foster, India Office Library, Mss Eur.E. 242 |
| Gordon-Walker Papers | Papers of Patrick Gordon Walker, Baron Gordon-Walker, Churchill College Archives, Cambridge |
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| Gwynne Papers | Papers of H.A. Gwynne, Bodleian Library |
| Hailey Papers | Papers of Sir Malcolm Hailey, 1st Baron Hailey, India Office Library, Mss Eur. E.220 |
| Halifax Papers | Papers of Edward Wood, 1st Earl Halifax, India Office Library, Mss Eur. C.152 |
| Harrison Papers | Papers of Agatha Harrison, Society of Friends Library, London |
| Keith Papers | Papers of Arthur Berriedale Keith, Edinburgh University Library |
| Lansbury Papers | Papers of George Lansbury, British Library of Political and Economic Science, London |
| Law Papers | Papers of Andrew Bonar Law, House of Lords Record Office |
| Lawrence Papers | Papers of Sir Walter Roper Lawrence, India Office Library, Mss Eur. F. 143 |
| Lloyd George Papers | Papers of David Lloyd George, 1st Earl of Dwyfor, House of Lords Record Office |
| Lothian Papers | Papers of Philip Henry Kerr, 11th Marquess of Lothian, Scottish Record Office, G.D. 40/17 |
| Lytton Papers | Papers of Victor Alexander George Robert Lytton, 2nd Earl of Lytton, India Office Library, Mss Eur.F. 160 |
| MacDonald Papers | Papers of Ramsay MacDonald, Public Record Office, PRO 30/69 |
| Meston Papers | Papers of James Scorgie Meston, 1st Baron Meston, India Office Library, Mss Eur. F. 136 |
| Noel-Baker Papers | Papers of Philip John Noel-Baker, Baron Noel-Baker, Churchill College Archives, Cambridge |
| Passfield Papers | Papers of Sidney James Webb, 1st Baron Passfield, British Library of Political and Economic Science |

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|---|---|
| Reading Papers | Papers of Rufus Daniel Isaacs, 1st Marquess of Reading, India Office Library, Mss Eur. E.238; F.118 |
| Samuel Papers | Papers of Herbert Louis Samuel, 1st Viscount Samuel, House of Lords Record Office |
| Sankey Papers | Papers of John Sankey, 1st Viscount Sankey: Bodleian Library |
| Seton Papers | Papers of Sir Malcolm Cotter Cariston Seton: India Office Library, Mss Eur. E.267 |
| Simon Papers | Papers of John Allsebrook Simon, 1st Viscount Simon: Bodleian Library |
| Stansgate Papers | Papers of William Wedgwood Benn, 1st Viscount Stansgate: House of Lords Record Office |
| Stewart Papers | Papers of Sir Samuel Findlater Stewart, India Office Library, Mss Eur. D.890 |
| Stopford Papers | Papers of Robert Jemmett Stopford: India Office Library, Mss Eur. E.346 |
| Stuart Papers | Papers of Sir Louis Stuart: Bodleian Library |
| Swinton Papers | Papers of Philip Cunliffe-Lister, 1st Earl of Swinton: Churchill College Archives, Cambridge |
| Sykes Papers | Papers of Major-General Sir Frederick Hugh Sykes: India Office Library, Mss Eur. F.150 |
| Templewood Papers | Papers of Samuel John Gurney Hoare, 1st Viscount Templewood: India Office Library, Mss Eur. E.240 |
| Thompson Papers | Papers of Sir John Perronet Thompson: India Office Library, Mss Eur. F.137 |
| Willingdon Papers | Papers of Freeman Freeman-Thomas, 1st Marquess of Willingdon: India Office Library, Mss Eur. F.93 |

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|---|---|
| WILPF Papers | Papers of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom: British Library of Political and Economic Science |
| Zetland Papers | Papers of Lawrence John Lumley Dundas, 2nd Marquess of Zetland: India Office Library, Mss Eur. D.609 |

## II. OFFICIAL RECORDS

1. India Office Records:
   a. Home Proceedings, Political and Judicial
   b. Information Department Files
   c. Private Office Files

2. National Archives of India:
   a. Home Political Files.

3. Public Record Office:
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House of Commons
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Edinburgh Review
Fortnightly Review
India Today
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## BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

These brief notes provide additional information on some of the persons mentioned in the text or in the references. Only selected details have been given. The main sources used were: Who was Who, the Dictionary of National Biography, the India Office List, The Times, the 'Dictionary of Quaker Biography' (typescript, Friends House Library), the Indian Yearbook, and Who's Who.

The following abbreviations have been used:

C. - Conservative;

L. - Liberal;

Lab. - Labour.

ABERDEEN and TEMAIR, Ishbel Maria, Marchioness of (1857-1939). President of the International Council of Women, 1893-99, 1904-36.

AGA KHAN (III), Sultan Sir Mohamed Shah (1877-1957). Head of Ismaili Muslims. Member of the Viceroy's Council 1902-4. Chairman of the British India Delegation to the Round Table Conferences, 1930-1

AINSCOUGH, Thomas Martland (1886-1976). Senior British Trade Commissioner in India, Burma and Ceylon, 1918-44

AIYAR, Sir Pazhamarneri Sundaram Sivaswamy (1864-1946). Indian Liberal. Member of the Legislative Assembly, 1920-3, 1924-6. Member, Indian Reforms Enquiry (Muddiman) Committee, 1924.

ALEXANDER, Horace Gundry.(1889- . Quaker. Lecturer in International Relations, and later Director of Studies, Woodbrooke College, 1919-44. Publications include The Indian Ferment, 1929

ALLEN of HURTWOOD, 1st Baron (1889-1939), Reginald Clifford Allen. Socialist and Pacifist. Chairman, Independent Labour Party, 1922-6. Director, Daily Herald, 1925-30

ANDERSON, Frederick (1884-1961). Indian Service of Engineers, 1905-37. Chief Engineer, UP, 1931-7. Chief Engineer, Bahawalpur, 1937-44

ARCHBOLD, William Arthur Jobson (1865-1947). Principal, Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College, Aligarh, 1905-9. Principal, Dacca College, 1909-18. Principal, Muir Central College, Allahabad, 1918-20

ATHOLL, Duchess of (Katherine Marjory) (d. 1960). MP (U) Kinross and West Perth, 1923-38. Parl. Secretary, Board of Education, 1924-9

AUBREY, Melbourn Evans (1885-1957). General Secretary of the Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland, 1925-51

BAILEY, Vernon Gerald (1903-72). Quaker. Secretary and later Director National Peace Council 1930-49. Member, India Conciliation Group

BARNES, Sir Hugh Shakespear (1853-1940). ICS, 1874- , Resident, Kashmir, 1894. Foreign Secretary, Government of India, 1900-3. Lt. Governor, Burma, 1903-5. Member, Council of India, 1905-13. Chairman, Imperial Bank of Iran, 1916-37. Director of Anglo-Persian Oil Company and several other companies.

BASU, Bhupendranath (1859-1924). President, Indian National Congress, Madras, 1914. Member, Bengal Legislative Council, Imperial Legislative Council, Member, Council of India,1917-23. Member, Royal Commission on the Civil Services, 1923

BAYLEY, Sir Charles Stuart (1854-1935). ICS, 1877-1915. Resident Hyderabad, 1905; Lt. Governor E. Bengal and Assam, 1912, Bihar and Orissa, 1912-15. Member, Council of India, 1915-24

BELL, George Kennedy Allen (1883-1958). Dean of Canterbury, 1924-9. Bishop of Chichester, 1929-58

BENNETT, Ernest Nathaniel (d. 1947). MP (L) Woodstock, Oxon, 1906-10. MP (Lab), Central Cardiff, 1929-31, (Nat.Lab.), 1931-45. Asst. Postmaster-General, 1932-5. Member, Indian Franchise Committee, 1932

BIRDWOOD, Field Marshal William Riddell, 1st Baron Birdwood (1865-1951). Secretary, Government of India, Army Dept., 1912-14. Commander-in-Chief, India, 1925-30

BLACKETT, Sir Basil Phillott (1882-1935). Secretary, Indian Finance and Currency Commission, 1913-14. Finance Member, Government of India, 1922-8. Director of Bank of England, Imperial and International Communications Ltd., De Beers Ltd., and several cable companies.

BLUNT, Wilfrid Scawen (1840-1922). Traveller, writer. In India 1883-84. Publications include Ideas about India, 1885; India under Ripon, 1909

BOWER, Sir Graham John (1848-1933). Royal Navy 1861-1884. Colonial Secretary Mauritius, 1898-1910

BRABOURNE, 5th Baron. Michael Herbert Rudolph Knatchbull (1895-1939). MP (U) Ashford, Kent, 1931-3. Parl. Pvt. Secretary to the Secretary of State for India, 1932-3. Governor, Bombay, 1933-7; Bengal 1937-9

BROCKWAY, Archibald Fenner, Baron Brockway (1888- . Joint Secretary, British Committee of the Indian National Congress, 1919. General Secretary Independent Labour Party 1928, 1933-9. MP East Leyton, 1929-31; Eton and Slough, 1950-64. Publications include: The Indian Crisis, 1930

BURDWAN, Maharajah of. Sir Bijay Chand Mahtab (1881-1941). Member, Executive Council, Bengal, 1919-24. Member, Indian Reforms (Muddiman) Enquiry Committee, 1924. Member, UBI

BURNHAM, 1st Viscount Harry Lawson Webster Lawson (1862-1933). MP (U) 1885-1904, 1910-16; Member, Indian Statutory Commission, 1927-30. President, Birkbeck College 1929-

BUTLER, Sir Spencer Harcourt (1869-1938). ICS. Governor, United Provinces, 1921-3; Burma, 1923-7. Chairman, Indian States Committee, 1928. Publications include India Insistent, 1931

BUXTON, Charles Roden (1875-1942). MP (L) Ashburton Devon, 1910; (Lab) Accrington, 1922-3, Elland, Yorkshire 1929-31. Treasurer, Independent Labour Party, 1924-7

CADOGAN, Sir Edward Cecil George (1880-1962). MP (U) Reading, 1922-3, Finchley, 1924-35, Bolton, 1940-5. Member, Indian Statutory Commission; Joint Select Committee.1933-4. Publications include: The India We Saw, 1933

CANDLER, Edmund (1874-1926). Writer. Director of Publicity, Government of Punjab, 1920-1. Publications include: Abdication, 1922

CHANCELLOR, Lt. Col. Sir John Robert (1870-1952). Governor, Southern Rhodesia, 1923-8; High Commissioner, Palestine, 1928-31. Vice-President of the Royal Empire Society. Director of several companies

CHETTY, Sir Shanmukham (1892-1953). Member of the Indian Legislative Assembly, 1924-34, President, 1933-4

CHETWODE, Field Marshal Philip Walhouse. 1st Baron Chetwode (1869-1950). Chief of General Staff India, 1928-30. C-in-C India 1930-5

CHURCHILL, Captain Edward George Spencer (1876-1964). Grenadier Guards, 1899. Served Boer War, First World War. Contested (U) Derby, 1906, Tynemouth, 1910

CLIFTON-BROWN, Edward Clifton (1870-1944). Banker. Director, Westminster Bank, Standard Bank of South Africa, Royal Exchange Assurance

COBB, Henry Venn (1864-1949). ICS, 1885-1920. Resident, Kashmir, 1914-15, Mysore (and Chief Commissioner Coorg), 1916-20.

COLVIN, Ian Duncan (1877-1938). Journalist. With the Pioneer, Allahabad, 1903-7. With the Morning Post from 1909. Publications include: Life of General Dyer, 1929

COTTON, Sir Harry Evan Auguste (1868-1939). Barrister in Calcutta. MP (L), 1918. President, Bengal Legislative Council, 1922-5

COUCHMAN, Malcolm Edward (1869-1938). ICS, 1893-1926 . Served in Madras. First Member, Board of Revenue, 1922-6

COUPLAND, Sir Reginald (1854-1952). Beit Professor of History of the British Empire, Oxford, 1920-48. Editor, Round Table, 1917-19, 1939-41. Member, Royal Commission on the Superior Civil Services in India, 1923. Publications include The Empire in these Days, 1935

COURTNEY, Dame Kathleen (D'Olier) (1878-1974). Hon. Sec. National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies, 1911-14. Member, Executive Committee of the League of Nations Union, 1928-39. Chairman, United Nations Association,1949-51

CRADDOCK, Sir Reginald Henry (1864-1937). ICS, 1884-1923. Served in the Central Provinces. Chief Commissioner, 1907-12. Home Member, Government of India, 1912-17. Lt. Governor, Burma, 1917-22. Member, Royal Commission on the Superior Civil Services in India, 1923. MP, Combined English Universities, 1931-7. Publications include: The Dilemma in India, 1929

CRAIK, Sir Henry (1846-1927). MP, Universities of Glasgow and Aberdeen, 1906-27. Visited India, 1907-8. Publications include: Impressions of India, 1908

CREWE, 1st Marquess. Robert Offley Ashburton Crewe-Milne (1858-1945). Secretary of State for India, 1910-15. President, Board of Education, 1916. Ambassador, Paris, 1922-8. Secretary of State for War, 1931

CROFT, Brig. Gen. Henry Page, 1st Baron Croft (1881-1947). MP (C), Christ Church, 1910-18; Bournemouth, 1918-40. Chairman, Executive of Empire Industries Association. Publications include: The Path of Empire, 1912; My Life of Strife

CROMER, 2nd Earl. Rowland Thomas Baring (1877-1953). Managing Director, Baring Bros. Director, P&O, BI Steam Navigation Co., Suez Canal Co. Chief of Staff to Duke of Connaught during visit to India, 1920-1, to Prince of Wales during visit to India 1920-2

CURZON, Charles Edward (d. 1954). Bishop of Stepney, 1928-36

DAVIES, Arthur Whitcliffe (d. 1966). Principal, St. John's College, Agra, 1913-28. Canon of Lucknow, 1917-29. General Secretary, Church Assembly Missionary Council, 1930-5. Dean of Worcester, 1934-49

DAWSON, Geoffrey (1874-1944). Editor, The Times, 1912-19, 1923-41. Private Secretary to Lord Milner in South Africa, 1901-5. Member of the Round Table Group.

DONALDSON, Frederic Lewis (1860-1953). Christian Socialist. Canon of Westminster, 1924-51. Member, Council of Industrial Christian Fellowship, 1920-44

DONALDSON, St Clair George Alfred (1863-1935). Bishop of Salisbury, 1921-35. Chairman, Missionary Council, Church Assembly, 1921-33

DUFFERIN, 4th Marquess. Basil Sheridan Hamilton Temple-Blackwood (1909-45). Member , Indian Franchise Committee, 1932. PPS to Lord Lothian, 1932

DUKE, Sir Frederick William (1863-1924). ICS 1882-1914. Member, Council of India, 1914-19. Under-Secretary of State for India, 1920

DUTT, Rajani Palme (1896-1974). Member, Executive Committee, Communist Party of Great Britain, 1922-65. Editor, Labour Monthly, 1921- Daily Worker, 1936-8. Publications include: Modern India, 1927

ELIOTT LOCKHART, Sir Allan Robert (1905-1977). With Gladstone Lyall & Co., Calcutta, 1926-58. Chairman, Calcutta Branch of the European Association, 1937-9. MLC, Bengal, 1931-7. Leader of the 'Royalists' (a ginger group of the European Association).

FISHER, Herbert Albert Laurens (1865-1940). Historian. MP (N.L.), Hallam, Sheffield, 1916-18, English Universities, 1918-26. President, Board of Education, 1916-22. Member, Royal Commission on Public Services of India, 1912-15.

FLEMING, Lt. Col. John Murchison. Indian Army, Asst. Surveyor-General, Survey of India, 1902-11

FOSTER, Sir William (1863-1951). Registrar and Superintendent of Records, India Office, 1907-23. Historiographer, 1923-7. President, Hakluyt Society, 1928-45. Publications include:The English Factories in India

FREEMAN, Peter (1888-1956). MP (Lab) Brecon and Radnor, 1929-31, Newport, 1945-56. Theosophist. Publications include: Our Duty to India

FREMANTLE, Sir Selwyn Howe (1869-1942). ICS, 1890-1925. Served in the United Provinces. Member of the Board of Revenue, 1921-5. Member, UBI Council

FROOM, Sir Arthur Henry (1873-1964). Partner, Mackinnon, Mackenzie & Co., Bombay, 1916-30. Member, Council of State, India, 1921-30. Member, Reforms Enquiry (Muddiman) Committee, 1924. Indian Central Committee, 1928-9

FRY, Joan Mary (1862-1955). Quaker. Took special interest in problems of Welsh miners. Member, India Conciliation Group.

FULLER, Sir Bampfylde (1854-1935). ICS 1873-1906. Chief Commissioner, Assam, 1902-5. Lt. Governor, Eastern Bengal and Assam, 1905. Publications include: Studies in Indian Life and Sentiment, 1910, The Empire in India, 1913

GARRATT, Geoffrey Theodore (1888-1942). ICS 1913-23. Served in Bombay. Publications include The Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India, 1934 (with E.P. Thompson)

GARVIE, Alfred Ernest (1861-1945). Principal of Hackney and New College, 1924-33. Moderator of the Federal Council of Free Churches, 1928

GARVIN, James Louis (d. 1947). Editor of the Observer, 1908-42

GLADSTONE, Henry Neville. 1st Baron Gladstone (1852-1935). Businessman. Senior Partner of Ogilvy, Gillanders & Co., London, and Gillanders, Arbuthnot & Co., Calcutta. In Calcutta 1874-89. Member, Royal Commission on Indian Finance and Currency, 1913

GOOCH, George Peabody (1873-1968). Historian. MP (L) Bath, 1906-10. Editor, Contemporary Review, 1911-60

GORDON-WALKER, 1st Baron. Patrick Chrestien Gordon Walker (1907-1980). Tutor, Christ Church, Oxford, 1931-40. MP (Lab) Smethwick, 1945-64, Leyton, 1966-74. Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 1950-1, Foreign Affairs, 1964-5, Education and Science, 1967-8

GORELL, 3rd Baron. Ronald Gorell Barnes (1884-1963). Editorial Staff, The Times, 1910-15. Under-Secretary of State for Air, 1921-2 Joined Labour Party, 1924. Considered for Viceroyalty, 1930. Editor, Cornhill Magazine, 1933-9

GOSCHEN, 2nd Viscount. George Joachim Goschen (1866-1952). MP (C), East Grinstead, 1895-1906. Governor, Madras, 1924-9. Acting Viceroy, 1929. President, UBI. Banker. Businessman.

GRANT, Sir Alfred Hamilton (1872-1937). ICS, 1895- Chief Commissioner, North West Frontier Province, 1919-21. Director of Anglo-Huronian Ltd., Associated Mining and Finance Co., Northern Rhodesia Co., General Cooperative Investment Trust Ltd.

GREENWAY, 1st Baron. Charles Greenway (1857-1934). Senior Partner, Shaw, Wallace & Co., Calcutta. In India, 1885-1908. President and founder of Anglo-Persian Oil Co.

GUPTA, Sir Krishna Govinda (1851-1926). ICS 1873-1907. Member, Council of India, 1907-15

GWYNNE, H.A. (1865-1950). Editor, Morning Post, 1911-37

HADEN-GUEST, Leslie Haden. 1st Baron Haden-Guest (1877-1960). MP (Lab) Southwark North 1923-7, Islington North, 1937-50. Publications include: India and the Labour Party

HAIG, Sir Harry Graham (1881-1956). ICS 1905-1939. Home Secretary, Government of India, 1926-30, Home Member, 1932-4. Governor, United Provinces, 1934-9

HAIGH, Mervyn George (1887-1962). Bishop of Coventry, 1931-42

HAILEY, Malcolm. 1st Baron Hailey (1872-1969). ICS 1895. Governor, Punjab,1924-8, United Provinces, 1928-30, 1931-4

HARRISON, Agatha Mary (1885-1954). Quaker. Member, National Committee, YWCA China, 1921-4. Visited India in 1929 as personal assistant to Beryl Power (member of the Royal Commission on Labour in India), Secretary of the India Conciliation Group, 1931-50

HARTSHORN, Vernon (1872-1931). MP (Lab), Ogmore, 1918-31. President, South Wales Miners' Federation. Member of the Indian Statutory Commission

HEATH, Carl (1869-1950). Quaker. Secretary, National Peace Council, 1909-14? Chairman, India Conciliation Group, 1931-50.

HEWETT, Sir John Prescott (1854-1941). Bengal Civil Service, 1877. Home Secretary, Government of India, 1894-1902. Lt. Governor, United Provinces, 1907-12. MP (U) Luton, 1922-3

HILL, Sir Claude (1866-1934). ICS 1887-1920. Served in Bombay, Mewar and Hyderabad. Member, Viceroy's Executive Council, 1915-20. Publications include: India - Stepmother, 1929

HIRTZEL, Sir Arthur (1870-1937). India Office 1894. Permanent Under-Secretary of State for India, 1924-30. Author of The Church, the Empire and the World, 1919

HOLLAND, William Edward Sladen (1873-1951). CMS Missionary, India 1899-1933. Principal, Kottayam College, 1921-4, Union Christian College, Alwaye, 1924-8, St John's College, Agra, 1929-33. Member, India Conciliation Group.

HORNE, Sir Robert Stevenson, 1st Viscount Horne of Slamannan (1871-1940). MP (U) Glasgow Hillhead, 1918-37. Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1921. Director, Suez Canal Co., P&O Steam Navigation Co., Lloyd's Bank, Commercial Union Assurance Co.. Chairman, Burmah Corporation

HORTON, Robert Forman (1855-1934). Minister, Lyndhurst Road Church, Hampstead, 1880-1930

HOUGHTON, Bernard. ICS 1882-1912. Served in Madras and Burma

HOUSMAN, Laurence (1865-1959). Writer and artist. With the Manchester Guardian, 1895-1911. Pacifist. Became a Quaker in 1952

HOUSTON, Lady Lucy (d. 1936). Suffragist. Owner of the Saturday Review

HOWARD, Sir Esmé William. 1st Baron Howard of Penrith (1863-1939). Diplomat. Ambassador to Spain, 1919-24, USA, 1924-30

HUNTER, Sir John Mark Somers (1865-1932). Indian Educational Service 1899-1923. Professor of English, Madras Presidency College, 1912-18. Director of Public Instruction, Burma, 1918. Founder of Indian Empire Society.

JACKS, Lawrence Pearsall (1860-1955). Professor of Philosophy, Manchester College, Oxford, 1903-31. Editor, the Hibbert Journal 1902-47

JOHNSON, Hewlett (1874-1966). Dean of Manchester, 1924-31. Dean of Canterbury, 1931-63. Called the 'Red Dean' because of his strong support for Communism

JONES, Thomas Isaac Mardy (1881-1970). MP (Lab) Pontypridd, 1922-31

JOYNSON HICKS, William. 1st Viscount Brentford (1865-1932). MP (U) 1908-29. Visited India 1920 (to investigate Amritsar incidents). Defended Dyer in the House. Home Secretary, 1924-9

KEITH, Arthur Berriedale (1879-1944). Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology, Edinburgh, 1914- . Expert in Constitutional Law. Author of numerous books on Indian literature and Indian Constitution

KENNEDY, Bennet Christian Huntingdon Calcraft (1871-1935). ICS 1889-1926. Bombay Judicial Service. Wrote,under the pseudonym of 'Al. Carthill', A Lost Dominion, 1924, The Garden of Adonis, 1927

KENWORTHY, Lt. Cmdr. Joseph Montague. 10th Baron Strabolgi (1886-1953). MP (L) Central Hull, 1919-26; (Lab) 1926-31. Succeeded father 1934

KIRK, Paul Thomas Radford-Rowe (d. 1962). Founder and General Director, Industrial Christian Fellowship, 1918-54. Vicar, Christ Church, Westminster, 1922-53

KNOX, Major-General Sir Alfred William Fortescue (1870-1964). ADC to Curzon, 1899-1900, 1902-3. MP (C) Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, 1924-45

LAMINGTON, 2nd Baron (1860-1940). Charles Wallace Alexander Napier Cochrane Baillie. Governor of Bombay, 1903-7

LANSBURY, George (1859-1940). MP (Lab) Bow and Bromley 1910-12, 1922-40. First Commissioner, Works, 1929-31

LANE-FOX, George Richard. 1st Baron Bingley (1870-1947). MP (U) Barkaston Ash, West Riding, 1906-31. Secretary, Mines, 1922-4, 1924-8. Member, Indian Statutory Commission. Member UBI Council

LANG, Cosmo Gordon. 1st Baron Lang of Lambeth (1864-1945). Archbishop of York, 1908-28, Archbishop of Canterbury, 1928-42

LAWRENCE, Arabella Susan (1871-1947). MP (Lab) East Ham North, 1923-4, 1926-31. Chairman Labour Party, 1930

LAWRENCE, Sir Walter Roper (1857-1940). ICS 1877- Served in Bengal, Punjab and Rajputana. Private Secretary to Viceroy (Curzon) 1898-1903. Publications include The India we Served, 1928

LAYTON, 1st Baron (1884-1966). Walter Thomas Layton. Financial Adviser to the Simon Commission, 1929-30. Editor, The Economist, 1922-38

LEE of FAREHAM, 1st Viscount (1868-1947). Arthur Hamilton Lee. MP (C) Fareham Div. Hampshire 1900-18. First Lord of the Admiralty, 1921-2. Chairman, Royal Commission on the Public Services in India, 1923-4

LEWIS, Sir John Herbert (1858-1933). MP (L), Flint Boroughs, 1892-1906; Flintshire, 1906-18; Welsh Universities, 1918-22. Parliamentary Secretary, Board of Education, 1915-22

LEYS, Dr Norman Maclean (1875-1944). Colonial Medical Service, Kenya, 1905-13. Critic of imperialism

LIDGETT, John Scott (1854-1953). Warden, Bermondsey Settlement, 1891-1949. Joint Editor Contemporary Review, 1911- Vice-Chancellor, University of London, 1930-2

LINDSAY, Alexander Dunlop. 1st Baron Lindsay of Birker (1879-1952). Master of Balliol, 1924-49

LLOYD, 1st Baron (1879-1941). George Ambrose Lloyd. Governor of Bombay, 1918-23. MP (C) Eastbourne, 1924-5. Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1940-1

LOW, Sir Charles Ernest (1869-1941). ICS 1893-1922. Served in the Central Provinces. Secretary to the Government of India, Commerce and Industries Department, 1915- Member, Indian Industrial Commission, 1916-22

LYTTON, 2nd Earl of. Victor Alexander George Robert Lytton (1876-1947). Under-Secretary of State for India, 1920-22. Governor of Bengal, 1922-7

MACMUNN, Lt. Gen. Sir George Fletcher (1869-1952). Royal Artillery 1888-. Quartermaster-General, India, 1920-4. Wrote several books on India, including The Indian Mutiny in Perspective, 1931, Black Velvet (a novel), 1934

MALLET , Sir Charles Edward (1862-1947). MP (L) Plymouth, 1906-10. Secretary for Indian Students, India Office, 1912-16

MARRIS, Sir William Sinclair (1873-1945). ICS 1895- . Home Secretary, Government of India, 1919-21. Governor of Assam, 1921-2; United Provinces, 1922-8. Member, Council of India, 1928-9. Principal, Armstrong College, Newcastle on Tyne, 1929-37

MARVIN, Francis Sydney (1867-1943). Educationist and Positivist writer. Professor of Modern History, University of Egypt, 1929-30. Author of India and the West, 1927

MATHESON, Hilda. Head of 'Talks' Division, BBC, 1927-32

MAYNARD, Sir Herbert John (1865-1943). ICS 1883-1920. Served in Punjab. Financial Commissioner, Punjab, 1913-20. Contested (Lab) King's Lynn 1929, Stroud, and East Fulham, 1931

MAYO, Katherine (1868-1940). Writer. Publications include Mother India, 1927, Volume Two, 1931

McDOUGALL, Frank Lidgett (1884-1958). Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister of Australia and Imperial Economic Conferences, 1923, 1932. Economic Adviser to the Imperial Conferences of 1926, 1930 and 1937.

McGOWAN, Harry Duncan. 1st Baron McGowan (1874-1961). Founder of Imperial Chemical Industries and Chairman, 1930-1950

MESTON, 1st Baron. James Scorgie Meston (1865-1943). ICS 1885-1919. Lt.Governor United Provinces, 1912-18. Finance Member, Government of India, 1919

MINNEY, Rubleigh James (1895-1979). Journalist. Editorial Staff, Pioneer, Allahabad; The Englishman, Calcutta; Daily Express. Editor, Everybody's Weekly, 1925-35. Publications include Night Life of Calcutta, Shiva: or the Future of India.

MOND, Alfred Moritz. 1st Baron Melchett (1868-1930). MP (L) Chester 1906-10, Swansea 1910-23, Carmarthen 1924-8. Minister of Health 1921-2. Founder and Chairman of Imperial Chemical Industries, to 1930

MONTAGU of BEAULIEU, 2nd Baron. John Walter Edward Douglas Scott-Montagu (1866-1929). Adviser on Mechanical Transport to the Government of India, 1915-19

MORISON, John Lyle (1875-1952). Professor of History, Armstrong College, Newcastle on Tyne, 1922-40. Publications include Lawrence of Lucknow, The Eighth Lord Elgin and chapters in the Cambridge History of the British Empire

MORISON, Sir Theodore (1863-1936). Principal, Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College, Aligarh, 1899-1905. Member, Council of India, 1906-16

MUDDIMAN, Sir Alexander Phillips (1875-1928). ICS 1897. Served in Bihar and Bengal. Home Member, Government of India, 1924-7. Governor, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, 1927-8

MUDIE, Sir Robert Francis (1890-1976). ICS 1914- . Secretary to the Round Table Conference, 1930-1. Governor, Sind, 1946-7

NAIR, Sir Chettur Sankaran (1857-1934). Founder Editor Modern Review. President, Indian National Congress, 1897, Amraoti. Chairman, Indian Central Committee 1928. Member of the Governor General's Council, 1915-19. Member Council of India, 1920-1

NEVINSON, Henry Woodd (1856-1941). Journalist. Wrote for the Manchester Guardian, Daily Herald and Daily News, among others. Publications include The New Spirit in India, 1908 (written after visit to India, 1907-8)

NOEL-BAKER, 1st Baron (1889-1982). Philip John Noel-Baker. MP (Lab) Coventry, 1929-31, Derby 1936-50, Derby South 1950-70 . PPS to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1929-31. Ernest Cassel Professor of International Relations, London University, 1924-9

NORWOOD, Frederick William (d. 1958). Minister, The City Temple, London, 1919-36. Chairman, Congregational Union of England and Wales, 1930-1

O'DONNELL, Charles James (1850-1934). ICS 1870-1900. Served in Bengal. MP (L) Walworth, Newington, 1906-10. Publications include Why India is Rebellious, 1930

O'DWYER, Sir Michael Francis (1864-1940). ICS 1885-1919. Served in Hyderabad and Punjab. Lt. Governor Punjab, 1913-19. Publications include India as I Knew It, 1925

OLDHAM, Joseph Houldsworth (1874-1969). Secretary Student Christian Movement, 1896-7. YMCA Lahore 1897-1900. Secretary International Missionary Council, 1921-38

PARANJPYE, Sir Raghunath Purushottam (1876-1966). Indian Liberal. President, National Liberal Federation, Lucknow, 1924, Allahabad, 1939. Minister of Education, Bombay, 1921-3. Member, Council of India, 1927-32

PATIALA, Maharajah Bhupinder Singh (1891-1938). Succeeded father 1900. Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, 1926-30, 1933-5 and 1937-8

PATON, William (1886-1943). Missionary Secretary, Student Christian Movement, 1911-21. General Secretary, National Christian Council of India, Burmah and Ceylon, 1922-7. Secretary, International Missionary Council, 1927-43

PEEL, Sir Sidney Cornwallis (1870-1938) MP (C) Uxbridge, 1918-22. Member, Indian States Committee, 1927-9

PEMBER, Francis William (1862-1954). Warden, All Souls College, 1914-32. Vice-Chancellor, Oxford University, 1926-9

PETHICK-LAWRENCE, Frederick William. 1st Baron Pethick-Lawrence (1871-1961). MP (Lab) Leicester West 1923-31, Edinburgh East, 1935-45. Visited India, 1926. Member, Round Table Conference 1931. Secretary of State for India, 1945-7

PHILLIPS, Godfrey Edward (1878-1963). Missionary in India (Madras, Bangalore) 1901-26. Foreign Secretary, London Missionary Society 1926-36

POLE, David Graham (1877-1952). MP (Lab) Derbyshire South 1929-31. Chairman British Committee on Indian Affairs. Publications include I Refer to India, 1929, India in Transition, 1932

QUICK, Oliver Chase (1865-1944). Canon of St. Paul's, 1930-4

RATHBONE, Eleanor (d. 1946). Suffragette. MP (Ind) Combined English Universities, 1929-46. President of National Union for Equal Citizenship, 1919-29. Publications include Child Marriage: The Indian Minotaur, 1934

ROBINSON, Henry Wheeler (1872-1945). Baptist, Biblical Scholar. Principal Regent's Park College, London (and Oxford) 1920-42

ROYDEN, Agnes Maude (1876-1956). Involved in the women's movement, particularly with the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies, from 1908. Published several tracts with Christian themes and on women's rights. Missionary in India. Member India Conciliation Group.

RUTHERFORD, Vickerman Henzell (1860-1934). MP (L), Brentford Middlesex 1906-10. Contested Labour Sunderland 1920. Publications include Modern India, 1927

SANKEY, 1st Viscount. John Sankey (1866-1948). Lord Chancellor, 1929-35. Chairman of the Federal Structures Committee (Round Table Conference)

SAPRU, Sir Tej Bahadur (d. 1949). Indian Liberal. Law Member Government of India 1920-3

SETON, Sir Malcolm Cotter Cariston (1872-1940). India Office 1898-1933. Deputy Under-Secretary of State for India 1924-33. Chairman East India Association, 1934

SHAFI, Sir Muhammad (1869-1932). President Muslim League, 1913, 1927. Education Member, Government of India, 1919-22; Law Member, 1923-4

SHARP, Clifford Dyce (1883-1935), Editor, New Statesman, 1913-31

SKRINE, Francis Henry (1847-1933). Bengal Civil Service and ICS 1868-97. Commissioner, Chittagong Div. 1896-7. Publications include India's Hope, 1929

SLATER, Gilbert (1864-1938). Economist. Professor, Ruskin College, Oxford, 1909-15. Professor of Indian Economics, Madras, 1915-21. Member, Madras Legislative Council, 1921-2

SLESSER, Sir Henry (1883-1979). MP (Lab) SE Leeds, 1924-9. Solicitor-General, 1924

SMITH, Sir Henry Moncrieff (1873-1951). ICS 1897-1932. Secretary Legislative Department Government of India, 1921. Secretary, Legislative Assembly, 1921-4. President Council of State, 1924-32. Deputy Chairman Round Table Conference Consultative Committee, 1932

SOMERVELL, David Churchill (1885-1965). Assistant Master Tonbridge School 1919-50. Publications include: The British Empire, 1930

SPEAR, Edward Norman. CMS Missionary in India: Travancore 1926-30; Bezwada, 1934- . Vicar of St. Agnes, Burmantofts, 1932-4

SPENCER, Sir Charles Gordon (1869-1934). ICS 1888-1927. Puisne Judge Madras High Court. Escaped assassination attempt 1909

SPENDER, John Alfred (1862-1942). Editor, Westminster Gazette, 1896-1922. Author of several books,including Great Britain, the Empire and Commonwealth, 1886-1935, 1936

STEPHEN, John Sturge (1891-1954). Quaker. Lecturer in History, University of Birmingham, 1925-51. Active in the East-West Friendship Council, which worked to provide a friendly reception to Asian and African students.

STEWART, Lady Frances Jane (d. 1952). 2nd daughter of G.A. Hobart Hampden, ICS (1849-1874); wife (m. 1898) of Major General Sir Keith Stewart (1872-1955) who commanded the 19th Indian Infantry Brigade and the Delhi Independent Brigade Area, 1922-5. Lady Stewart spent twelve years in India. Was a member of the India Conciliation Group.

STEWART, Sir Samuel Findlater(1879-1960). India Office, 1903-Secretary to the Indian Statutory Commission, 1927-30; Permanent Under-Secretary of State for India, 1930-42

STOPFORD, Robert Jemmett (1895-1978). Private Secretary to the Chairman (Simon) of the Indian Statutory Commission 1928-30. Secretary to the Conservative Party Delegation to the Round Table Conferences, 1930-1

STUART, Sir Louis (1870-1949). ICS 1891-1930. Judicial Secretary to the Government of India, 1910-12. Puisne Judge Allahabad High Court 1922-5. Chief Judge, Oudh Chief Court, 1925-30. Honorary Secretary, Indian Empire Society. Editor, Indian Empire Review, 1932

SYDENHAM of Combe, 1st Baron (1848-1933). George Sydenham Clarke. Governor of Bombay, 1907-13. Vice-President, Royal Colonial Institute. Publications include My Working Life, 1927, Studies of an Imperialist, 1928

SYED, Sir Ali Imam (1869-1932). Law Member, Government of India, 1910-15. President of the Nizam's Executive Council, 1919

SYKES, Major-General Sir Frederick Hugh (d. 1954). MP (U), Hallam Sheffield, 1922-8. Governor, Bombay, 1928-33. MP (U) Central Nottingham, 1940-5. Chairman Royal Empire Society, 1938-41

TATLOW, Tissington (1876-1957). General Secretary, Student Christian Movement, 1898-1900, 1903-29; Chairman, 1929-33

TEMPLE, William (1881-1944). Bishop of Manchester, 1921-9. Archbishop of York, 1929-42. President, Workers' Educational Association, 1908-24

THOMPSON, Edward John(d. 1946). Missionary and writer. Taught in Bankura Christian College, 1910-22. Publications include: An Indian Day, 1927. The Other Side of the Medal, 1925; Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India, 1934 (with G.T. Garratt)

THOMPSON, Sir John Perronet (1873-1935). ICS 1896-1932. Chief Secretary Punjab 1916-21. Chief Commissioner Delhi 1928-32. Chairman Union of Britain and India

TURNER, Sir Ben (1863-1942). MP (Lab) Batley and Morley 1922-4, 1929-31. Secretary for Mines, 1929-30. Member of Labour Party Executive Committee.

WADDY, Percival Stacy (1875-1937). Secretary, Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, 1925-37

WEDGWOOD, Josiah Clement. 1st Baron Wedgwood (1872-1943). MP (L) Newcastle under Lyme, 1906-19; (Lab) 1919-42. Publications include Indo-British Commonwealth, 1922

WELLOCK, Wilfred (1879-1972). MP (Lab) Stourbridge, 1927-31. Publications include: India's Awakening

WILKINSON, Ellen Cicely (1891-1947). MP (Lab) Middlesbrough East 1924-31; Jarrow 1935-47. Minister of Home Security 1940-5. Minister of education, 1945-7. Led the India League Delegation to India, 1932

WILLIAMS, Garfield Hodder (1881-1960). Principal St. Andrew's College Gorakhpur 1914-18. Foreign Secretary, Church Missionary Society 1921-4. Secretary of the Missionary Council, Church Assembly 1924-9. Dean of Llandaff, 1929-31. Dean of Manchester 1931-48

WILSON, Cecil Henry (1862-1945). Christian Socialist. MP (Lab) Attercliff, Sheffield, 1922-31, 1935-44

WINGATE, Sir Ronald Evelyn Leslie (1889-1978). ICS 1912-39. Indian Political Service. Served in Kashmir, Rajputana, Baluchistan, Maskat

WOODS, Edward Sydney (1877-1953). Bishop of Croydon, 1930-7

YOUNG, Edward Hilton. 1st Baron Kennet (1879-1960). Financial Editor, Morning Post, 1911-15. MP (L) Norwich 1915-23, 1924-9; (C) Sevenoaks, 1929-35. Chairman, Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, 1926. Minister of Health, 1931-5

YOUNGHUSBAND, Sir Francis Edward (1863-1942). Indian Political Service 1890- . Resident Indore 1902-3, Commissioner to Tibet, 1902-4. Resident Kashmir 1906-9. Publications include Dawn in India, 1930. Member India Conciliation Group